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0SE
introduction fo ms $w m
The role of government* both state and mbional*..la the economic 
relations between labor and management has become one of major importance 
in recent years. M  the main* government regulation of industrial 
relations has been accepted as a desirable alternative to the evils of 
unrestricted warfare between Gzqployem m g  employees* Both the federal 
and many of the state governments are pursuing a policy today designed 
to promote industrial peace#
1# BAOK0B0UHB OF BEOJi&mtl
m e  role of government bodies in the industrial conflict has not 
always been as. Important as it is today#. In the early years of .American 
history* industrial conditions did not warrant extensive Intervention in 
the affairs of master and servant* Production of goods was carried out 
m  a highly decentralised basis# Ihe relationship between employer and 
-employee was etmmoteriaed by the presence of mutual interest#! the 
element of conflict in economic objectives was almost nan-existent. The 
majority of workers In this early stage of Industrial development were 
self^ is^ Xoyed* owning their own tools of production# Even those who were
alloyed by other craftsmen* the apprentices* could look forward to the
' * •£• ,
day when they too would become master craftsmen and enjoy the independence 
of self-^ en^ loya^ nt •
2the doctrine of conspiracy
In spite of the relatively harmonious relations between employers 
and employees in this early period* government regulation of industrial 
relations was not entirely absent# Associations of workers were organised 
in this societyj as these groups became more and more militant in their 
demands* striking for higher wages* the closed shop*'1' and asserting the 
right to organise* the judiciary felt impelled to check this activity#
This was accomplished by the application of the common law doctrine of 
conspiracy to the associations* Under the doctrine of criminal conspiracy* 
an act which is lawful when performed by an individual* may be unlawful 
when done in concert with others* In many of the early labor cases the 
doctrine of criminal conspiracy invoked by the courts was successful in 
stemming the rising tide of employee organisations*^  Even though this 
doctrine was sharply limited in the case of Commonwealth v. Hunt»
♦'criminal prosecution for conspiracy continued to be quite frequent until 
about 1890* and thereafter ceased to be of much importance only because 
injunctions had become the most usual form of action in labor disputes*'*^
Impact of the Industrial He volution on isovemment regulation
the conditions which existed in American Jndustry in the first
1 Peo^ Xe T* * * lv in 9  ^Wheeler 0* 0. (If. I.) 262* <1810).
2 Philadelphia Cordwainers Case, <1806.) •
3 4 Metcalf 111* (Mass** 1842).
^ Commons* 1* H«* and Andrews, J* B.* Principles of Labor 
Legislation, New York* Harpers* p# 102#
3' half of the nineteenth eetgtaugr m m  drastically changed when the 
Industrial Bevolution reached the United States.# With the advent 
of the factory system of production* the worker could no longer mm 
the tools 'with which he worked*. The tools in the factory system
■ were the machines* and few men could amass the capital necessary to
purchase them* Thus, two rather distinct glasses arose* On the one
hand was the capitalist and employer who owed and controlled the means
, of production^  and mat therefore able to offer employment* On the other
£-v,\-
hand was the formerly independent craftsmen* who now were forced to work 
for wages* is., the gulf widened between these’ two classes .in the indust* 
rial, society* it was' quite natural that conflicts between them sbouM 
arise* and as the factory system gained a firmer hold in the United 
States* these, conflicts m m  intensified*
B a  S a U s s M -
The prevailing philosophy at that time definitely favored the 
employer In this conflict* The last quarter of the nineteenth century 
" witnessed, however* the beginnings of strong unionism, in the form of the 
American Federation of labori this In spit© of the rather strong anti- 
union feeling in the country* A few- years before the. turn of the century*, 
the labor injunction became the principal, regulatory device of the state 
and rational government* and it was freely utilised by the courts to pro­
tect the rights of employera. fro® concerted activities by the.unions*
■ Organised labor sought relief from, the injunction as well as itm the 
Sherman Antitrust Act* which the courts had interpreted as applying to
labor,^  and roll of m & granted by Congress la the passage of the day* 
toa Act in 1914# *Sb& -Supreme 0aurt of the baited States, heaver, 
interpreted the Act in such a manner that- it ms rendered worthless 
insofar as protecting, organised labor m s ; concerned*-^  In-the 2 m $  
case, an Arisen© statute which closely adhered to the wording of the 
Clayton Act was declared ^ constitutional * ©ms, the early attespts of 
the. state and 'national legislatures to provide labor with a semblance of 
protection were overruled by the judicial branch of government*
Beimlation jn the depression yearp«
In 1932, however, Congress again enacted legislation designed to 
encourage and protect the unions* Ttm passage-in that year of the Horris~ 
laGuardia Act which curbed the use of injunctions in labor disputes, was 
more favorably received by the courts than ms the Clayton Act* State 
legislatures: also passed similar legislation, known as the "little Horris-* 
laCuardia Acts", and these tended to supplement the national law in the 
area of Intrastate commerce*
Positive regulation of the- rights of employers in the industrial 
.conflict mu achieved with the enactment in 1935 of the Wagner Act, which 
'defined certain unfair labor -practices which employers could not lawfully 
perform in dealing with employees, scad set up the national labor Halations 
Board to handle grievances arising under 'the Act, In '1937, the Bwprmm
5 teal. X* tSS&SE* 203 o. S, 274,. (1908).
6 _
„  ^ . _ , oc< . ,.. .  , 257.0. S- 312, q921)| M s  M * M m  r n &  ,
£s* x * 254 u . s . 443,  ( i9 2 i)j M te ^  m&gss, x« Ssaaaaga Sssl
S o., 259 0. 3. 344, (1922).
Court held the Wagner Act to be constitutional in a. series of four 
decisions handed' do*** on the ease day*? tous the role of the- national 
government to the regulation of industrial relations was vastly ex­
panded*
toe state governments had long been active to enacting frag­
mentary legislation designed to regulate industrial relations* When 
the constitutionality of the Wfegner Act m i  assured* several of the 
states passed their m m  labor relations acts*^ toes© were modeled after 
the national law for the most part* although those passed from 1939 on 
to the present time have tended to place m m  restriction on the rights
t
of labor than did the Wagner Act* Several of these laws* for exaisple* 
define certain practices which are unlawful when performed by labor* 
to addition to the eiployer unfair labor practices*
HafrJas §m m&m jm&sMm si MashuM*
' Itetog the years of World. War XX# the Wagner Act remained the law 
of the land* Government regulation of industrial relations was consider­
ably extended* however*, to meet the need for uninterrupted production of 
war goods* the War labor Board was formed to facilitate production* 
labor gave up the right to strike to return for maintenance of membership 
agreements# and other concessions were granted by both employers and the 
unions to achieve the objectives of the war effort* this was m  era of
7 MUMS v. Jones and ImmMAw Steel Corp.. 301 U, S. lj <1937)I 
Press v, MLRB. 3CE U, S. 103, (1937)| SU£8 v.
Maries ClothlPK Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 615; | M §  1- I^ehauf .Trailer 
&$»« Ct. 642.
® Colorado, 1943; Connecticut, 1945; Massachusetts, 1937, Michigan, 
1939J Minnesota, 1939; Sew loric, 1937; Pennsylvania, 1937; Shod® Island, 
1945; Utah, 1937; Wisconsin, 1937.
&uncommon cooperation between the two disputants# but the cooperation 
was not entirely voluntary since it was enforced by the Board and the 
War Labor Disputes Act*
It mm perhaps inevitable that a wave of stride© should follow 
the cessation of hostilities* Reconversion was constantly interrupted 
by work stoppages* As a result, public syxqmthy with the program of 
organized labor waned considerably, and a strong demand for restrictive 
regulation of labor unions became apparent* , This demand was translated 
into action by Congress with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 
194?* The salient features of this act are well-knovmj it defines un­
fair practice© by labor, outlaw the secondary boycott and the closed, 
©hop, and requires periodic reports fro® union organizations* in short, 
the Act places many restrictions on the activities of labor which were 
allowable under the original Wagner Act of 1935* It is the culmination 
of federal regulation of industrial relations to the present time* fkm  
Taft-Hartley Act, has been severely criticised by the leaders of organ* 
ized labor* As a result of the Democratic victories in November, 1943, 
it was felt that this law would be repealed, but present trends in Son** 
gress indicate that this is highly unlikely, at least until after 1950* 
As shall- be shown subsequently, the states have also followed the trend 
toward restrictive labor legislation in the postwar era*
II* THE PBOBXSH
t t* *
-■ * r
The preceding cursory examination of the background of regulatory
V I . #
action by governmental bodies in the United States-in the field of
uncommon cooperation between labor spd management, but the cooperation 
was not entirely voluntary since it was enforced by the Board and the 
War labor disputes Act,
It was perhaps inevitable that a wave of strikes should follow 
the cessation of hostilities* Reconversion was constantly interrupted 
by work stoppages. As a result, public sympathy with the program of 
organised labor waned considerably, and a strong demand for restrictive 
regulation of labor unions became apparent* this demand was translated 
into action by Congress with the passage of the Taft^Bariley Act in 1947# 
The salient features of this act are weH-knownj it defines unfair 
practices by labor, outlaws the secondary boycott, the closed shop and 
the jurisdictional strikej it requires periodic reports from labor organic 
nations and non^eommunist affidavits from union leaders. In shorty the 
Act places many restrictions on the activities of labor which were aliens 
able under the original Wagner Act of 1935* It is the culmination of 
federal regulation of labor relations to the present time* The Taft# 
Hartley Act, has been severely criticised by the leaders of organised 
labor* As a result of the Democratic victories in November, 194B, it 
was felt that this law would be repealed, but present trends in Congress 
indicate that this is hl#iy unlikely, at least until after 1950* As 
shall be shown subsequently, the states have also followed the trend 
toward, restrictive labor legislation in the postwar era*
II* THE PROBLEM
The preceding cursory examination of the background of regulatory 
action by governmental bodies in the United States in the field of
?industrial relations indicates two rather significant facts* First, 
certain trends may he seen in the historical development of goverment 
activities in the industrial relations field* Originally taking the 
position that associations of employees were detrimental to the public 
interest, state and national governments utilised their pavers to 
restrict the rise of unionism, invoking first the doctrine of criminal 
conspiracy, and later the injunctive power of the judiciary. Except 
for a reversal of policy in respect to railway employees, this trend 
continued until the passage of the Uorris^LaOuardia Act in 1932«* From 
this point a new trend m s  evident as governments became dedicated to 
a policy of not only encouraging the rise of unionism but also to a 
program of active regulation of employer rights in industrial relations* 
this phase of goverment control continued with little interruption 
until 194?* With the passage of the TafWiartley Act, government policy 
has returned to a less liberal policy toward labor in an effort to 
equalise employer-*eraployee relationships •
The second implication of the historical background of government 
regulation of industrial relations is also pertinent to the present 
study# that is, there has been a tendency for the regulation of the 
federal government in industrial relations to overshadow the action of 
the state governments in this field* This has been particularly true 
since the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935* A drastic restriction of 
the jurisdiction of the states in industrial relations m s  imposed by 
the Supreme Court in 195? when it held the Act to be constitutional * In
<aie ofi'the four decisions ^ holding its Gonstitutlomlity, J&JgBj v»
*fcnes pid laujd&la S|eel Gorp>^ the Court hold that mamfaeturing 
ms a part of interstate commerce and subject# to federal jurisdiction, 
thus reversing a iong*»standing decision that manufacturing establish** 
meni© were solely within the domain of intrastate commerce*^ While 
it is granted that federal, regulation has assumed a position of greater 
significance' in the conduct of Industrial relations' than is accorded to 
state action, the latter must be given a position of iagjori&aee as an 
integral part of the total picture of industrial relations regulation ir 
the United States# In Spite of the tremendous expansion of the concept 
of interstate commerce in recent years, many small business establish* 
ments remain within the jurisdiction of the states# The in$>ortance of 
state action to regulate the conduct of employer-employee relations in 
these intrastate establishments should not be minimised#
Statement of the problem
The field of state regulation of industrial relatione has been 
relatively neglected by students of labor law and legislation# Accord** 
Itig to Professor .Miller, one reason for this **is the impossibility of 
treating cos^ rehensively state laws that include such wide variations 
from one state to another* In light of the facts, this statement 
seems justified j however, it does not exclude the possibility of exam­
ining specific area© of regulation to determine the general manner in
9 301 U. S. 1, (1937)*
1° United States v. E. C. Knight Co.. 156 U. S. 1, (1895).
Miller, G. W., American Labor and the Government. Hew Tork,
Prentice Hall, 19A&* p# H§4# " "
’which the states have met the problem of industrial conflict, and to 
point out significant trends in legislation# ’
4>'-v
the purpose of this study, therefore, is to determine the nature 
and extent of state regulation of industrial relations as such regale* 
tion applies to significant areas of economic conflict between employ­
ers and employees* These areas are* (% } the making of uniohsecurity 
agreements! (2) picketing! (3) boycotting! (4) striking^  (5) regula­
tion of union affairs j and (6) unfair labor practices by employers and 
employees* two- secondary problems are considered, namely, the matter of 
conflict between state and federal jurisdiction, and the methods of 
administering industrial, relations legislation# 
limitations of Uie s^ djr
-In addition to the subject matter limitations on the extent of 
the study outlined above, certain other limitations must fee considered# 
The validity and accuracy of the study is limited to a relatively short 
period of time due to -the fact that the field of labor law and leglsla* 
tion is by nature highly dynamic and subject to change* That which is 
law today may not fee law tomorrow* Although the state legislatures 
generally convene every two years, the legislation itself is subject to 
constant re-inte rp re tat ion sand modification by the courts# But while 
the details of the study my be subject to change, it is not probable 
that the major provisions of the laws will change significantly for a 
few years at least*
The study is further limited fey the fact that many areas properly 
included in the field of labor legislation have been omitted*. Wage and
mhour legislation, child labor legislation, regulation of women ill 
industry, regulation of wording conditions, and workers compensation 
legislation, to m m  but a few. Me m, the flings of industrial 
relations reflation, but they do not properly lie within the scope of 
a study which is concerned primarily with the regulation of the 
industrial conflict's# State Anti^ Xojunetion laws, popularly known as 
the ^ little Morris-laQuardia Acts1*, have also been omitted tram the 
present study# While they limit the power of the state courts to issue
r
injunctions in labor disputes, their importance at the present time has 
been greatly' reduced by the significance of other legislation with which 
this study Is concerned*
xii* m s m x m m  of m s  used
In order to clarify the terminology used in this study, technical 
tems which are directly 'related to specific chapters are defined within 
the text of each chapter* General terms, not related to a 'Specific 
chapter,., are defined below* although there are conflicting definitions 
of various terms in the 'laws of different states, for the purpose of this 
study the most widely accepted definition is used, unless specific recog*** 
nit ion is given to the fact that a conflicting definition is being 
followed*
Ae used in this study, the term employer means %  person who 
engages the services "of an employee, and includes any person acting upon
CO
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his behalf."*2
Boanloyse
The tern employee includes any person who works for another 
person in any capacity other than as a supervisor*, or as a domestic 
servant* or for a parent or spouse * or who is subject to the Bailway 
labor Act .*3
M>2£ AjffiiM
In this study* the tern labor dispute refers to any Controversy 
concerning the terns* tenure* or conditions of employment. • .regardless 
of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and 
employee."*^  The latter part of this definition is of great importance 
since It in effect legalises such activities as stranger picketing.
The Colorado law* on the other hand* claims that an employee-employer 
relationship must exist before a controversy is deemed a labor dispute, 
ibis conflict is considered in the chapter on picketing*
Company union*
The Michigan law defines the tern company union la a manner 
followed by most of the states* A company union "includes any employee 
association* coimittee* agency* or representation plan*- formed or exist*’ 
ing for the purpose*..of dealing with employers concerning grievances
S*2 Wisconsin Statutes* chapter ill* section 111.02* (1939).
^  Ibid.. section 111.02 (3).
^  Mass. General laws* chapter 150 A* section 2 (7).
m  terms and conditions of employment" which is wholly or partly 
dominated by an employer. ^
1 M  this study the term labor organisation includes any associa­
tion of 'employees formed or existing for the purpose of dealing, with 
employers which Is not in' any way controlled or assisted -by the 
employer*
x?. of the study amp materials used
In order -to clarify, and. Integrate the remaining sections of this 
study* a 'brief .review of the. plan of organisation is advisable at this 
point.
Organisation o£ the study
In the following chapter* the Jurisdiction of the states in the 
regulation of industrial relations is discussed* and conflicts between 
state and federal. Jurisdiction are outlined* In chapter three* state 
regulation of union security agreements is discussed and evaluated* 
Chapter four deals with picketing as a device for exerting pressure on 
employers and the public* with emphasis upon state action to regulate 
this activity* Following the chapter on picketing* attention is 
focused on state regulations affecting boycotting* In chapter six* a 
review is made of the limitations which states have imposed, upon the 
right of employees to strike. The following chapter serves to outline
. . . .       t........
^  Colo. Laws* chapter 131* section 2 (7).
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various unfair labor practices by unions and espleyers which a number 
of states have included in their labor legislation'* In chapter eight, 
the regulation of labor organisations* ay relatively new type of state
4
legislation*.,is surveyed*
In chapter nine* attention is focused upon the various methods 
of administering state legislation affecting Industrial relations* with 
emphasis,upon the powers and procedures of administrative agencies* this 
discussion of administrative law precedes the final chapter* in which the 
study is summarized and conclusions are foimlated*
Materials used in the sbudv
, Since this study is an objective survey of state regulation of 
industrial relations* the primary source material utilised consists 
largely of the statutes pertaining to the subject as enacted by the 
legislatures of the Various states* Whenever possible* court decisions 
relating to the specific topics discussed are reviewed* House and 
Senate reports on proposed legislation are also utilised* as are the 
Annual Reports of the National labor Relations Board*
Secondary sources used consist mainly of articles, appearing t in 
law journals and related ^publications* together with definitive textbook 
material*
G nm m cto
THE JUBISDICTian OF THE STATE IN IHBOSTRIAI,
HEUTICNS REGULATION
i* xNmoBucTiasi
In order to understand the role of the state governments in 
the regulation of Industrial .relations considerable attention must be 
given to the problem of the states1" jurisdiction over industrial 
relations* Several questions must be considered In this connection* 
First, what is the legal basis for state regulation in this field? 
Second,, in what areas of industrial relations do the states exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction? And third, in what areas does state jurlsdie* 
tion conflict with federal jurisdiction, and what attempts have been 
made to resolve conducting jurisdictional questions?
With regard to the first two questions, fairly definitive answers 
may be given* These will be discussed immediately in order to clear 
the way for the more important considerations involved in the third 
question*
Legal basis for state regulation
The fundamental basis upon which the states are empowered to 
regulate industrial relations- is known as the state police power* This 
power, which is possessed by all of the states has- been defined as 1 the 
power inherent in government to protect itself and all its constituents, 
and for this purpose to hold the govemment immune, so far as necessary,
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from any limitations imposed in the past.”^  The word inherent in this 
definition is important* The Federal Constitution makes no mention of 
a delegation of general police power to the states* and indeed, such a 
delegation, had it been granted, would have been largely superfluous 
since the colonial state governments possessed this power prior to the 
formation of the federal system of government*
&  ■ this connection it is noteworthy that the federal government 
possesses no inherent police power* Bather, whatever power in thl© 
respect which it exercises is derived indirectly! that is, by implies- 
tion from specific grants and delegation of other powers* All of the 
basic labor legislation which Congress has enacted in the past has 
been an indirect exercise, of its police power through the specifically 
delegated power to regulate interstate em m erm *
On the other hand, the states are free to protect the health, 
safety, morals, and general well-being of their respective populations 
in whatever m y  they deem appropriate, providing such legislation does 
not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law, or otherwise subvert the Federal Constitution, the 
Supreme Court, in interpreting state regulations of industrial .rela­
tions in light of substantive due process, .has been rather free in 
nullifying such legislation on the grounds that due process has been
i -q.i: rrr ' 1 "V1 ” ;i:'1 n-"inT|.”,:l inu.'«[,nwu.JJ:
' * Gerstenberg, 0* H*, American 'Constitutional law* Hew fork, 
Prentice Hall, (1937)* P* 264*
^ 14th Amendment to the Comtitution*
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violated*3 xn tbs Thornhill Case*, a state law which outlawed peaceful 
picketing was held  ^unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated 
the Constitutional guarantee of free speech, ettstr&xy to the fourteenth 
Amendment* , Although these decisions have sharply Halted the police 
power of the states, there is some indication at present that the Court 
will, be lees restrictive in.the future with regard to- state regulations 
of the industrial conflict*^ ' The conflict between state- police power 
and the power of the Court to overrule Its use by the states is by no 
means resolved, but as one student of the problem has written j
Only if the Court continues to recognise that the primary duty 
and responsibility for the regulation and settlement of local 
economic and social, controversies rests upon state governments, 
and limits its consideration to cases in which the state' has 
arbitrarily violated its obligations, can it preserve that 
detached and disinterested attitude which is necessary if it is 
to maintain its position as the final authority on the interpre-* • 
tation of the constitution of the United States, and at the same 
time, preserve that local self-*govemaent by states, which is m  
essential of the dual sovereignty provided by our Constitution, 
and a fundamental of Anglo-Saxon democracy* 5
It may be concluded, therefore, that the legal basis for state 
action in the field of industrial, relations is the inherent police 
power of the state, Subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amend* 
ment and other provisions of the Constitution*. In the final analysis, 
the scope of state police power*ia, and will continue to be defined by 
the Supreme Court, in light 'of the. prevailing philosophy of that body#
-  ^Thornhill y* AlaMma* 101 U* S* 83, (1940)5 r^uax v* Corrigan, 
257 0# .8* 3 iZ i il92l}| etc,
4 See A^oma PljaSSd ggnggs Co. Wisconsin Employment Itera­
tions Board.93 law ed. 541, ( w ) .
5 29 Virginia law Review 16?, (1942).
JL jj Jl M k  irii #iMi#*k lMk.JP ^>^^.#0#* #*4* 4MlJk i m a ' I  m. 0» JB <iit4H*LiM.' jr. Jhrat one time in wo® iuOwiy oi insusti?dL&x relations r ©gui^ itiotx 
the state© possessed a much larger Jurisdictional area than they 
presently may claim* 4s mas mentioned previously, the Btjpesms Court
severely limited this area in 1937 *hsn it handed dona its decision
#*
in the Jonea and laughiln ffted case# Previous to this decision, 
manufacturing establishments m m  not considered a part of Interstate 
commerce# But the Court, in order to support the constitutionality of 
the Wagner Act, in effect was forced to abandon precedent and adept a 
much wider view of interstate commerce# the ramifications of this 
decision, in respect to the Jurisdiction of the states, cannot be 
overemphasised*
But within the limited sphere of intrastate commerce, that Is, 
idier# a business is conducted solely within the boundaries of a state, 
and the effect of its operations on interstate commerce is negligible 
the state legislatures are free to legislate regulation of industrial 
relations. Bven in this area the jwisdiotton of the state is not 
entirely dear# Attesting to this is the fact that only one state has 
limited -the term ^coim erae” to mean commerce within the stated  Consider** 
able difficulty arises when m  attempt is made to draw a lime of 
demarcation between intrastate and interstate commerce# It is with 
this problem that the remaining portion of the chapter £0 concerned*
* Utah Code, section 49-1-10 (6)#
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i f *  mimmmmM* c g h fiic t  m m m  s ia ®  tm is s m  
govbmbiiis m m m  the Act
Under a federal extern of government, such as that of the 
lotted' State©* which provides for a separation of power© between the 
-state and national governments* conflict© with regard to Jurisdiction 
are inevitable* this has bam true in this country* not only in the 
field of industrial relation©*,, but also in a number of other areas of 
regulation*? Since the ih&ure status of state regulation of -Industrial 
relations hinges directly upon the outcome of the jurisdictional eon** 
troversy between the states and the Federal government* it is- appropri­
ate that an examination be made of the background of the conflict* 
together with a review of the present status- of the problem*
Sss. Ms°Mm mess Mis. Steg M.
the- problem of jurisdiction .in matter© of labor and industrial 
relation© was brought into ©harp focus with the passage of the original, 
National labor Relations Act* popularly known a© the Wagner Act* Section 
XO-'(a) of the Act. Is directly pertinent to the problem!
The Board ie.eegKmred* as hereinafter provided* to prevent any 
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 
B) affecting, commerce* This power shall be - exclusive* and shall 
not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention 
that has been or may be established by agreement* code, law* or 
otherwise*®
7 See §k- te.k» gs& l« l« £a« x* ^
0* S. 557, (1886),
8 49 Stat. L. 453, 29 U, S. C. (1940) section 160 (a).
this provision leaves little doubt but' that' Congress me 
providing the National labor Elation© Board (I'URB) with sole juries 
diction over’ the administration of the substantive features of the Act* 
In the last sentence of the section* other agencies* including those 
of the states* are specifically forbidden jurisdiction in the enforce­
ment of the law* th e question arising' voider the section, is whether or 
not Congress intended to supersede state action 3m the field of indust** 
rial ablations* and to pseenpt state prerogatives under cover of the' 
commerce clause. An examination of the legislative history of the Act 
indicates that it did not* neither the House nor the Senate Committee 
reports indicates such an intention* and there is no specific mention in 
either concerning the jurisdiction of the states in handling unfair 
labor practice#*? V
It may be argued that since no state labor relations acts-*® were 
then in existence,. Congress could not be ejected to specifically grant 
or supersede jurisdiction with respect to the states* But it is doubt­
ful that Confess would not have forseen the eventual creation of 
agencies of the states to enforce their mm "little Wagner Act©1** 
particularly in light of the fact that states had imitated previous 
Federal legislation, specifically the Horrls-laGua rdia Act and the Olay- 
ton Act*.
9 See House -Report Bo* 1174, ?4th Congress, 1st session! June 10,
1935, p* 23; and Senate Report Ho* 573, 74th Congress, 1st session^  May
1, 1935, P* 15#-
She term “labor relations acts" refers to .the ten states having
lam  similar to the National, labor Relations Act, the- first of which was
passed in 1937*
mIt is fairly certain* therefore* that the intent of section 
10 (a) ms merely tto dispel the confusion resulting from dispersion 
of authority and to establish a single paramount administrative or 
u^asi-judicial authority in connection with the development of the 
Federal American law regarding collective bargaining * n31
Xf any doubts existed as to the intent of Congress not to 
preempt the authority of the state to pass its own industrial relations 
legislation, they were dispelled in the construction of the Act by the 
Supreme Court* . A case in point is that of Consolidated Edison Co* of 
Hew fork v* which came before the Court in 1930* Although
Chief Justice Hughes held that the Ht&B had properly taken jurisdiction 
in the case* he did not rule out the possibility that the Hew fork 
State Belaiione - Board could have handled the dispute under the state 
act* this interpretation of section 10 (a) was re-enforced by the 
Court*# decision in the case of L o $ a l ateggMfla
Employment Halations B o a r d *^ 3 _ question before the Court was 
whether or not the State of Wisconsin could Impose restrictions cm 
certain union activity, specifically mass picketing* In holding that
the state had the power to restrict union conduct Mr* Justice Douglas
abated*
\
H  Senate Report 573* jle- elt.
12 305 V. S. 197, 59 S. fit, 206, J&938).
13 315 0, S* 7AO, 62 S* Ct* 820, (19A2).
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We.'agree -w ith the statement of the United States as amicus 
curiae that the federal Act was not designed to preclude' a 
State from emoting legislation limited to the prohibition or 
regulation o f this type of union activity* the Committee Beporta 
on the Federal Act plainly indicate - that' it is not %• mere- polled 
court measure" and that authority of the several States may fee 
exerted to control such conduct*. Furthermore* this Court has 
long insisted that an "intention of Congress to exclude States 
fro$ exerting their police power must fee clearly manifested"*^
In spite of the fact that the Court clearly construed the Act as alien**
ing concurrent Jurisdiction between the states and the Federal govern*
ment, .certain, definite, limitations were placed upon, the power of the
states* In Hines v* Bauidowttz^5 the Court statedi
fbere is not«—and from the very nature. of the problem there 
cannot fee^ any rigid feiwXu or rule which can fee used as a 
universal pattern, to determine the meaning and purpose of every 
act of Congress* ibis Court, in considering the validity of 
state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the 
same subject, has made use of the following expressions t conflict­
ing;; contrary toj occupying, the field; yggnxgn&nce; difference;. 
irreconcilability; inconsistency! violation! curtailment! and 
interference* . But none of these expressions provides an in-’ 
fallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yard­
stick* In the final, analysis* there can fee no crystal clear 
distinctly marked fomaula* - Our primary function is* to determine 
whether, under the circumstances of this particular case* 
Pennsylvania * a -law stands as an'obstacle to the accomplishment i 
and execution of the full purposes’ and objectives of Congress*^ ®
Sms* although concurrent jurisdiction is recognised by the Court* state
laws must not stand as nm  obstacle- to- the accomplishment and execution
of the full pmiposes and ■objectives of Congress*"
^  Ibid.. at 748.
15 312 *J. S* 52, 61 S, Cfc. 399*
16 JMd*» at 67,
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Bcder the Wagner Mi* a considerable degree of cooperation 
existed between the state labor relatione boards and the NM3* nThe 
suggestion made in the Edison case was the basis for a rapprochement 
between the. federal, and state agencies which***was carrled to the point 
of negotiated agreements which assigned to the local agencies the 
responsibility for handling certain categories of industries*^ this 
policy was first stated by the N1BB in its third Annual Beport in 193d«
It said then*
last year the Board also reported that it hoped to make coopera­
tive arrangements with the State boards to the end that administra­
tive friction and lack of unifomity in the application of principles 
would not ensue* this hope has been completely fulfilled and the 
Board or its agents has been able' to achieve satisfactory working 
arrangements with all of the State boards or their agents* M  a 
result, cases filed with this Board in which State boards had 
jurisdiction were immediately and Informally transferred to the 
State boards* or vice versa, with a minimum of misimderstanding and 
with no delay* * * *latnraHy* the Board hopes 'that, when the State 
legislatures meet again they will give serious consideration to the 
question of bringing to workers engaged in intrastate business the 
benefits ho*#- enjoyed by workers in Interstate commerce* the Board 
has never been jealous of its jurisdiction and is prepared to 
cooperate with any mm State boards to the same extent as it has 
With the beard© already created*18
It may be Inferred from the Court*s construction of the Wagner Act 
and from the positionttsken by the M £& that the jurisdictional problem 
was fairly -well settled during; the first ten .years of the. Act*© operation* 
Hie Court had acknowledged the legitimacy of state action in the industrial 
relations field* and the National Board had made rather extensive agreements
17 Smith, H. A ., 46 Mich. U  Rev, 593, a t 6071 (1943) ,
national labor Relations Board, Annual Report, 1938, p. 3,
nit)} the state agencies designed to prom ote cooperation of policies# 
Biit the problem me by no mean© settled* as ms forcibly illustrated 
in the Bethlehem case^ %^±ch m m  before the Supreme Court in 1947#
The question before the Court ms whether the, Hew fork State 
Labor Relations Board could require the Bethlehem Steel Co** end the 
Allegheny Indium Co* to recognise the bargaining rights of supervisory 
employees when the policy of the National Labor Relations Board ms 
such that supervisory were not accorded bargaining righto#. M  tho 
language of the Court the sole question was "whether* Congress having 
undertaken to deal with the relationship between these companies and 
their foremen, the State is prevented from doing eo,n2P In holding 
that the State board did not have the power which It had easercised over 
supervisory employees, the Court* in effect* reversed Its earlier stand 
on the question of jurisdiction taken in the Allen Bradley ease and t|e 
Consolidated Edison case# ^
S & m s a m
the essence of the majority opinion was as follows s (1) the 
exclusion of state action may be implied from the nature of federal 
legislation and its subject ma|tcr* although expressed declaration of 
such an intent is lacking#^ (2) Under the Commerce Clause* Congress
19 M p $g i assaSk Sa« z* Ifes Sags Mss fe M lte  ga&Bl*
67 S. Ct. 1026, (1947).
20 £bid*» at 1029,
^  1029#
Can reach local and intrastate activities which may vitally affect 
interstate commerce*^ (3) ffae^ power of the states. to heal with 
matters Xeftto its control by ingress does not include the power 
of the states to hinder the accomplishment of ^federal objectives.^ 3 
(4) Where federal ad&inl stration .has made eowpgwhetiaiCe .roles to 
cover the subject matter of a statute enacted under the Commerce 
Clause, state regulation in the field of the statute is invalid* even 
that mrticular phase o£ the subject 'matter .hap m i beep eon*
alggasg M  lisa M w k  amm*2*
this decision was unfortunate in light of the degree of coopera­
tion which had been achieved between the BURS and the state board? In 
Jurisdictional matters# But perhaps more Important* the decision made 
a rather drastic further restriction on the police power of the state 
to deal even with industrial relations in intrastate commerce. Mr. 
Justice Bi*aiikfurt^ r* in a seperaie Opinion* points this out so forcefully 
that his judgement is worthy of quotations
Since m  are dealing with aspects of commerce between the States 
that are not legally outside State action by virtue of the Cfcmmrm 
Clause itself* lew forte has authority to act m  long as Cbngress 
has not interdicted her action. $hile the State does m  sufferance* 
in ascertaining 'whether Congress has allowed State-action we are 
not to consider the matter m  though Congress were conferring a mere 
bounty* the extent of which must be viewed with a thrifty eye, When 
construing federal legislation that deals with matters that also lie 
within the authority* because within the proper Interests* of the 
States* we must be mindful that we are part of the delicate process
3* Ibid.. at 1030*
of adjusting the interacting areas of National and State authority 
over commerce* tbm inevitable extension of federal authority over 
economic enterprise has absorbed the authority that me previously 
left to the States. But .in legislating, Congress is not indulging 
Hi doctrinaire, bard*an&*fas:h curtailment of the State power® 
reflecting genial State interests* federal legislation of this 
character must be construed- with ■ due regard --to accommodation between 
the assertions of 'mm federal authority and the functions of the 
individual States, as reflecting the historic and persistent concern® 
of our dual system of government* Bince Congress can, if it chooses, 
entirely displace the Stages to the full extent of the far-reaching 
Commerce Clause, Congress needs no help from generous judicial impli- 
cations to achieve the supersession of State authority*. To construe 
federal legislation so as not needlessly to forbid preexisting State 
authority .is .to respect our federal system, ' Any .indulgence in con* 
struction should be li* favor of the States* ***^ 5
And in concluding his criticism of the majority opinion,. Justice Frank-
/
furter touches upon the' effect of the decision on federal-state coopera­
tion in the field of industrial relations*
M  the submission by the Board before us, we have the most 
authoritative 'manifestation by national authority that State 
collaboration would be a blessing rather than a bane, and yet 
judicial construction would forbid the aid which the agency of 
Congress seeks in carrying out its duty., * .Neither what Congress i 
has said in the National Labor Kelations Act, nor the structure 
of the Act, nor its policy, nor its actual operation, should be 
found to prohibit the Board from exercising its -discretion so as 
to enlist the aid of agencies charged with like duties within the 
■States in enforcing a common policy..**26
Even a casual study of the jurisdictional problem under the 
Wagner Act should indicate the logical superiority of Hr* Justice Frank* 
furter1"® opinion over that which was. rendered by the majority of the 
Court* His assertion that the future of the federal system of government 
in the United States depends upon the judicious and conservative Inteipre-
2* Ibid., atTcm.
spiwiPiPiiji “ ■ ^
26 Ibid., at 1035.
isbien of federal legislation ondmr the Commerce Clause m  it is 
applied to areas of preexisting state authority la a striding defense 
against the. increasing '.infiltration of federal control in m tim m  of 
local significance* He does pet deny, however* the authority of the 
federal gomrmg&t to exercise its poeeta to the fullest extent under 
the Commerce Clause* but he does oppose the extanblon of that power fey 
the. Court ip the absence of apedfic Confessional .intent* fm m  the 
documentary evidence that has been presented it is fairly dear that 
Congress* in passing m  section M  (a) of the Acts £id not wish to 
prsespt state action to rcgdate industrial conflict in the manner In 
which the majority of the Court felt necessary* B^roader .language was 
used In the opinion than was necessary to the decision, and- it is 
difficult to believe that the Court would, if put to the test, have held 
subsequently that cooperative enforcement by the states of policies 
conforming to those of the National Board was no longer possible*1*^ ?
Boon after the decision in the. Bethlehem case was handed down. 
Congress passed the labor Management Halations Act of 194?* commonly 
known as the fafWiartley Act#-, this legislation amended the original 
National labor Halations Act of 1939# several- of its provisions are 
pertinent to the problem of federal^ state jurisdiction over industrial 
relations* Although th© Act. did not greatly clarity the problem an 
examination of these provisions will provide some Insight into the 
present -status of. the controversy*
Judith*.; H# -A-#.*. Jsl^ *# at 610*
2?
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In five of the aeetioiie of the amended national labor Eolations 
Act deal with. tho-’JofiediatiaBi of the-states isr
tetter affecting amplo^rMVployee relations, Congress has been fairer 
clear in setting forth its intentions* With the amended section 10 (a), 
however, the- intent of the legislators is subject to considerable speeu* 
lation* In order to clear the way for a discussion of this section, those 
provisions which are mm m  less capable of positive interpretation shall 
be di^mssed ■ first#-; -
m s  B&on ayWjftEg' BrRvlBioti
One of the most important provisions of the amended national labor 
Halations Jot with respect 'to jurisdiction of the states is contained la 
section 14 (b) of the Act* this section provides that
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorising the execu** 
tion or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor 
organisation as a condition of any state or territory
in which such execution or .applicative is prohibited by .State or 
Territorial law*
This section was passed by (tengm m in order to clarify any doubts which 
might arise in connection with the Congressional authorisation of the 
union shop under certain specified conditions In section 8 (&) (3)* 
Congress realised that some of the states had labor legislation which 
prohibited even the union shop, and a complicated jurisdictional problem 
would naturally arise If it regained silent as to the statue of these 
state restrictibhs* ’
30
* t * , « , : -...,
fp m  the histoary.ef the aei*^ Atia dear that
the intention of ’Congress was to allow abate union security prwr%~ 
eions to stands providing that the s ta te  laws were not lesft restrict 
hive than the 'Federal provision in section 0* the states fsaay* if they 
wish* p am  union security prohibitions which are m m  restrictive in 
character'than, the Federal law* even to the extent of prohibiting all 
union security provisions* the constitutionality of these state 
prohibitions on union security agreements shall be discussed under 
section W  of J^ is' /chapter* * V  *'
restrictioBag on the r^ jhfe strike
Another provision of the tended national Labor Relations Act 
which rather clearly defines the jurisdiction of the states is con* 
cemad with limitations on strike action. Section 13. of the -Act' states*
Nothing in this .Act* except-as specifically provided for herein* 
shall be construed eo&s either to interfere with or impede or 
diminish im  any way the right to strike* or to affect the AAmita~ • 
tions or qualifications on that right* " . . . ,
The pertinent -clause of this provision in the sfinal. one* In. effect*. it
:m m &. that the- states are free to. ir^ oae restrictive on the right to
strike* providing that these restrictive are not inconsistent with
controlling decisions of the Supreme Court*2^  The Senate Committee
Report makes it clear that this section nAe not intended to change £tt
iiWMawMM#
Mouse Report 0®$ $Oth Cong., '1st sees** p* £0*
. 29 f £ g £ *  F ^ te ^  Mefeallurjrlcal J »6  B. 3 . 2*0, (1939)}
taerioan SSra Co., In c ., 55 I t S  1302 ( l9 W l tCJffl v , Sands Mfg. Co., 
306 U. S. 322, (1939), '
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any respect existing law as construed in these administrative and
30judicial decisions*“
In interpreting this section* on© difficulty is presented* that 
is, it is hardly likely that Congress was unaware of the rather extensive 
state prohibitions on the right to strike which were existent at the time 
of the passage of the Act*- Therefore* did Congress mean that the guide**? 
posts offered by judicial decisions in this matter were to serve a© the 
maximum limit on state action* or as the point of departure from which 
the states would be free to restrict strike activity? No positive answer 
to this question is possible until the Supreme Court receives a test case* 
but as one student of the problem has pointed out* “the lawyer could 
hardly be charged with negligence if he should take the section at it© 
face value and conclude that state power to deal with strikes remains 
unimpaired • “31
Jurisdiction over supervisory employees
The amended National labor Eolations Act is quite clear on the 
question of staie-federal jurisdiction over foreman and other employers 
acting in a supervisory capacity* The pertinent provision in this 
respect is found in section 14 (a) of the Acts
Nothing herein ©hall prohibit any individual employed a© a 
supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organiza* 
tion* but no employer subject to this Act shall be compelled to deem 
individual© defined herein as supervisors as employees for the 
purpose of any state law*, either national' or local* relating to 
collective bargaining*.
30 senate Report 105# 30th Cong** 1st session* p* 20*
31 &aith* R* A** o|>* Cft*» p* 601*
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The position of tbs £&£& under the Wagner Act with respect to 
supervisory employees and their bargaining rights under the Act had not 
been consistent* But in the Packard Motor Car eas©#32 appar­
ently resolved the inconsistencies of the Board*s fluctuating opinions 
by declaring that for the purposes of the Act, supervisory workers -were t? 
to be considered m  esployees. Section 14 (a) of the amended Act clearly 
repudiates this doctrine# But more important, the section excludes state 
action over supervisory employees engaged in industries affecting inter­
state commerce* So concurrent Jurisdiction Is. possible; the position of 
supervisory workers in the sphere of collective bargaining is not affected 
by tbs lavs of either the states or the KLBA, and such workers have no 
legal basis for assarting the right to bargain collectively* This fact* 
of course, does not prevent the supervisory employees from engaging in \ 
collective bargaining, but merely forces them to rely upon their own 
power to achieve a bargaining agreement with the employer* \
B s s £ $ & m a i8 !&  M  W&xssttagk j&ss^Msa
Section 8 (d) (4) of the eaended H IM  provides for a degree of 
concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state agencies in the media* 
tion of conflicts arising under collective b a rg a in in g agreements* fhn% 
the Act provides in this section that in any dilute arising out of an 
attempt to modify a collective bargaining contract, or attendant to the 
termination of such a contract, notice must be given to the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service and to "any State or Territorial agency
* 32 iiB§ v- Hotor Car Cg., 330 IT. 8» 485, (1947).
established to mediate and conciliate disputes |\nrthemore,
section 293'(b) of the Act directs the 'Service ”ho avoid attesting to 
mediate dilutes which weld have only a minor effect on interstate 
commerce if State or other conclaliation services are available to the 
parties.”
jHSs&sMaa&f ^fegtg jsaaHs jsbs £Sa £ £ k
ffeat Congress did not Intend-that the Federal. -C&uris should have 
exclusive jurisdiction to entertain damage actions -arising under the Act 
is shown in section 393 (b), Title XSX of the IKEA* fn addition to the 
jurisdiction of the/federal District Courts, radial action may be 
..Obtained, in %ny other court living jurisdiction of the parties1* for 
violations of section-'303 (a) * 'which prohibits boycotts /and other unlaw* 
fuX ccHablnaticme*
Sfeatg .iorlgdictlttn wider aeotlop 10 (a) ag aaepded
the preceding discussion of the provisions of the amended USA has 
shown that the intention of Congress has been to provide, forever possible* 
for the concurrent jurisdiction of federal, and state agencies in the labor 
relations field# These provisions, while placing certain restrictions on 
the- jurisdiction of the state#, by no means indicate 'm .intention to 
entirely preempt state action, either in. Industrie# affecting interstate 
commerce, or in the United sphere of intrastate commerce*
the most important jurisdictional provision of the TafWHartley 
.Act,, section 19 (a)* was passed to clarify the situation that gave rise b
to the in early 1947* At discussed above, justice
Frardsfurtor rendered a strong distent opposing the eaasg>leie super*- 
sedure of state jaritdiotiofe by the TOP, At that tine he stated, ”1 
cannot join In the Courtis opinion because I read .it to mem that it is 
beyond the power of the national Board to agree with state agencies 
enforcing M m  like the Vagner Act to divide, with dee regard to local 
interests the domain over which Congress had- given the national Board 
abstract discretion, but which practically, cannot he covered by It 
alone*1*
t
Ihls objection to the Court*s construction of the Wagner Act by 
justice Fimkfurter was specifically resolved, in section 10 (a) of the 
amended Act as follow# t
the- Board is. ^ pcweredjf, as hereinafter provided, . -to prevent any 
person, from engaging in any unfair labor practice' {listed in sec* 
tion B) affecting commerce* mis power shall not be affected by 
any other 'means, of adjustment or prevention that has been or m y  
hi established, by agreement, law or otherwise! Piyvlded*. mat the 
Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of a^Tsiate or 
territory to- cads to such agency jurisdiction, over any cases in 
any industry {other than mining, manufacturing, communications, 
and transportation except idierejre^ Ujmlnat^ y local In character)- 
even, though such cases m y  involve labor disputes affecting com* 
mere#, unless the provision of the state or territorial statute 
applicable to the detersiiination of such cases. by such agency Is 
inconsistent with the esorrespending; provision of this Act or 
has received a construction Inconsistent therewith*
It may 'be observed that Congress has conferred upon the MUB the 
power to cede to state agencies jui&adietion over cages.In which It has 
original authority 'to. act, with two exceptions! (1) It- m y  not cede 
jurisdiction in mining, manufacturing, c<OTsunicatlone and trai^ sportation
except where these industries are pmdamimntlp local in their operas
hi<ms$ and (2) eases m y  not fee ceded to the state agency when - either
the state pfovi&im, which applies or it# Judicial, construction is not
. consistent with the- .amended BtM*
,fhe first o m o fo im . to the Board *s power to cede jurisdiction
was merely a translation of the dicta laid down by the Buprmm Court in M
1941 into statutory fora*34 Oongrese recogniaed the sirtgular; iKportanee-
0f these major industries to- the well-being Of the entire: economy and saw
fit to Jtoiude them cos^ letely, except where they' m m  of local importance'
only, from the jurisdiction of state agencies* It is of some significance,
however, that the Board is prohibited from ceding jurisdiction in ^ mining,
maimfacburlng, <^ msaunications and transportation^  rather than where these
industries are %f t acted%  Because of the expansion of the concept of
%
industries a^ffecting*1 eam®ere% the difference in terminology is quite
j^orfeant,**^
Yhe reason why congress imposed Mss second exception to the Boardt 
power to cede jurisdiction is obvious. .If state, laws, governing the con* 
duct of ecployers and m p toyees were grossly Inconsistent with the -policy 
of the National G a m m m n t $ ceding jurisdiction in labor matters to such 
states would render the authority of the National Government practically 
mmninglese* $hl& exception, however, doss not m m  that state laws must 
fee consistent in every respect to the N1M  as amended, a fact which the
■ &  Mart# X * J&* olt** Ilf
35 l& Illinois L. Hmr, 500, at 501*
the Act makes eXe&r*3& ■ to all practical panoses 
it merely means that 'state-law- may not be leas stringent in their pro scrip** 
timm of; unfair ■ labor practices than the M&tiohal fev*3T‘‘
In spite of'the apparent clarity of the above observations, it is 
possible to eonetrue the important clauses of section 10 (a) In a number 
of mysv^ However, since the construction of the section has recently 
been subject to the- consideration of the Supreme Court, ©peculation in 
tfaisimtter is somewhat superfluous* On the other hand, it is appropriate 
that several questions be presented at this point to suiamarise some of the 
important jurisdictional problems arising but of the provisions of the 
amended ^ tloml labor delations Act, and also to serve as an introduce 
tion to the subsequent discussion of recent % 3» e  Court decisions relate 
log to the problem* these* question are* (1) Hay a state agency assert 
Jurisdiction over the certification of a collective bargaining representa­
tive where the TO® has not exercised its authority? (2 ) May' a state 
agency assert Jurisdiction in -cases of concurrent power over commerce 
where Congress has not Nearly -supplanted such jurisdiction? (3) ’ Boss 
a previous certification by the MU® preclude subsequent jurisdiction of 
a state agency to' enjoin practices which. are' contrary to--the' laws' of the 
state? (4) May a state legislature prohibit union security agreements if';
Senate Bepori j®5# CObh Cong, 1st session,. (1947),
. See Lincoln Ifeds,
00.«t 9$ law* “ "' ~
3$ For a detailed atmmsary of such constructions, see 46 Michigan
1. Bev* 6Q|* C334B}*
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that prohibition is more stringent than the Federal Act?
It is with these and other questions that the following section
of the chapter is concerned# It is significant to note that'these are 
the controlling decisions in matters of state and federal jurisdiction 
over industrial relations at the present time# (June, 1949) *
m. m m m  supreme court decisions relating to the
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The question of the jurisdiction of a state agency to certify a 
bargaining representative, in an industry affecting commerce, where the 
NLRB had not acted was decided in the Bethlehem case in April, 1947.
Xt has been pointed out that the majority of the Court held that the 
state agency, the New Terte State Labor Relations Board, did not have 
jurisdiction* This case was decided, however, prior to the enactment 
of the TafWiartley Act, which provided, in section 10 (a), that the 
NLRB could cede jurisdiction to state agencies under certain conditions# 
It was quite natural, therefore, that the question of the Bethlehem case 
should again, arise in light of Congressional intent in section 10 (a)#
The LaCrosse Telephone case
On January 17, 1949* the .Supreme Court handed down its decision 
LaCrosse Telephone pom* v* Wisconsin Itoloyment Relations Board *39 
The facts in the case are briefly these* The Wisconsin Employment
^  93 Law. ed* Advance Opinions 265, (1949)• (Citations of this 
and subsequent opinions discussed refer to Law*, ed* Advance Opinions) *
Relations Board, at the request o f a union in rivalry with a union 
with which the appellant corporation had a collective bargaining agree­
ment, which was to continue from year to year unless terminated by 
notice, held an election in. appellant*© plant to determine which union 
was the choice of the majority of workers in the plant* The rival 
union won the ©lection, and the old union was ousted* Both the employer 
and the ousted union brought suit in the state courts# An order of a 
circuit court' setting aside the certification was subsequently reversed 
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court*
The pertinent question before the United States Supreme Court 
was whether a ©tat© agency had jurisdiction to certify a bargaining agent 
in an industry affecting commerce, where the NLHB had not asserted juris** 
diction, and where the NLRB had not specifically ceded jurisdiction to 
the State Board*
The Wisconsin i&E^ loyment Relations Board and the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court had contended that the State Board could exercise jurisdiction in 
the certification of a bargaining representative until or unless the NXRB 
asserted its authority to act in the matter* Sh rejecting this contention, 
Mr.* justice Douglas reiterated the position of the Court in the Bethlehem 
case* With regard to the 'latter, he stated*
Those considerations control the present cases* This employer is 
conceededly in interstate' commerce* and the National Board has 
consistently exercised jurisdiction*. The Wisconsin Act provides 
that a majority of ejqsloyees in a single craft, division, department 
or plant of an asg&oye? may elect to constitute that group a sepa­
rate bargaining 'unit*. Section 111*02 (6)* The federal act leaves 
:that matter to the discretion of the board. ■ When under those cir** 
cumstanees the state board put© its ic^ rimatur on a particular
3 f
, t group m  the collusive bargaining agent of the employees* it 
freeze© into- a pattern. that which the federal act 1ms left fluid 
** »•& certification by a state board under a different or con** 
flteting theory of represeatatft& m y  therefore he a© readily die- 
foptdve of the practice under the federal act m  if- the order# of 
the two board# made a head-on collision* fhsse are the very real 
potentials of conflict which lead vm- to allow supremacy to the 
federal scheme even though it ha# not yet been applied in any 
form! way to this particular s«pi0yer*$*
Hr* Justice pougl&ss conclude# by stating that the r^esult we haw reached
is not changed by the labor Hanagement delations Act of (June 23) 1947*
What are- the iiopMoationa of this decision? First* it m m m  dear
that the Court will not invoke section 10 (a) of the ai&ended HLE4 in case#
Involving ^ presentation proceedings* that section apparently i# appli**
cable only to cases involving .labor disputes* and the Board'*# power to cede
jurisdiction 1# 'limited to such cases* thus*., the £3&$ met exercise
exclusive jurisdiction in the ceHlfication of collective bargaining rep**
resentativesjj and m y  not cede* even thou# it my wish to do so* its
exclusive authority, the second implication of the. Xa.Cro^ se l^ aoticn#-
decision is that the Bethlehem case* In which the. Court took the position
that a state agency could not assert, jurlidliition where the tfjUSB had all
ready taken action* ha# been extended to the point where even in the
absence of IffiSB action In a specific case involving representation* the
state agency m y  not certify' a bargaining agent* lb the discussion of'
the Bethlehem case it was- noted that the Gourt had placet an extremely
3bM*§ at m *  
U  Ibid., at 270.
narrow construction on the original section 10 (&}* But instead of 
relaxing the stringent interpretation of the piwislon* the Oourt in 
the groase m m  has further narrowed tee area of state jurisdiction*
. In light- of the legislative history of tee fafWH&rtley Act* ante an 
interpretation violates the spirit of tee provision in order to follow 
a, precedent Which m s  thoroughly criticised by tee minority of tee Ctemri* 
as well as by many students of the juilsdietlon problem*
The Courtis interpretation may be criticised bn m m  practical 
grounds* Use tremendous work load of te&.jN&BB prohibits effective and 
quick disposition of all cases arising under tee Act which it is to 
administer* But merely because a state prevision is not. consistent .is 
all respects with the national law* Justice Douglas would prevent the 
ML8B from making working arrangements with, local agencies whose policies 
are in general compatible with those of Congress* it does not seem 
unreasonable to ■ suggest that the effectuation of the Act should be the 
responsibility of the Board working through Congress* rather than that 
of tee Court* which has m m  fit to determine the working policies of the 
■ H£8B by judicial.- decree, there is no indication in the case that NLHB 
had disputed the assimgation of jurisdiction by the Wisconsin BoaMi 
indeed* it had already entered into an agreement with tee Wisconsin Board 
to effectuate tee policies of the Act under another provision*
. It may be argued that because tee H&8B did not specifically cede 
jurisdiction td tee state agency the latter*# action was not valid under 
section 10 (a)♦ But ■ that provision does not state that the Board must
-specifically cede jurisdiction case by case* even in mining* manufact** 
uring* transportation and communications where these are predominantly 
local. in character* ■ the question' n m  becomes* who is to determine 
under what circumstances the Board‘is to cede jurisdiction* Congress* 
working through HLSBj or the Supreme Court? the t&  Crosse decision
w  *■ ••WPIil* «wpppiBppil»(PW(P*
seems to indicate that the Court .is taking a large measure of- respon­
sibility In this determination* -k position which Justice Frankfurter 
so strongly opposed in. the ~ Bethlehem case#
&
tee Mneeln federal e^ sa
Tet another recent case involving the jurisdiction of the states 
to control and regulate the conduct of industrial relations Is that of 
X^ neoln Federal Labor Uniop v* teitewesbe**n £ H 1 SSd Metal Co.« &
this decision*, the Court combined questions arising under a constitutional
>
amendment of the State of Nebraska and a similar North Carolina statute*
teese two states had provided that no one be denied employment because
of membership or because of non-^ nembership in a later organisation* and
outlawed the making of agreements which would be inconsistent with this
policy* Although this case will be discussed in full in the chapter on
union security agreements* it is necessary at this point to indicate the.
Court* s position with regard to the constitutionality of such an exercise
of the state police power. Mr.# Justice Black said in parti
‘ fhis Court beginning at least as early as '193% teen the Mebbial 
Case was decided* has steadily rejected the due process philosophy 
enunciated in the Adair^ Coppage line of cases*. In doing so it has: 
consciously returned closer and closer to the -earlier constitutional
^*93 law* ed* Advance Opinions 201* (1949)*
principle that states have power to legislate against what are 
found to he injurious practices 'in their internal commercial and 
business affairs* so long as their laws do not rim afoul of some 
specific federal constitutional prohibition^  or setae valid federal 
law*# **Ohder this constitutional doctrine the due process clause 
is no longer to he so broadly construed that the Congress and 
state legislatures are put in a strait Jacket when they attempt 
to suppress business and industrial conditions which -they regard 
as offensive to the public welfare*^
Hds decision marks a rather bread extension of the state police power in
the industrial relations field since the Court had not previously rendered
an authoritative pinion m  the validity of the anbi^ closed shop- laws
of the states* Although many of the states have had. these laws, for eerne
time* their constitutionality was subject to sons doubt* particularly
'before the passage of the faft^ Hartley Act. Since the Lincoln Federal
decision* however* the states are clearly free to exercise their police
power in this matter* the Court could hardly have decided otherwise .in
light of its construction of the due process clause since, the lebb^ s
case*^
Closely related, to the Mncal^ Fsiea^ decision*' the Supreme Court 
■on March 7® %9hf» handed, down, its opinion In. the case of Xlxm m ffewnili 
m  «2- Z * m asom SM  Sm loym ent Hetotloaa Board.4? the fact* to
this case are briery these 1 During the last war*
^  l^dfc i at 208ft
44 Habbla y. Swr 291 6* S. 502, (1934).
45 93 tow. ed. 541,
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pressure from the War Labor Board, agreed to the inclusion of ©alnbet** 
m m  of membership clause 4a tits collective bargaining contract with a 
union duly; certified by the HLHB* this clause was •carried over tram, year
to- year# even after the war had ended*- Noting under a Wisconsin statute
\
ashing it an unfair labor practice for an employer to enter into such an 
agreement unless it has been- approved by a. majority of his employees, 
the Wisconsin Board ordered the m player to- cease and desist from giving 
effect to the clause, and to reinstate a discharged es^ loyee with back 
pay, the employee having been .released for failing to conform to the 
agreement* Hie Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the order in the face of 
the contention, by both union and employer that the Jurisdiction of the 
state, board was ousted by the -authority of the MMB$ and that the state 
statute was in conflict with the national labor Relation Act as ammended* 
In affirming the .order of the Wisconsin arploycaent Relations Board 
and the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court* Mr* Justice Frankfurter 
msmM in part-1
' |a))' must mean'that bossibi* of ju*4adiot4on $» to-
take place on3y where state and federal laws have parallel pnovi-* ; 
slotss* Where the state and federal laws do not overlap* no cession 
is necessary.**.Other provisions of. the T&fWKartley Act make -it;. 
even dearer* * *thab the states are left free to pursue their own 
more restrictive policies*-***^  , .r
the Court then points to the provisions of section 14 (b) which specific
cally state that nothing in the faft-Hartley Act shall be construed to
mean that union security agreements are authorised in any state which
prohibits suchftgremaents* Here one of the jurisdictional problems of
Ibid., 'at*"549.
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the Taft*4iartley Act is answered# That is, the Court construes sec#*
tion 10 (a) to meantbat states need not wait for a cession of Juris** .
•diction, where- the provisions in point do not overlap with similar
federal.provisions* But this formula may.be applied only to action
in cases of unfair ■labor practices, and not in representation action,
apparently* in light of the Ja grouse decision#
In considereing the union and exaployerfa contention that because
of a previous certification by the HLB8 the Wisconsin .Board had no
authority to enjoin unfair labor practices under the state act, the
Court continued*
Since the enumeration by the Wagner Act and the Taft~Hartley 
Act of unfair labor practices over which the National Board has 
exclusive Jurisdiction does not prevent the States from enforcing 
their own policies in matters not governed by the federal law, 
such freedom of action by a State cannot be lost because the 
Watlomi Board has once held an election under the Wagner Act#
The character of activities left to State regulation is not changed 
by the fact of certification*, * ♦ Indeed, the express disclaimer in 
section B {$ ) of the National labor Relations Act of intention to 
interfere with State law and the pemission granted the States by 
section, 14 (b) of the Taft-Hartley to carry out policies incon** 
sistent with-the Taft-Hariley Act itself, would be practically 
meaningless if so easily avoided#^ *
Justice Frankfurter, Joined by the majority of the- Court, concluded that
the Wisconsin prohibition of certain union security agreements was not
in conflict with the enacted policies of Congress*
By this decision, the Supreme Court affirmed what to all appear*
anees was the Intent of Congress— to leave the states wide latitude in
their- Jurisdiction of industrial relations, where the exercise of such
w  Ibid.. at 549*
jurisdiction dee® net conflict with federal law*
Although there have \m m  inconsistencies la the G&ovi** construe-* 
tion of the faft~Harbley provisions dealing with state jurisdiction, thefe 
seems to he a trend in the thinking of the Gourt toward preserving, as 
far as possible, the inherent polios power, of the states to .regelate 
industrial relations#: Within the personnel of the Court, of course, Br# 
justice Frankfurter .has become the most vigorous exponent of this phil** 
esophy* With regard to practical as well as theoretical considerations 
involved, this philosophy presents, the wisest course of action if the 
federal, system of government is to be preserved in the United .States#
?* m m t  A ssm n m s m® m m &
OF JUEIS0XCTOT B3T H1HB
fhe discussion of the federal-state jurisdiction problem in 
industrial relations would be incos$>Iete without a survey of recent 
83LR8 action in asserting and denying for itself authority to regulate 
industrial relations affecting commerce# It cannot be emphasised too 
strongly that the interdependence of our present economy has rendered 
the concept of "purely intrastate commerce* practically meaningless* 
fhe expansion of the conceit of business and industry "affecting commerce* 
has left but little latitude for the existence of the former concept# 
fhe HtBB has, for example, asserted jurisdiction in the past over a small, 
business whose sales were entirely in intrastate commerce and whose 
materials were purchased entirely within the state, but whose materials 
were originally manufactured in another state*
mAlthough the SUB could* If It so desired* assert jurisdiction 
ever' many small businesses to the lifted States*, this policy would 
entail such a heavy edmtototrative burden, that the important phases of 
Its m rk  would suffer* ..It ha© therefore' been the policy of_the HUB 
to restrict its Jurisdiction* not because of a lack of authority, but 
because the policies of tbs tot which It must adiatolster would not be 
effectuated*
ascent eases to which jurisdiction haa been asserted
i , . »
to# HLHB has recently asserted jurisdiction over a local 'bus 
company solely on to# ground that it transported to and t r m  w ork 
esplojreee who were engaged in interstate businesses.*8 The taw coap&ny 
was not licensed by the toiersiate Commerce tommiselon and there was no 
exchange of passenger© with any other bus system* to# Board has also 
recently taken jurisdiction over a retailer of farm equipment who 
purchased all of hto stock within the state and whose sales were less 
than five per cent to other states*^ v.
In another im * n c e  the HUB asserted Jurisdiction over a new 
and used oar.-dealer too also operated, a garage and.gas station*^ ah 
of the dealers purchases and ©ales were made witoto the state* Although 
the new and m od .cars war# purchased in the state* the Board asserted
^  KlPaeo-Ssleta Sue Co., Inc., 79 BtKB No. 1£U.
#  Hwfcoth factor Co. fit. al,# 79 MEAB So. 3».
1. Townsend. 81 H1BB No. 122.
mjurisdiction on the ground that they had been originally shipped from  
outside the state to a distributor within the state*
SSSSZ& cages j^ich jurisdiction £gg been S S 3 M
On the other hand, the ffiSB has refused to assert jurisdiction 
over a photography shop who received annually #25,000 worth of materials 
from out of the state*, the 'Board held that the effect of these trana» 
actions on Interstate commerce was inconsequential*^  HLEB has also 
refused to assert jurisdiction over a chain of four drug stores in one 
city| -where one~third of its purchases were from outside the state, and 
most of the remainder was originally transported across state line s. ^
B M tm m i M m m  Mb  $ m m & . H e  S M
In the past, few months, considerable disagreement has been evident 
in the position taken by the National labor Relations Board and its 
General Counsel, Hr* Robert H* Denham, with respect to questions involve 
ing assertion of jurisdiction over cases where the business only remotely 
affects interstate commerce* Hr* Denham has taken the stand that it is 
the Board*s duty to handle every case over which it has been given 
jurisdiction by Congress* the on the other hand has refused to
handle minor cases, leaving these to state enforcement officials* fhe 
Chairman of the Board, Mr* Herzog, recently defended this position before
m M i
■** fTed Montgomery, d/b/a Pereira Studio, S£ ipj© 87, 
Haleston Drugsto.res Inc*, 82 H1B8 Mo* 148*
a Congressional committee on aralaticms^ ? It is
apparent that the General Counsel, who would seem to have the final 
word In this matter under the provisions of the IUfb~Hartley Act, 
feels that he has aia&ndaie from Congress to prosecute all oases 
arising under the federal law* no matter hew infinitesimal the effects 
of the business upon interstate commerce* Once asked what businesses
he would escsspt from interstate commerce, the General Counsel replied
♦ r ' ■‘X-.
that he could think of none except %  farmer who milked his cows and 
sold the milk down the road#«54
Ihis controversy will ultimately be settled in the courts, but 
until that time the small business man has no assurance as to the
legality if his relations with employees* It may. be surmised that the
outcome of the conflict will be determined in light of recent Supreme 
Court opinions which have definitely been favorable to state Jurisdiction* 
From a logical standpoint, the position of the HU1B is clearly superior 
to that taken by the General Counsel* If the present federal system of 
government is to survive in the United States, the scope of the concept 
of business "affecting interstate commerce1* must be .limited far short of 
the boundary set by Hr* Denham*
^G^edLin Keeeareh Institute of America, labor Coordinator* p* 151#. 
54 Hew forte T im * , V o l. XCVU1, S o . 33,385, June 20, 1949, p. 10.
chapter m m
state  m m u m m  m  xmmm s m m m  agreements
Having examined the background o f modem industrial relations 
regulation in the first chapter* and the problem of federal-state 
jurisdiction in the second* attention is now directed to some of the 
specific areas of industrial conflict in which the states have exercised 
control# The purpose of the present chapter is to determine the nature 
of state regulation of union security agreements* and to discuss the 
constitutionality of such regulation in light of recent Supreme Court 
decisions# However* it is first necessary to point out the nature and 
significance of union security agreements in industrial relations#
X# THE NATURE AND SXOOTX0AN0B OF 
UNION SBpUKOT AGREEMENTS
Union security agreements consist of three closely related types 
of arrangements into which labor organizations and employers may enter* 
usually in connection with a collective bargaining contract# These 
three arrangements consist of the closed shop agreement* the union shop 
agreement, and the aaintenance-ef-moabership agreement#^ * 
l^ finitlon of the closed shop agreement
The first of these three types of union security devices* the 
closed shop agreement* is by far the most iEportant# It may be defined
u jrn uj.ii,«i-mmiinyiiinii.m i t  "-, irnnir 1 i
* Other types of union security agreements may exist* such as the 
preferential shop* but these are of negligible importance in state laws#
mas an arrangement with an employer whereby union membership is'a eon** 
dition of employment* Some writers have made a distinction between a 
el<>se<* ei»p with, a closed union and the eloeed shop with an open union,2 
but the difference is not noted, it* the provisions of the state laws*
Definition <rf the union shop agreement
The second union security device* the union shop agreement, may­
be defined as m  arrangement between m  employer and a labor organise**
* ' . 
tion which provides that persons hired by the employer must become
members of the union within a specified period of time* usually thirty
r *
days* as a condition of future employment* Thus* under a union she# 
agreement* the employer must discharge any employee who has failed to 
join the union by the thirtieth day of his employment* This type of 
agreement has become especially significant since the passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act* which condones the union shop under specified condi­
tions.
Definition of the. mintenance-ofHaembership agreement
The minbenance-ef^n^ type of union security device was
given considerable impetus during World War II by the policies of the 
War labor Board* The Board felt bound to aid labor organisations In 
keeping their memberships intact during the period in which the latter 
had generally given up the right to strike* To achieve this objective*
2 eummlns* B* E.* and BeVyver* ?* ?** She labor Psoblem M  the 
{halted States# New fork*. J»* fan liostrand Co*, Inc** 194^ p* 2I^ T
the Board ordered the Inclusion of imlnteimnce--of-membersIiip clauses 
in contacts which did not provide for a dosed or union shop* if such 
contracts were in dispute* ■ ^ Sisply the maintenance of membership clause 
provides that after a fifteen day period, during which -any member may 
resign from the union* a worker then a member of the union must retain 
his membership as a condition of ecployment for the duration of the 
contract*^
Significance of union security agreements to organized labor
Of all the controversial questions connected with the labor* 
management conflict, that which is concerned with union security devices 
ha© been the most bitterly debated* Specifically, the focal point of 
the argument , ha© been the desirability or undesirability of the closed 
shop* Since little difference exist© between the dosed shop and the 
union shop* in principle* the two devices have been generally treated 
as one*
From the viewpoint of organized labor* the closed shop is the 
flesh and blood of the trade union movement* Xh a ©hop where both 
union and non-union wurisers are employed the latter receive all the 
benefits of the former1© collective bargaining efforts without paying 
their share of the cost of achieving those benefits* labor leaders 
claim that this undermines the morale of union members and prevents 
the organization from gaining new recruits* Also* the fact that the
3 Ibid,, p. 224. • . .
munion does not present a solid front makes the employer-less vulner­
able to the union*s demands*
But perhaps even more important* organised labor feels that the 
closed shop prevents competitive wage bidding by employee©. when jobs 
are not plentiful* Whsre the dosed shop exists* no employee can 
offer to work for less than the union standard wage and thereby deprive 
a union member of employment* Shis applies not only to wages* but also 
to hours and other conditions of employment. If the union*© policy of 
standardisation is to be effective, therefore, it is held that the 
closed shop must be enforced*
Other arguments have been presented by organised labor to back 
up its claim that the union movement depends upon the prevalence of the 
closed shop* Union leaders claim that only where it exists is it 
possible to effectively udisciplinef the rank and file to prevent **wiM~ 
cat1* and "outlaw® strikes* Here the closed shop offer© advantages to
. f
the employer! in some Industries, the building trades particularly, 
management itself has offered this argument in support of the closed 
shop *4
Arguments against the closed and union a hop
Although it may be granted that the above arguments are at least 
partially valid, the closed and union shops have been seventy criticised 
by employers, as well as by a considerable segment of the non-union
4 Haber, W. G*, Industrial Relations in the Building lnd»«fcCT-
Harvard Frees, 1*00, p* 254#
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public* One o f the principal con ten tions, o f those antagonistic to the 
closed shop has been that the employers right to hire whom he pleases 
is removed* The hiring {and firing) of workers Is essentially taken 
over by the union itself, since it alone controls the requirements 
for membership, and therefore employment* The argument is of course 
invalid in the case of a union shop agreement, since the employer may 
employ anyone as long as the worker joins the union within the speci­
fied period of time*
The most appealing argument against union security devices a© 
far as the public Is concerned is that they interfere with the- **right 
to work*1. It is claimed that organised labor, in enforcing the closed 
shop, holds monopolistic power in  the labor market, and that it is 
thereby able to prevent some workers from securing es^ loyment* Where 
union membership requirement© are unduly restrictive, and where exces­
sive initiation fees and dues are emoted, this argument is valid*
SB&aUaB S i £&& controversy
All of the contentions of both those who favor end those who 
oppose union security device© certainly contain element© of truth* In 
the past, the controversy has been too often waged on an emotional 
plane, however, rather than upon the basis of rational analysis* The 
claim that the union movement would die out in the absence of the closed 
shop is as latently propagandist!© as is the contention that its exist­
ence is un-American* If any conclusion Is indicated, therefore,-it-Is - 
that the validity of the argument can-only be proved or disproved through
ma trial and error type of e^ertamtahlon In union mempsy legislation 
by the etuis#* It Is therefore dessJrmbX# to mdk&’#n ms&satlan of the 
m&imsr in which the states have im t the problem of union sMd^ty*
ix* mmiamm m  m m  u m  mmutmo
yjSAvwl 3fc
An examination of the laws of the forty-eight states at the present 
time reveal# the fast that the state# have- b#e» active in regulating 
union security agreements* Xhe use of the term ^ regulate” as used in 
this chapter may seem ambiguous in Ught of the numerous flat prohibitions 
of security M gm m m bti which are found in the laws of lit# states*- 'but 
its broad const r uction to include both partial and unequivocal proscrip­
tions of such agreements will allow a cos$&ate survey of state agreement# add 
will allow a complete mirveyof stale activity in this area of industrial 
relations* fh© t#m tTregualte<,# however* Shall apply to those states 
that limit the us# of u n io n security devices but that donoi prohibit them 
altogether* Xu contrast to this group of states are those that completely 
proscribe the dosed shop* and by inference the union shop and maintemncs- 
of—membership ■sgreeBOBSBts*
M & M * m s tte M m  S£ Site, flft&aiitot deyjgga
twelve states have provisions for the regulation of union security 
devices.5 Ban® of these etates prohibit all union security provisions
I,.,.n , . n...
Alabama, Colorado, Comectieut, Kansas, Kaseachusetts* Michigan* 
Minnesota* New fori;* Oregon* Rhode Island* Utah and Wisconsin*
in collective bargaining contracts* but all set up certain require**
■ ments which must be fulfilled before the agreement is lawful*
One of the most frequent conditions which must be met is that 
a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit must vote for the 
inclusion of the security agreement in the contract* Such a provision 
is found in the law of Kansas* Minnesota* Michigan* fihode Island* 
Massachusetts* Connecticut and Mew fork* A typical provision is that 
found in the Michigan labor Relations Act.6 Section 14 of the Act 
reads:
Nothing in this act shall be construed to interfere with the 
right of an employer to enter into an all-union agreement with 
one labor organisation established among his employees and 
recognised by him* by consent* as the representative of a 
majority of his employees: nor shall anything in this act be
-construed to interfere with the right of the employer to make 
an all-union agreement with more than one labor organisation 
established among his employees if such organisations are 
recognized by him* by consent* as the representatives of a 
majority of his enployos*?
In the two states which do not provide for majority rule in 
union security agreements, Colorado and Wisconsin* more stringent 
requirements must be met* Xh Wisconsin* instead of a mere majority* 
two thirds of the employees voting in the election must signify
willingness to accept the agreement*^  In addition* the State labor*
Board may terminate any security agreement if it finds that an employee
^ 1.'1939» 'Public Act 176.
7 Calif, labor Code, section 921.
£ Colo, Acts, 1943, chapter 131, sections 6 (1) (c), (o),
6 (2) <b), 7 (1).
$m denied taembership In the union without cause*, the latter provision 
is alio found -in the California law in a modified form* tn  that state*' 
the closed shop with the closed union is banned* but closed ©hops with 
■open unions are "legal*? But, thejCelorado law offers the most rigid 
regulation of union security agreements*^ ® . In this' state* such cotw* 
tracts may -be exeeuted pnly after three-fourths of the ^ aployees vote.
, i' - ‘'
for the- agreement in a referendum conducted by the- Industrial. CoBmission* 
titering into asyunion security agreement in-■ai^r. other way constitutes 
an employer unfair labor practice* Following the Wisconsin procedure, 
the Colorado Ccwission may terminate any such agreement if it Is found 
that an employee has been refused membership in the union* And further** 
more* the Act declares that it is not an unfair labor practice for an 
employer to refuse to capitualte to employe# demands for a union security 
agreement*
Aside from the requirement of a referendum .of the employees prior 
he the execution of a union security agreement* three of the states have 
imposed other, regulations on the,making of such agreements* jO&bam^ , for 
expBple* guarantees the. right of .every person to refrain. Ihm joining a 
labor organization, end In the exercise of this freedom* to be free from 
OoereisR, fores, or intimidation either against himcelf or bin .fWOjr*^-.
? Calif* labor 'Code* section $33*
^  Colo. Acts* 1943* chapter 131* section 6 (1) (c), (e)* 6 (2) (b)* 
? <1>*
1# 1943* Act No* section B#
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The provisions of the Utah and 'Oregon laws are essentially the same.
At first glance, it would seem that the closed ©hop was banned* On 
the contrary, the courts of these states have construed the provision 
as' outlawing only unlawful interference wlth .a persons attitude toward 
joining a labor organisation through threats, coercion* or force against 
the person or hi© family*^
Thus it is apparent that even in these twelve state© which allow 
the closed shop and other union security agreements, the making of such 
contracts is subject to rather thoroughgoing regulation. Even where 
they are allowed to exist in the states, there is the further regulation 
of the Federal Government* The Taft-Hartley Act, while allowing union 
©hop agreements under certain circumstances, prohibit© closed shop agree­
ments in industries and businesses affecting commerce. All but three of 
the twelve states, however, provide for elections prior to the execution 
of security contracts which are as restrictive or more restrictive than 
the Taft-Hartley Act* The essential difference in the state laws and the 
national law is that the former do not provide for a thirty day period 
between employment and required union membership, a provision which is 
essential to a legal union shop in interstate commerce * It is clear, 
therefore, that closed shops could not lawfully be executed in busi­
nesses affecting interstate commerce, although they are legal in intra­
state commerce* . Their legality in these states, where they affect commerce 
is clearly unconstitutional! whether or not they will be so held is a
■.nil", "inmm n.rnru-H" ri.mj.lijntir ip ii.-M.jimnrl-rrj iwrilirMriilt-
Hotel and Restaurant Bspjoydeg International Alliance and 
Bartenders International league of America v. Arthur Greenwood. 249 Ala. 
265, Ala. Sup,Ct.(l947). - !
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matter of Aether or not the I&&B asserts jurisdiction*
Prohibition t|he .closed shop and pfthar union secu^ dtv
the regulation of union security dm ices by the states has not 
ended with a mere recital &£ conditions which must he fulfilled prior 
to the egseution of an agreement*' legul&iieii* as such* has been cast-aside 
by a number of the states in favor of flat prohibitions of the closed 
shop* And since there has been no differentiation between the closed 
shop# the 'Union shop* and maintenance«ofmembership agreements in 
them state laws* they may be. considered to proscribe all union security 
devices*
Thirteen states3^  have enacted prohibitions against union security
agreements either by legislation or constitutional, amendment*. The oldest 
such- law in force is that of Hevada* which dates bach to 1929. The 
height:, of the anti-*eIosed shop drive was reached in 194?* when seven 
states took action*. Since then* only one state* Borth Dakota* h m  im * 
posed a ban on the closed shop* The geographic distribution of these 
states indicates that bans .on the -closed shop 'have come from the non* 
industrial* predominantly agricultural sections- of the country* This 
may be accounted for by the lack of union strength in these areas* It 
is not unreasonable to suggest that the closed shop prohibition# in the 
Southern states indicate a defense against the organisation drives which
^  Virginia* Texas* Tennessee* South Dakota* Borth Dakota, Berth 
Carolina* Nevada* Nebraska* Iowa* Georgia* Florida* Arkansas* and Arizona.
 y r ~ ™
5?
<9 ' •
many national unions have recently conducted in that area*
Among these thirteen states that proscribe union security In
all its forms, several interesting variations may be observed* The
Arizona constitutional amendment declares that*
Ho person shall be denied the opportunity to obtain or retain 
employment because of non-membership in a labor organization, 
nor shall***(anyone) enter into any agreement, written or oral, 
which excludes any person from employment or continuation of 
employment because of non-membership in a labor organization#*^
Florida fs constitutional amendment provides that the "right of persons
to work shall not be abridged on account of membership or non-membership
in any labor union, or labor organization*. ♦ • Georgia has enacted an
elaborate statute, containing eleven separate sections, all of which
simply proscribe union security in any form whatsoever* The Horth
Carolina statute of 194? not only prohibits the closed shop, but also
gives reasons for the action* It declares that*
The right to live includes the right to work* The exercise of the 
right to work must be protected and maintained free from undue 
restraints and coercion* It is hereby declared to be the public 
policy of Horth Carolina that the right to work shall not be 
abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor 
organization or association*
The Horth Dakota statute begins with the statement that "Ho person shall
!
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,1* 
and subsequently points out that because the closed shop is such a
Constitutional Amendment, adopted Hov* 5, 1946*
3-5 Constitutional Amendment, adopted Hov* ?, 1944*
16 L. 1947* chapter 328, sedtion 1.
deptivabion# all' such contracts are mil and vold*^ ?
It Is- apparent that in spit© of the variation in temimlegy ai*d 
mttesaiimtion msptc^Bd by these states# ■ the statutes ape essentially 
similar* there-1© to doubt but that they on© and all prohibit the 
making of union security agreements#
Althougha total of tweniy^ fiv© eta-tee at present either thoroughly 
reptote #r flatly proscribe union security agreements in collective 
bargaining. contracts#. at lea st tie* states tere taken action recently to 
prevent each reflation or prohibition, the legislature of the state of 
hhlne* after enacting a dosed -shop h m  in-1047# found that a legal 
teelmi-aality prevented the hill from becoming h©# -it • the general eleo* 
tion in September# 194&# the hill and a constitutional amendment initiated 
fey the people were submitted for a referendum* Both of the .measures mm 
defeated at the polls* Wm Hampshire, has also taken steps to remove regu-» 
latlona on union security agreements* these regulations# Imposed in 1947# 
wore repealed on March 11# 1949*^
Eaiing surveyed both the regulation and the prohibition of union 
security devices .by the. states, the task remaining is to -determine the 
const 1 tut tonality of union security regulation fey an e^ amlsaatlon of 
pertinent Supreme Court decisions*
1* 1947#- chapter 243# section 1# effective July 29# 194t* 
10 1 . 1949* chapter 57.
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tty, tor ccesrautioNALira of i
tMfT W  *00® 4^£*MS*CIXJS&iyf J?X *tlpSi ifi3fcj*Al£&
Iwt* top*# scare of to# states bow prohibited and wgwlsbed 
the closed shop and union goimritF agreements of other types for many 
$m m $ the consittubiomlity of those statutes had awer bean given 
authoritative eojuiidembton until early la 1949* M  1945* Florida1'# 
constitutional amendment declaring that the "right to work" shall not 
he denied bacsu## of wmtortofp or SKU^embertolp la- a labor organise 
tion was upheld by the state warts* but la Ifid this Judgement was 
reversed by the United States Supreme Court on the ground that the 
florid# court# had jaisccastrued the . An effort was made to
obtain an authoritative wnstracbion in 1947# but with no success♦
Cn January 3# and parch 7, 1949* however, too Supreme Court 
matoitoXXy clarified the state# of state 'union security regulation* 
Cpinions by the court to the Itocoln federal case* and toe Algoma ftoiood 
s^d Veneer case haw been discussed to connection with the Jurisdiction 
problem* lb# third decision* toerican of &##!» v* Amsatoati
SS^MSSM-SS^* 20 **» merely an extension of the Mneoln FedeiraA
judgement* handed down on the same day* He avoid repetition* toe 
#®pha#to to this discussion shall, be placed- upem the no^Jurisdicttoml 
aspect# of these opinions upholding toe validity of union security 
regulation.
iy m  &* m s m  m  o. s. sea, e m u .
93 Law, «t» Advance' Opinions 209, (1549).
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la. combining the questions. m in in g  under the M m a fk a amsn*§»*
rnent m&, the Berth Carolina statute banning the closed shop In the «.
case of Idneela Federal labor Union v* ISerfchweefcern lion and. Metal Co#,^
the Court me faced with a masher of issues*, first M g .  these me
whether or not the abates* In prohibiting employment discriadn&tion
either for membership or iwiNeesherehip in. a labor organisation# ’tod
violated constitutichel grants of freedom of speech# and the right to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, as ,
guaranteed by the first Jtoendment and protected from Invasion by the
states in the fourteenth itendment*
Hr* Justice M&eS%. speaking for m ix of the Justices# felt that
the- state provisions proscribing the dosed shop did not so do*.. .In this
connection he declared*
Under the state policy adopted by these laws# sap!pyers must# 
other considerations being equal* give equal opportimlt.is0 for 
remunemtive work to union and m zm m lm  members without discrlmlna- 
tlon against either*, 'in order to achieve this objective'***# employ** 
»rs are forbidden to make contracts which would obligate them to 
Mrs or keep m m  but union members* Nothing in the language of the 
laws indicates a pmpoee to prohibit speech* assembly*.' or petition**** 
It In difficult to- see how enforcement of this state policy could 
infringe the freedom of speech of anyone# or deny to anyone the right 
to. assemble or .'to petition, for a redress of grievances**®
fhts opinion was further strengthened by Mr* Justice B3aek*s statement
that there weannot be « m g  from a constitutional, right of workers to
^  93 .law*; ed* Advance Opinions, 201# {19493-* 
22 Ibid-■ at 204.
ass^ib3je***a further constitutional right to drive from remunerative 
espleymeht ;all other persons- who will, not or cannot#, participate in
' fhe second issue# whether the state -laws violated freedom of 
contract m  provided for' in Article I'section 10 of the 'Oonstituti'sm# 
was prcmptly dismissed as -a contention ^ without meritw by -the Court*
cited foas and .jfcfjgft V* .^ aisdeil* 290 C* S*
394# -and other .exporting cases*
It mi toiler contended that the laws of Horth Carolina and 
Bebraska deny union members and- union organisations equal protection 
of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth j&aendtani* this assertion 
mss refuted' by the Court, because «inideniical language these’ state' 
lams 'forbid employers to cliscrimiimte against- union and mt&mlm.- 
lumbers* " -Kebras&a and lorth Carolina thus equal employment oppor­
tunities for- both gimps of workers**1^
- The fourth issue was. Aether the "laws deprived the mipn m^ers ' 
and union organisation©# or eaployers# of liberty without due process 
of law* ■ the specific contention of -the appellants was- that the part of 
the- laws -which.prohibited makin.g of discrimimtory contracts was in ; •' 
conflict with the Fourteenth But Mr* Justice Black thought
otherwise! 'if **the states have -constitutional power to '‘ban such diaerSia* 
Inatlcn %  law# they also-: have power to- ban contmefee which if perform
union
at 205. 
BtitU. at 206.
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wnuM bring about the prohibited - m  m  holding*
« *  Court wmdered the precedents of Jggig *» gg&g. Stoteg*26 and 
CoooaKe v. toneas.^  null «n& void# if auch action wae even necessary 
in light of the Courtis construction of the due process clause since
ilthmigh the Gourt g&rongly upheld the tot!* Oareliha and W tem &fo 
prohibitions of discrimination against union or aon^ unlon m m herst some 
doubt ■aa&eied as to whether they would as vigorously simeiion the Arlsona 
amendment^ , which provided that only noiGHfflefflhers of labor organim.tions 
were protected from ei^ layment diserhaimtion* fhis case# ftaeffi&im 
-f t , labc^ -V*, Ja^ erlcaii Sfe&ft and. Boor' Op*#-, was decided on the 
some day as the Mneote federal- case#. Hr* Justice Black again delivering 
"the opinion of Hie Court*
3h holding that the -Arisotm amendfaeni prohibiting "the closed shop 
did not violate freedom of speech* assembly* or petition the Gourt relied 
on the reasoning• of the Mnooln Federal decision*:' the principal- issue*, 
however* 'was whether the failure of the- law to provide the seine protection 
to union mmfa&tn m  that which was provided for non-union .workers denied 
the former" equal protection of the lews*-. In refuting the contention that
>lW>^ ilWl>W <)l,1|^ i<i« . y i»^i|wm i»Mr(l>|ii'i>UJIHi|i.i<i»ii|llll<|.
26 208 B. S. 161 (1908).
• 27 236 8*. 8* '1* (1915) ♦
equal protection had been denied malm jgHlhers*. *|ustif# J8X&& poinisi. 
to the State'*0 m % i~ ^l3 u m  dog contract Jaw* ,Fusthe**a&re# he m pv®&* 
m & the view* previously heM by the Gourt* that l^egislative .authority* 
everted, within its proper field* need net embrace all ihesvlle ■ within 
Its reach.02® Therefore, merely because the State of Arizona had not 
provided that dieerimta&iion against union aon&sro in mm
unlawful* dons not render the- protectioh -afforded another gsmg*
undOnstltutional*.
* .’*^- ’
' %- those two decisions* the Court ifeusupheld the closed ship.
' \ ' * . * -* - ' ' *
prohibitions in the thirteen states that have such lawn* tad in the 
m m ^  decided three months later* the Court upheld the right 
m i the states to regulate the making of union security agreements*
« » * j. ?
that MprnS,m»- .to effect* establishes the constitutionality of the 
proVioioiis in the laws of .twelve other states which require*, prior 
to the e&ecuticn of ^ .such an agres«aent| a referendum in which a 
. mlority or more Of the authorise the; contract*
t deo^ympj.
it is'pertmp# too early- to judge the effects of the decisions 
discussed above,# there is. .little doUbb* however* that the Cburt*# 
opinions will encourage other-state#1-to- either regulate or prohibit
„ _  ^  tism^SamS SgBsgf So. I ' M mBoat'd. 93 Z&w. ed. Advance {fcinioaa 541* (1949)
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u n io n security devices. The fact that the power of the state to 
take action in this field of industrial relations has been upheld 
without reservation* and without strong dissenting opinions* shears 
away many of the. obstacles which in the past have mdm mam states 
reluctant to attempt ^ gelation*
Perhaps the most significant effect of the decisions is that 
they involve a considerable extension of the power of the states* 
which in the past has been narrowed considerably by a restrictive 
construction of the due process -and equal protection clauses of the 
Constitution* tn ether fields of regulation* this construction 
began to yield to a more liberal Interpretation a number of years 
ago* finally being abandoned in the case of Nebbia v;* Hew York» in 
1934* How the Robbia philosophy has been applied with full force 
and effect In the - regulation of security agreements in industrial 
relations* The precendent has been established* whether it will be 
expanded or Halted in the future depends largely upon public opinion
and the composition of the C o u rt*
Ho attempt has been made in this discussion of union security 
regulation and prohibition by the several states to ^rove” the
desirability or undesirability of such legislation# It ms submitted
afoove^ O however* that only through experimentation within the states 
could the controversy foe resoXvedU In  this cormection* Mr* dusttee
•' t c ‘ ■* '
Frankfurter1 s opinion in the. Ameidcan Sash and Hoor case is illuminate, 
ings
See page
Even where the social undesirability of a law may be convincingly 
urged, invalidation of the law by a court debilitates popular 
democratic government* Most laws dealing with economic and social 
problems are matters of trial and error* That which before trial 
appears to be demonstrably bad may belie prophecy in actual opera-* 
tioru It may not prove good, but it may not prove innocuous* But 
even if a law is found wanting on trial, it is better that its 
defects be demonstrated and removed than that the law should be 
aborted by Judicial fiafcv**’
^  M k 1* American Bash and Door Co** op* clt* at 216,
chapter mm
STATE REGULATION OF PICKETING
i
lb has been shown in the preceding chapter that many states have 
regulated or prohibited union security agreements in collective bargain* 
ing contracts* This, however, is but one area of industrial relations 
in which the states have been active in exercising their Inherent police 
power* It is the purpose of this chapter to examine another field of 
industrial relations which has been subject to state regulation, that 
which embraces the use of picketing as an economic pressure device by 
labor organisations* Because of the importance of judicial decisions on 
the regulation of picketing by the states, a review of selected Supreme 
Court opinions is advisable at this boint* This discussion is followed 
by a survey of present state laws affecting picketing, together with 
an evaluation of these provisions in light of controlling precedents of
9
the Supreme Court*
I* ATTITUDE OF THE COURT TOWARD 
PICKETING PRIOR TO 1940
Picketing as an economic pressure device has had a long and 
variable history before the courts of the land* Oily forty years ago 
the majority of the judicial fraternity considered all picketing, peace-* 
fbl or attended with violence, as a tort* Thus in Pierce v; Stablemen *s 
Unionthe California Supreme Court held that a legitimate boycott was 
rendered unlawful merely because the unions demands had been transmuted
1 156 Calif. 70, 103 Pac. 324, (1909).
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to the public by a picket line. That the picketing was carried on in 
an orderly and peaceful manner was of no concern to the court5 neither 
was the fact that the attendant strike was for union recognition-—not 
a purely economic strike. The sole concern of the court was the legality 
of the picketing, Justice Henshaw reflected much of' the. early attitude 
toward this union device when he declared*
'Me think it plain that the very end to he attained by picketing,*, 
i© the injury of the boycotted business through physical molestation 
and physical fear caused to the employer, to those whom he may have 
employed or who may seek employment from' bin* and to the general 
public* The boycott having -employed these means for this unques- ■' 
tioned purpose,- is illegal and a court will not seek by over-niceties 
and refinements to legalise the use of this unquestionably illegal 
instrument*^
Truax v* Corrigan
The views of the courts on picketing were not wholeheartedly shared 
by the state legislatures, however* Soon 'after the Clayton Act was passed 
by Congress in 1914# & number of states enacted their own anti-injunction 
laws which to all appearances made peaceful picketing by strikers non- 
enjoinable* The State of Arizona had a statute similar to the provisions 
of Section 20 of the Federal law at the time the Trua*? case reached the 
courts of that state* Briefly, the facts were that the employees of -a 
restaurant in Bisbee, Arizona set up a peaceful picket line in front of 
the establishment during -a strike. The placards which the picksters 
carried were quite micomplementary to the owner, the quality of his food, 
and his practices in dealing with employees, The picketing, while peaceful,
'*Zbia.' !
3 Truax V. Corrigan. 257 U, S. 312, (1921),
mwas very effective, cutting the business volume of the restaurant down 
to twenty-five per cent of nonaal* An injunction application against 
this activity ms refused feythe trial Justice, a judgement which ms 
affirmed by the highest court of the State*
In 1921, the plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court on constitutional grounds, contending that the state law deprived 
Mm of property without due process of law, and denied Mm equal pro­
tection of the lam* the majority of the Court, following the preced­
ents of the frl-Cityk case decided two weeks previously, held that the 
picketing had been carried on in an unlawful manner, and that the 
Supreme Court of Arizona had misconstrued the statute* Thus, it is 
apparent that the Court felt that .even peaceful picketing, carried on 
by strikers who carried signs which did more than advertise the exist­
ence of a dispute, ms unlawful. 3h the - Tri-Cities case, Chief Justice 
Taft had laid down seme .rather stringent regulations on picketing, 
limiting pickets to *one lone missionary* at each point of Ingress and 
-egress of the struck, plant, but Truax v* Corrigan marks the heighth of 
restriction on this union pressure device*
The Senn case
The.most important develcpaent in labor relations, as far as 
picketing is concerned, between 1921 and 1937 was the enactment of the 
Norria~LaGuardia Act in 1932* Section 4 (e) of the statute provides
4 j&ssisgs Ipafiaass s* J&-£&ias; central JteSsa fesro a*
257 u. S. 184,
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that no court shall, have jurisdiction to issue an injunction or tem­
porary •restraining order ■against "(living publicity to the existence 
of, or-the' tacts involved in, -any labor dispute* whether by advertising, 
speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or 
violence*1* One of the principal effects of the law was to en&our&ge 
the adoption- of the so-called "little Korris-la<kiardia Acts" by several 
of the states* the case of Sena v» filelayers Protective Union* 5 
ms a landmark picketing case prior to 1940, ms essentially a judgement 
by the Supreme Court of the validity of these state anti-injunction acts, 
and as Professors Gregory and Kats have pointed out, it is difficult "not 
to 'regard the Senn case as the first assurance from the United States 
Supreme Court that the Rorris-baGuardia Act was constitutional*
fhe ^ enp. case presented the question, of whether the Wisconsin anti­
injunction provision, which declared peaceful picketing, 'patrolling, and 
related activity by strikers immune from injunctive action, violated due 
process or equal protection of the laws* According to the facts in the 
case, Senn, a small tile-laying contractor, was-picketed for failure to 
conduct his business on a closed shop basis* Previously, he had agreed 
to the union *s demands if he were allowed to- work at the trade along 
with his employees* But because the union wished to retain the work for 
its own members, it refused to grant this concession* Setm requested an 
an injunction against the picketing, but it was refused, a judgement
5 301 U. s* 466, (1937)*
6* Gregory, 0* 0*, and Kats, H* A*, labor law* Mchie Casebook 
Corp., Charlottsville, fa*, 1940, P* 2?1*
70
subsequently affirmed by the Supremo Court of Wisconsin#
Mr* Rustic© Brandeis, who had dissented in Truax v* 
held for the Court that the 1921 case did not apply to the present con­
siderations* He then proceeded to deny plaintiff1© appeal that he had 
been denied liberty and property {the right to use his hands at his 
own trade) without due process of law* and that the state statute 
authorising peaceful picketing had been a means by which that right 
had been denied* Peaceful picketing, he further declared, is not pro­
hibited by the Fourteenth Amendment j indeed, apmfeere of a union may make 
known the facta of a labor dispute without specific authorisation from 
the state, since that right has been granted by the First Amendment to 
the Constitution*
Although the Senr, decision did not completely overrule Truax v# 
Corrigan and American Steel Foundries V #  Tri-City Central Trades Council* 
it was dear that the Court would no longer hold picketing, not attendant 
with violence, coercion, intimidation or libel,' .a© unlawful* Furthermore, 
the Court now considered the making known of facts in a labor dispute as 
a Constitutionally guaranteed right# It should be noted however, that 
Justice Brandeis merely stated that members of a union might ’‘make known 
the facts in a labor dispute, for freedom of speech Is guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution11, a statement which has been erroneously interpreted 
as meaning that picketing itself is.free speech guaranteed by the Consti­
tution*? Biers is a significant difference between what Justice Brandeis
. ? Gregory, C. 0*, labor and the law* W* W* Horton and Co*, Hew fork, 
1949# p# 340* • * ' > •
said and what a lumber of studentsof labor law have inferred front 
hie opinion# However, three years later the Court itself adopted the
view *|hat picketing which is carried on in  a peaceful manner is a form
. of speech which may not 'be abridged, thus rendering the argument purely 
academic.
II* flCKEfUSG AS SHSECH FB0M194G fO 1949
While the Bern decision ejcpounded the principle that peaceful
picketing could not. be, enjoined by, the courts, and that, the states were 
within their Constitutional - rights" in passing, legislation making this. 
union device non-enjoinable, the,basis upon which picketing was held 
to be legal was considerably altered in 1940*
The Doctrine of Thornhill Alabama
In that year, the Supreme Court enunciated its now-famous doc­
trine that peaceful picketing was a form of speech, and thus Constitu­
tionally protected from abridgement by the First and Fourteenth Amend- 
ments# This case, Thornhill y* Alabama* marked the end of the concept 
of peaceful picketing as *a contradiction in terms as held by Chief 
justice Taft in the Tri-City case. The question before the Court was 
whether a state statute which was. so broadly drawn, as to proscribe 
picketing in any for® was a violation of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment which protects freedom of speech from abridgement 
by the ‘states*: In holding the Alabama law prohibiting picketing
'" *« Alabama. 310 II* S*. 88, (1940).
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unconstitutional# Hr. Justice Murphy saids
The existence of such a statute* which readily lends -itself to 
harsh and diserin&h&iory .enforcement by local, prosecuting officials 
* ♦•results la a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom 
of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its pun- 
View*^
This new doctrine of the Court* wherein picketing is regarded on 
the same inalienable plane as other forms of speech* was indeed a far 
cry from that enunciated in v* Stablemen^ s Union little more
than thirty years before* .Sn Carlson y* California,^  a case decided 
soon after the Thornhill decision* the Court reaffirmed the freedom of 
©peech— peaceful pirating incept* and in A m tim x t Federation of labor 
y* Swing^ the doctrine slashed its broadest development* In this case* 
stranger picketing* that is* picketing by persons other than employees* 
was held to be Just as much a to rn  of speech as that which obtained when 
the picketing worker© were en^ loyees* The Court upheld stranger picket­
ing in this case in spite of the fact that neither the employer nor his 
employees desired unionism#
Limitations on tfaft Thornhill doctrine
In spite of it© Immediate benefits to organised labor* the Thorn­
hill doctrine has not given such organisations unrestricted freedom in 
picketing# It soon became apparent that picketing as free speech would
9 Ibid.
10 310 U. S.-IPS', (3.940). 
•U312;U,.'.S. 321, (1 9 a ).
nbe held subject to- the earn© restrictions which attend other fonns of 
speech protected from abridgement by the Constitution. there seemed 
to be no question bat that the C ourt would- not protect violent picket-* 
log as an - inalienable right to free speech* and -indeed it did not#- In 
M ilk m m n Drivers Onion local. 753 v* Meadowmoor Dairies the
Court refused to consider picketing ^ enmeshed with contemporaneously 
violent conduct11 in the m m  light as peaceful picketing# A1so* a state 
statute which regulated picketing by allowing the State Employment tela* 
tions Board to issue a cease and disist order to prevent mass picketing* 
threatening of employees, obstruction of factory entrances and streets* 
and the picketing of workers homes, was upheld by the Court even though 
such activity proacrlbed by the State *ae carried on in a peaceful manner,23 
Another limitation on picketing as free speech was made in Carpenters 
agg Joinera Union of flmerlca v. Bitters Cafe.22* it was here determined 
with clarity that the states could restrict the communication of ideas by 
means of the picket line to an area in which the labor dispute actually 
existed. In keeping with this limitation* the states are free to enjoin 
or prohibit by statute picketing of m  establishment with which the pickets 
have no dispute* even though . they may have a grievance with the owner in 
connection with Ms dealings with them in some other transaction# But this 
does not prohibit peaceful picketing where no labor dispute exists as
12 312 U. S. sm » (1941).
23 315 0. S. 74Q» (1942), 
U  315 «, s. 722, (1942).
ndefined by .state law#,^  only that which has ‘been, called:-' secondary pitted ‘ 
eting*
. . From 1943 through If&t# the Supreme Court was not called upon to 
extend# limit# or clarify the themhill doctrine* However# on iprtl 4# 
If49* the Court handed down m . opinion which not only restricted# but 
further clarified the- doctrine of picketing m  free speech* In Glboney 
y> Empire Storage. and Ice Cfo* the Court was faced with determining 
whether peaceful picketing could be enjoined where such picketing Is 
c^arried -on^asj^s^prable and essential part of a course of conduct" ox 
as^ inpep^ rable and essential part .of a 'Course of conduct which is in , 
violation of the state law*^ fhe ice peddlers union in Kansas City# 
Missouri sought to induce all non-eieEiber peddlers to Join the organisation# 
most of whom refused* M  order to put pressure m  the recalcitrant ped* 
dlers* the union sought to enter into agrements with wholesale distribut­
ors whereby the latter would only sell Ice to the union members. Only ; 
one distributor refused#, the appellee# and he ms promptly picketed by 
the union* 4 Missouri statute makes such an agreement an unlawful resr 
traint of trade# punishable by heavy fines and i^ ris^ mient* . fhe appellee 
petitioned for injunctive relief and It was granted by the trial court# 
and subsequently affirmed by the highest court of the State*
* f  MfMSZJSM iMS&SZ MSS£2§. 323 M fiS S t SSS. X* M & * 3*5 
U. S* 769, (1942).
^  93 X*«r ed. Advance Opinions 650, (1949)»
17 Ibid,, at 651*
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fh holding that the injunction me properly obtained* and that 
the picketing ms unlawful, though peaceful* the Court saich
It iias rarely been suggested that the constitutional freedom 
„.. for speech and press extends, its. immunity to speech cr^ wriilng 
used as m  integral part ait conduct in violation of a valid 
criminal statute# reject the intention now.
Neither fhorafalll if* Alabama»:#*mr garXson v. California* *# 
supports the contention that conduct otherwise unlawful is 
always immune iwm state reflation because an integral part 
of 'that ‘■induct M  carried bn by display of placards by peaceful 
pteketers**■
Thus* the Court has placed two rather broad limitations oh the 
HmrnhiH doctrine since 1940# In the first piece * picketing* to be
1 ' ■ •• . * *
protected tm m abtddgemenb by the abates* must be conducted in' a law* 
ful manner# Violence* intimidation* threats* and coercion remove 
picketing carried on in this maimer from the area of constitutionally:/ 
protected free speech*' In  the second place*, the picketing must be 
exercised for ends which are- not in themselves unlawful* Picketing* 
for an aaBeaspla* to force an employer to grant a closed shop lit a stats 
which prohibited union security agreements would clearly be enjoinable 
in light of the jfeoige Storage decision just reviewed* However, where 
the picketing la peaceful* and tbs ends sought art- not unlawful* the 
-Supreme Court .has Indicated its intention to strike dam stats regular 
tion© -that impose greater restriction© on the right to picket* fhis 
widely utilised device to exert economic pressure on amployers and the 
public has become ftoaly entrenched as a form of speech* and there is 
little likelihood that the Court will not continue to regard it as such.
Ibid** at 654#W- *r * .
IH* PROVISIONS OP STATE LAWS 
WHICH REGULATE PICKETING
The landmark cases concerning picketing and its regulation by 
the states having been reviewed, the remaining sections of this 
chapter deal with the provisions of state laws which are designed to 
regulate this form of concerted activity by labor organizations * In 
■a general manner* two questions arise with respect to those picketing: 
regulations# First* what is the general state policy toward picketing 
as a union pressure- device? And second* what is- the constitutional 
status of these laws in light of controlling decisions of the Supreme 
Court* particularly those that have been rendered since 1937?
Constitutional, regulation of picketing
In one fora or another* picketing has been regulated by thirty* 
six of the forty-eight states* In a few states* regulation has been
imposed by the judiciary in the absence of specific legislation* In
\
several others* picketing has been indirectly regulated through the 
"little Nor ris-LaGuardia* acts*. But in the majority of the states, 
specific regulatory legislation has been passed that limits in some 
manner the right of unions to picket* In a surprising number of state 
laws dealing with this phase of union activity elements of unconstitu­
tional restriction of free speech are to be found* On the other hand, 
many states have exercised considerable restraint in the regulation of 
picketing*, and have closely conformed to the limitations which the 
Supreme Court has defined* (My those regulations that are clearly
constitutional am  discussed at this pointf the examination of laws 
which are in. conflict with the announced policies of the Court are 
left for a subsequent section*
One of the most frequent regulations of the right to picket 
found in state laws is that which outlaws picketing which is directly 
or indirectly attended with -violence* intimidation* and undue coercion# 
Fifteen states*^  have enacted specific measures which outlaw- picketing 
carried on in this tenner# It is not unlikely that the court©, of any 
state in the union would hold such picketing unlawful* even in the 
absence of specific statutory authorisation* It ha© been pointed out 
that the Thornhill doctrine was not intended to embrace violent picket­
ing in the realm of constitutionally protected freedom of speech. In 
the Headovsaoor Dairies case*, decided a year after Thornhill y> Alabama* 
this limitation on picketing was specifically made by the Court to dispel 
any doubt or ambiguity concerning the status of violent picketing.
A typical provision outlawing the use of violence in picketing 
is found in the Virginia statute*
It shall be unlawful for any person singly or in concert with 
others to interfere# ** with another in the exercise of his right 
to work*.• by the use of force, threats of violence or intimidation, 
or by the use of insulting or threatening language directed toward 
such person* to induce or attempt to induce him to quit his employ­
ment or refrain from seeking oEployment.20
Alabama* Colorado, Delaware* Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, 
Hew Jersey, Texas, Idaho, Nebraska, Hew York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 
Virginia*
^  Va. 1*. 1946, chapter 229*
Th© statute also declares picketing unlawful where violence is used to 
obstruct free passageway to and from a place of business, or to obstruct 
the public streets* It should, 'be noted that the violence does not have 
to be 'manifested in physical force, since even threatening speech renders 
the picketing unlawful* On the other hand, the prohibition of picketing 
which obstructs free ingress and egress from the establishment being 
picketed, and the obstruction of public streets should not b© interpreted 
too broadly* Almost any tyse of picketing, even by a single person 
carrying a sandwich board, might otherwise be- held to constitute an 
obstruction to free- passage way*
In light of the inherent power of the state to protect the public 
safety, specific provisions of state laws outlawing violent picketing 
may appear to be superfluous* However, since much industrial conflict 
has had its origins in the presence of a belligerent picket line, the 
states cannot be' criticised for specifically outlawing this activity* ■ 
Certainly the Supreme Court has given the states a free hand in pro­
hibiting violent picketing.
In eleven states2^  provisions may be found which prohibit mass 
picketing. Ordinarily, no indication of what constitutes mass picket­
ing is given, but in one state, Texas, the term is rigidly defined*
In that state mass picketing includes any picketing in which there are 
more than two pickets at any one time within- fifty feet of any other 
picketer or pickets, or where there are more than two pickets within
^  Colorado, Georgia, Michigan, Hew Jersey, Ohio, Texas, Utah, 
Wisconsin, Delaware, Pennsylvania, South Dakota*
fifty feet of any entrance to the establishment, or where picketing 
constitutes an obstacle 'to free passageway.2^  Other states seem content 
to rely upon the judgement of the courts to determine when mas s. picketing 
exists#.
The constitutionality of prohibitions of mass picketing by the 
states has been inferred from Supreme Court decisions* There has been 
no- clear cut declaim in this matter since Chief Justice Taft declared 
mass picketing to be unlawful in the Tri-City case in 1921. However, 
Justice Roberts, in his dissent in the Ritters Cafe decision, stated 
that there was no doubt but- that the states could, limit participant©' in 
picketing to "reasonable numbers”.23 But what actually constitutes a 
reasonable number of' pickets is apparently -left to the .judgement of the 
state court©*
A number of other regulations have been placed on picketing by
i
the states, - all of which are plainly constitutional* Picketing to * 
achieve an illegal end has been proscribed by Massachusetts and Oregon, 
a right which the state© may exercise in light of Giboney y* Empire 
Storage and Ice Co* Texas has declared that the misrepresentation of 
facts by pickets is unlawful, and the courts of a number of other states 
have condemned untruthful picketing* Florida .and Kansas have also * 
limited the area in which pickets may operate to a place of business 
where the dispute exists* Such laws were held constitutional in the
22 House Bill No. 41* effective 9/4/47.
23 Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritters Cafe, og. clt., (1942).
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Bitters Cfofef. decision* ten. states2** have specifically proscribed the
picketing of a worker* a home, this regulation having been affirmed in 
the Allen Bradley case*
Provisions of doubtful constitutionality
In spite of the doctrine of fhornhill v* Alabama, and its later 
extension in the Swtn^  case, a number of states have enacted laws which 
are clearly in conflict with the concept of peaceful picketing as free 
speech* One of the most flagrant examples of state legislation which 
violates this principle is that of Nebraska*23 Any person who p^ersists 
in talking to or communicating in any way with (a) person or members 
of his immediate family against his or their will**2^  is picketing in an 
unlawful .manner* Also* a picket who is loitering about, picketing or 
patrolling the place of work of any person against his will^ 7 is guilty 
of an unlawful practice* It should be noted that the picketing proscribed 
is not violent or coercive, in which case the law would not be subject 
to question* But the mere showing of persistence in communicating with 
a person, even against his will, is deemed peaceful picketing by the 
Supreme Court and the .states may not prohibit it.2^
^  Connecticut, Florida, Ohio, Kansas, Michigan, Wisconsin, Bela* 
ware, Utah, Nebraska* Arizona, an the other hand, specifically legalizes, 
home-picketing *
25 Neb. Kev. Stat* 1943, section 20*012*
26 Ibid.
27
,$enn v* file layers Protective Union* 301 U« S* 460, (1937) *
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A number of other state laws have proscribed stranger picketing, 
in violation of the awing decision* Hi© provisions relating to stranger 
picketing in Missouri, South Dakota, Delaware, Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Minnesota and Morth Dakota clearly conflict with the Supreme Court* s 
decision* Hi© Pennsylvania statute, however, has been declared uncon­
stitutional. Delaware court© have interpreted the ©tat© statute as 
meaning that no picketing is lawful where a legitimate 'strike does not 
exist,2? Worth Dakota, similarly, declares that only an employee of 
the employer may lawfully picket,3® Virginia’s law is also unconatitu- 
tional in the light of AKA y* Swing* It reads as follows i
It shall be unlawful for any person who is not, or immediately 
prior to the time of the commencement of any strike was not, a 
bona fid© employee of the business or industry being picketed to 
participate in any picketing activity with respect-to such a 
strike or such business or industry*^
It is apparent that the states are openly flouting the Supreme 
Court holding that a person need not be an employee of the establishment 
as a prerequisite of lawful picketing* In so far as these states continue 
to restrict free speech by limitations on stranger picketing, they are 
abridging the constitutional protection of the first Amendment* Hie re 
is little doubt that the' Supreme Court will declare such provisions 
unconstitutional whenever they are subject to its purview.
29 Motion. Picture Machine Proi ectionist s Protection Union v.
Malta' t b a a t .......
1* 1947# section'12, chapter 242*
^  1* 1946# chapter 2291
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A few of the states have limited picketing- to situations in. viiich 
a labor dispute exists*32 The Newark statute was struck down by the 
Court in. Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl»33 where it was held that ; 
picketing by a union could not be enjoined merely' because a labor dispute 
did not exist*. These statutes -are unconstitutional^ , not only because 
they violate the Wohl decision* but because they also preclude stranger 
picketing*
Evaluation of state picketing regulation
As has been pointed out in the preceding discussion* not all of 
the present regulation of picketing imposed on unions by the states is 
a valid exercise of state authority* However* the Court has left the _ 
states free to restrict picketing in certain situations* The Thornhill 
doctrine has not been so broadly construed as to prevent the states from 
prohibiting violent picketing*, the picketing of workerrs 'homes* mass 
picketing* and picketing to achieve unlawful ends* On the other hand, 
in spite of-the action some of the states have recently taken* they are 
prevented from enjoining' peaceful picketing for legitimate objectives, 
stranger picketing, and picketing in the absence of a labor dispute*
In light of the numerous state provisions which attempt to regulate 
picketing in areas in which the Supreme Court has .held that they live no 
authority, it is likely that the Thornhill doctrine will be subject to
* t "
much attack in the future* The concept of peaceful picketing, however,
32 South Dakota, Texas, New fork*
33 315 u. S. 769.
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as constitutionally protected spaaed has become ftmly entrenched in
V
the thinking of the Court, and it is unlikely that there will be a
significant retreat from this position# .
CHAPTER FIVE
STATS REGULATION OF THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT
It has been shown in the twe preceding chapters that the states 
have exercised a significant degree of regulation in the economic con­
flict between employers and employees, specifically in the restriction 
of union security agreements and picketing# It is also significant to 
note that the legislatures and courts of the states have taken definite 
action in yet another sphere of industrial relations, that which embraces 
the use of the boycott by organized labor as an integral component of 
its economic policy* As in the case of union security agreements and 
picketings the preponderance of state action with respect to the boycott 
has been restrictive in nature* The purpose of the present chapter is 
to survey the extent of restrictive legislation of the states designed 
to regulate boycotting, and to determine the fom which such legislation 
has generally taken* In order to provide a foundation for this study, 
an examination of the historical status of the boycott as determined by 
the courts and the legislatures must first be made*
1* HISTORICAL STATUS OF THE BOYCOTT
Since there are a number of t^ pes of boycotts, it is desirable ito 
make a working definition of the form of boycott which has been regulated 
by the states* Since the primary boycott has generally been upheld as an 
unquestionably legal labor weapon, it has not been subject to restriction. 
It is the , secondary boycott that has been subject to censure by the courts
as
and the legislatures! - therefore, where the tern "boycott1 is used in 
this study it means the secondary form exclusively* One writer has 
declared that the boycott is a term of "vague signification of which 
no accurate and exhaustive definition has ever been given* This 
opinion notwithstanding, the secondary boycott, as defined by most 
states, involves the concerted refusal to patronize an establishment 
or to handle goods which have been made by -non-union labor, and to 
Induce others not to patronize or handle such goods* Hie element of 
coercion is almost invariably present in a secondary boycott* There is 
a close relationship, furthermore, between the boycott and the strike.^
Hie Danbury Hatters* case
Although the boycott was declared illegal by some state courts 
3
as early as 1886, and one state, Alabama, proscribed its use in 1903,
the Supreme Court of the United States was not called upon to judge its
merits until 1908, when the famous Danbury Hatters * case^  came within 
its purview. The Hatters * union, in an attempt to unionize the Loews 
Co. of Danbury, Connecticut, instituted a nationwide boycott of Loewe 
hats, not only by refusing to patronize dealers handling the products of 
the company, but also by bringing pressure to bear upon the dealers 
throughout the country to discourage them from handling the boycotted
^ Oakes, £. S., Organized Labor and Industrial Conflicts. Lawyers
Cooperative Publishing Co., Rochester, 1927, p* 601.
^ See Taylor, A* G., Labor Problems and Labor Law, Prentice Hall 
Inc., 1939, New York, p. 490~
3 People v. Wilzig. 4 H* Y* Crim. 403, (1886)*
** 2* Lawlpr. 208 U. S. 274, (1908).
products The question before the Court was* granting that the boycott 
had interfered with interstate commerce* whether the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act applied to labor organisations and their coercive activities* The 
majority of the Court held that the Act was to be construed as applicable 
to interferences with commerce by labor organisations as well a© business 
combinations in restraint of trade* The Hatters1 were fined some $252*000 
under the treble damages provision of the Sheman Act*
The Bucks Stove case
In 1911* the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Loewe v* 
Lawlor* It held* in Compere v. Bucks Stove and Bange Co#*'* that an injunc­
tion against the circulation of “unfair1* and “we don*t patronise** lists 
had been properly served since the use of these terms is “as much subject 
to injunction as the use of any other force whereby property is unlawfully 
damaged#**^  This adverse decision* coupled with that of Loewe v. Lawlor* 
considerably lessened the use of the boycott until after the pug sage of 
the Clayton .Act in 1914* which was hailed by Samuel Compere as the “Magna 
Charts of Labor#** It was soon apparent however* that the eructations 
of labor with respect to the boycott provisions of the Act far exceeded 
what little Immunity it provided in actual practice# A review of the 
Supreme Court1© interpretation of the act will demonstrate this fact*
rv t
5 221 U* S, as, (1911).
"SB &**>lex Printing case
The landmark ease Involving the legality of a secondary boycott 
under the Clayton Act was that of Duplex Printing Press Co# y* Peering#?
The Duplex Co# conducted an open shop in Michigan* where it manufactured 
printing presses for delivery in other states. Mew York City providing 
a market for a large share of the firm1 s product# In 1913 the Machinists1 
union called a strike at the plant at which time only fourteen union 
members walked out# The strike itself was ineffective, but the ^concurrent 
institution of a secondary boycott against the plaintiff1© product in Mew 
York City was successful* Members of the union in Mew York refused to 
install the Duplex presses3 customers of the company were threatened if 
they purchased the Duplex product; trucking companies were, threatened with 
trouble if they delivered the presses; and repair' shops were- coerced into 
refusing to work on previously purchased machines.
In 1921, the Court held that even under the Clayton Act, a secondary 
boycott could be enjoined# The principal reliance of the Court was on 
section 20' of the Act, which it construed to prohibit injunctions only 
where the legitimate purposes of labor were lawfully being carried out 
by employees of an employer* The Court considered the restraint of trade 
to be an unlawful objective* Furthermore, the union members who instituted 
the boycott did not stand In a proximate relationship of-employees of the 
Duplex Co* These two 'facts rendered the boycott an illegal, interference 
with commerce, and folly demonstrated the ^inherent weaknesses of the Clayton 
Act* The Duplex decision was reiterated in 192? in Bedford Cut Stone Co*
7 254 0. S. 443# (1921).
m%• Journeymen .atone Gutters Association*^
The Boycott wider the Horris-laGuardia Act
Mi&tever organised labor failed to achieve from the Clayton Act, 
it gained under the 1933 Korris-laCKxardia Act* this pre-Hew Beal legis- 
lation remedied the faults' of the Clayton Act* declaring that no injunc­
tion could be issued in a labor dispute regardless of Aether or not a
$
proximate relationship between employee and. employer existed* Under the 
construction of the Act by the Court the landmark case with respect to 
boycotts was United States v. Hutcheson,^  decided in 1941* The facts of ♦, 
the case involve a jurisdictional dispute between two unions over which 
organisation should perform certain work in the Anheuser-Busch plant in 
St* Louis* After lengthy arbitration, the work was given to One of the 
unions engaged in the dispute* ibis action was followed by a strike by 
the members of the union which had been deprived of the disputed work in 
the plant, coupled with a concerted campaign to induce other union members 
to refuse to patronize the products of Anheuser-Busch, specifically to 
refuse to drink Budwelser beer* By use of banners and parades the union 
advertised the boycott, and by distribution of leaflets and circulars to 
the effect that Anheuser-Busch was on the union1© u^nfair1* list*
Mr* Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court held that the 
secondary boycott could not be enjoined under the Morris-LaOuardia Act*
In this connection he stated*
3 274 U. S. 34, (1927).
9 312 V, S. 219, (1941).
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Hie underlying aim of the Harris-laQoardia Act was to restore the 
broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton 
Act but which was frustrated* so Congress believed* by unduly restrict 
tive Judicial construction*** *The Horris-IaCkiardla Act was a disap­
proval of Duplex Printing Press Co* v* Peering* Supra* and Bedford Cut 
Stone Co* v* Journeymen Stone Cutters* Assn***,*l°
In holding the secondary boycott legal* it was necessary for Justice 
Frankfurter to reverse the Court*® holding in the Buniex and Bedford Cut 
Stone cases* Thus* United States y> Hutcheson stands as the controlling 
case in matter© involving the secondary boycott as far as the Supreme Court 
is concerned* Recent federal legislation* however* has overruled the 
Court*
Secondary boycotts under the Taft-Harbley Act
In 1947* secondary boycotts were proscribed by Congress a© unfair 
labor practices by unions under section 8 (b) of the amended national 
Eolations Act* and were made subject to damage actions by section. 303 of
the labor Management Relations Act* The two provisions are identical in
scope* the former calling for intervention by the HLRB* the latter giving 
■approval to the entertainment of suits by injured parties* Section 8 -(b) 
read© = in part* It shall be an unfair labor practice for a- labor organisa­
tion or its agents*
1 t
to engage in* or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in* a strike or concerted refusal in the course
-of employment to use* manufacture* process* transport* or otherwise 
handle or work on any goodsl # *or to perform any services* where an 
object thereof iss♦••forcing or requiring any employer or self- 
employed person to Join any labor or employer organisation or any
10 Ibid*, at 236.
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employer or other person to cease usings selling, handling, trarm~ 
porting, or otherwise dealing In the products of any producer..*or 
to -cease dealing with any other person****
In addition it is an unfair labor practice. for a onion to .institute a
boycott to force an employer to assign work to- a particular labor organic
ssatlon* thereby rendering the Hutcheson decision impotent as far as the
present is concerned* Hie policy of the federal government at the
present time, therefore* is to- prohibit the us© of the secondary boycott
.in the industrial conflict* Hie course of state action has followed a
similar trend* as shall be brought to light in the remaining Sections of
this chapter*
u* m m s a x m  of state iams m m
BBSPBCT TO THE SBGCIIMHX BOfCOTT
The use of picketing* the strike* and the secondary boycott are 
so interwoven aa to make a complete differentiation between them* as 
far as state statutory regulation is concerned* almost iixpossible*
Twenty of the states^ however, have enacted laws dealing with the 
secondary boycott which are so. clearly intended to proscribe or limit 
its use that there is no question as to their application* In two- of 
the states* Alabama^ and California,^ the prohibition of the secondary
' 11 j&abaw&j California, Colorado*. Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa*. Kansas* hassachusetts# Hinnes.ota, Mxesotiri, South Dakota, Oregon, . . 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, ferns, Utah and Wisconsin*
^  Invalidated in API y# McAdory* 246 Ala* 1, (1944) •
33 Invalidated in Ex Partp ELaney, 184 P* 2nd 892 (Cal. 1947)*
boycott has been held unconstitutional; and the proscription of agricul­
tural boycotts have been struck down by the courts in Idaho,^ 4 South 
Dakota, and Oregon**^  Other provisions of the latter three laws were 
unaffected, however, making' a total of eighteen states having valid laws 
prohibiting the secondary boycott at the present time*
Unconstitutional prohibition of boycotts
It is worthy of note that both the Alabama and the California 
courts have rendered the anti-$econdary boycott statutes unconstitutional 
in those states* Doth of' these laws contained whot cargo** provisions, 
which made the refusal to handle non-union made goods, or goods made by 
a rival union, unlawful* The Alabama Supreme Court reasoned that workers 
have a constitutional right to refuse to handle non-union material*
Hie invalidation of the California Hhot cargo” and secondary boycott 
provision was made on three separate findings of the state court* First, 
it held that the prohibition was an unreasonable exercise of the State*s 
police power on the freedom of speech, press and assembly* Secondly, 
the statute was so vaguely drawn that it was impossible to determine what 
conduct was unlawful* An third, the statute did not differentiate between 
conduct which the state might regulate and other conduct which enjoyed 
constitutional immunity*-^  One or more of the above charges could apply
^  Held unconstitutional in AF1 v* Lanalev. 66 Idaho 763, (1946)*
15 Invalidated in AFX. v. Bain. 165 Ore. 1B3, 106 P. 2nd 544, (1940).
16 Mk 2* HcAdogr. og. cit., note 12.
W  Ex Parte KLaney, og,. cit.. note 13.
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to many of the other state laws which prohibit the secondary boycott, 
but where test cases have been presented the statutes have been held a 
valid exercise of the state police power#
The boycott as a nnfpt* unfair labor practice
In eight of the states*** where the constitutionality of ,fhot
cargo” and secondary boycott statutes has either been upheld or no
ruling has been made, this type of union activity has been declared a
union unfair labor practice# the Delaware provision is typical# The
law declares that It shall be an employee unfair labor practice!
To engage in a secondary boycott or to hinder or prevent, by 
threats, intimidation, force, coercion or sabotage, the obtaining, 
use or disposition of materials, equipment or services, or to 
combine or conspire to hinder or prevent, by any means whatsoever, 
the obtaining, use or disposition of materials, equipment or * 
services*^
This provision is exactly duplicated in the Colorado Labor 
Relations. Act,*® a district court in that state has held that where a 
labor organisation attempted to organise non-union dairies by inducing 
truck lines to discontinue deliveries to non-union establishments, and 
by inducing union workers to cease construction of non-union dairy
buildings, such ■conduct is not unlawful where it is carried on in a
/
peaceful manner*^ To all appearances then, the intent of the Colorado 
statute had been subverted by the court, although the law was not held
rmi.- r - n r : j g ^  Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsyl­
vania, Utah, and Wisconsin# .•
^  L, 1947# chapter 194, section 2 (g),
L, 1943# section B (2) (g)* *
^  Hennl/>h v, .International. Brotherhood of Teamsters* (Colo# 1946), 
District Ct,, Denver County, 11 Labor" {S^s’43,094, Feb# 27, 1946#
unconstitutional# The Kansas provision, on the other hand, has been 
held to be an unconstitutional violation of freedom of speech*^
Of the eight states that hold the secondary boycott to be an 
unfair union labor practice, Minnesota^ has proscribed its use in the 
most elaborate terns* With respect to the boycott, a declaration states 
that 5
It is recognised that whatever may be the rights of disputants 
with respect to each other in any controversy, they should not be 
• permitted* **to intrude directly into the primary rights of third 
parties**#legislature, therefore, declares that, in its 
considered Judgement, the public good and the general welfare of 
the citizens of this state will be promoted by prohibiting secondary 
boycotts and other coercive practices in this state*2^
In keeping with this declaration of policy, the Minnesota statute not
only declares the use of the secondary boycott to be an unfair labor
practice by unions, but also prohibits it as "an illegal combination in
restraint of trade and in violation of the public policy of this state
Worth Dakota also has provided that the secondary boycott is in conflict
with the public policy of the state
The boycott as a conspiracy in restraint of trade
In addition to the Minnesota provision above, three other states2^  
declare secondary boycotts to be an illegal conspiracy in restraint of 
trade* South Carolina law, for example, provides that any agreement by
Stapleton v, Mitchell, 9 labor Gases 62,574. 
^  tm 1947, chapter 436#
Ibid*, section 179*40*
Z* Ibid., section 179*43*
^  L# 1947, chapter 242, section 13*
Missouri, Illinois, and South Carolina*
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two or more persons "to refuse to buy from, or sell to, a person because 
such person Is not a member of an association, or to threaten to boycott 
such person is a conspiracy in restraint of trade.f,28 the vagueness of 
this provision, and its all inclusive scope, would tend to make its 
constitutionality subject to question* A Missouri statute,29 however, 
which is similar to the South Carolina law, has been upheld* The Missouri 
Supreme Court held that the Constitution of the United States does not 
guarantee labor unions the right to boycott, and under the State1s Anti- 
Trust Act such conduct may be enjoined as an illegal restraint of trade.20 
Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, thereby strength- 
ing, in a negative way, the constitutionality of these provisions* Illi­
nois has similarly declared the boycott to be an illegal conspiracy in
restraint of trade, and also proscribes the posting of notices, or dis­
tribution of circulars to the effect that a boycott is in progress "with 
the fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to injure the 
business or property of another**##"^  An Illinois court has held that 
the publication of libeous statements by a number of employees against 
managerial personnel cannot be enjoined as a conspiracy where such state­
ments would not be subject to an injunction if made by an individual.^ 2
South Carolina Code, 1942, section 6628*
29 3* B* 79, L*. 1947# section 8.
2° Rogers v* Potect* Sup* Ct*, 355 Mo* 986, 13 Labor Cases 64,180,
(1946)* Certiorari denied, dune 16, 1947*
*
2^  111* Laws, chapter 38, section 139*
22 Montgomery Ward and Co* v. United Retail, Wholesale, and Depart­
ment Store Employees, Sup* Ct*, (111* 1948) 14 labor Cases 64,398.
95
Other State provisions making the boycott unlawful
& number of the states33 have merely declared the secondary 
boycott to be unlawful* without characterising it as an unfair labor 
practice* an illegal restraint of trade* or as contrary to public policy* 
Iowa34 for example* declares that the -secondary boycott and “hot cargo11 
agreements are unlawful* and provides penalties of fine or imprisonment 
for violation* Injunctive relief may also be severed from illegal 
coercion# Georgia^ -* declares the use of a secondary boycott to be a 
misdemeanor and subject to penalty* as does the Missouri statute *3& 
the Texas boycott statute declares that:
It shall be unlawful for any person* **to establish* call* parti~ 
cipate in* aid or abet***a secondary boycott****37
The Texas Courts have construed this provision to mean that violations
may be prosecuted under the anti-trust laws of the state*3&
Evaluation of anti-boycott statutes
It may be observed from the . preceding discussion that a signifi­
cant phase of state regulation of industrial relations has been the 
prohibition of the secondary boycott* Mot only have twenty states 
specifically outlawed this fern of concerted activity* but also .in- the
33 Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Missouri and Texas*
34 l* 1947, chapter 297, effective May 1, 1947#
35 &4 1947, Act Mo* 141, sections 5, 6*
36 1, 194?, S. B, 79, section 8.
3? Texas K; C. S. 5154 f. section 1.'
f4mer v. Zanea. (Texas, 1947) Ct. of Civil App., 14 labor Cases 
64,310, 206 S. W. 2nd, 144. •
courts of two other states it has been condemned as an illegal, practice .39 
It is worthy of note that none of the states have 1 regulated1* the use of 
the boycott by prescribing situations under which it would be legal % 
rather, the states have outlawed it without reservation* This policy is, 
of course, in harmony with that of Congress at the present time*
The question of the relationship between the secondary boycott 
and the free speech doctrine which the Supreme Court has applied to 
peaceful ^picketing is one charged with potential controversy. Whether 
the Court will, or should, confer constitutional imaunlty on peaceful 
secondary boycotting through an extension of the Thornhill doctrine la 
a matter for conjecture. The courts of three s t a t e have declared 
secondary boycott and whot cargo” prohibitions invalid as an unconstitu­
tional exercise of state police power* In these cases, however, the 
basis for invalidation was the vagueness of the provisions, rather than 
the illegality of the secondary boycott nor se»
Arguments may be presented in support of the view that peaceful 
secondary boycotting is as much an exercise of speech as is picketing* 
Chief among these Is that the two forms of union activity are substan­
tially interrelated* A boycott is almost invariably accompanied by 
picketing, and picketing may be thought of as a form of the secondary
boycott, in that it is an attempt to persuade third parties not to deal
*. *
with the employer* If this point is conceded, is it possible that the
nrrrr-n iruWriir—i 'm * r r r r .  m u hit :.-|'T.h . “ rrr;»l
Mew York and Ohio*
^  Alabama, California, and Kansas*
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Supreme Court could reasonably confer constitutional immunity on peace­
ful picketing,, and at the same time hold anti-boycott statutes to be a 
reasonable exercise of state police power? It is submitted, however, 
that the parados is only theoretically existent, and that in actual 
practice, the imposition of a secondary boycott by a labor organisation 
is significantly different from the use of a picket line* In the first 
place, the effect on third parties is not identical* A picket line 
where peaceful, is a means by which ideas are communicated to the public 
by passive means* The public, as the third party in the dispute, may 
accept or reject the communication without realising harm if either 
course is taken* In the case- of the secondary boycott,, on; the other 
hand, demands made to third parties usually result in retaliatory action 
if not accepted, and there is typically no free choice possible. It is 
difficult to ■visualize a successful boycott which could’ be carried on in 
a peaceful manner, as that term has been defined by the courts with 
regard to picketing. If a labor organization only requested cooperation 
from third parties, without threats or intimidation, it is unlikely that 
the request would be accepted in many instances*
Chief Justice Taft, in 1931, stated that peaceful picketing was 
a 11 contradiction in terns His contention was subsequently overruled 
by a later Court where it was held that peaceful picketing was speech 
and therefore protected from abridgement by the states* Whether peaceful 
secondary boycotting is a c^ontradiction in terns** or whether the Court 
will eventually confer it with the immunity of free speech will undoubtedly
41 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council. 257 
0. S. 184 (192l) .r
be determined in the near future* the large number of state anti- 
secondary boycott statutes makes the clarification of this matter 
extremely urgent* From the available evidence* furnished by the re­
strictions which the Court has placed upon picketing as free speech* 
together with numerous recent decisions upholding state police power 
in the matter of union security agreements* it is reasonable to suspect 
that the Court will not strike down state secondary boycott prohibitions*
CHAPTER SIX
STATE LIMITATIONS ON THE EIGHT TO STEIKE
In the preceding chapters* attention has be focused upon the 
manner in which the state legislatures have regulated some .Of the 
inport ant economic weapons which have been utilised by organised 
labor in the industrial conflict* It has been shown that the state 
governments have been active in prohibiting or limiting the right 
of employees to make union security agreements* to picket* and to 
employ the secondary boycott* These devices* however* are usually 
considered to be of secondary importance to the principal economic 
weapon used by labor to achieve its objectives* the strike* The 
overshadowing importance of the strike is not difficult to understand* 
for it is the most effective way in which pressure may be exerted on 
employers to induce them to cosily with the demands of organized 
employees* It is the basis upon which all the coercive tactics of 
labor unions are grounded; indeed* the picket line and the secondary 
boycott depend upon the existence or threat of a strike to render 
them effective in many instances*
Although it has been clear that the states cannot absolutely 
proscribe all strike * activity since the Supreme Court so held In 1923*^  
they have enacted a significant amount of regulatory legislation designed 
to limit in various ways the right to strike* The purpose of this chapter
1 Wolff Packing Cto. v , Kansas. 262 U* S. 522, (1923).
100
is to surrey the important areas of strike regulation to determine the 
extent of such regulation and the principal forms which it has taken*
A recent trend toward differentiation between strike regulation in 
private industry and similar regulation in industries "affected with 
the public interest" necessitates their discussion under separate see** 
tions of this chapter*
X# STRIKE REGULATION XM PRIVATE INDUSTRY
The concept of "private: industry** in relation to state regulation
of the right to strike Is somewhat ambiguous* Private industry has been
subject to increasingly frequent inroads of state regulation under the
inherent police power* and since 1934* the Supreme Court has been
*
inclined to look with favor upon the encroachment* It may be argued 
that there are no industries which do not affect the public* But as far 
as strike regulation is concerned the states have generally reserved to 
private industry all businesses which are not absolutely essential to 
the public safety, health and general welfare. Communications, trans­
portation, water works, sewage disposal plants, and electric light and 
power plants have generally been-excluded from the private industry 
category*
Procedural regulation of the right to strike
One of the most effective means by which a large number of the 
states have regulated the right of employees to strike has been the
2 Nebbla v. New York, 291 U, S. 502 (1934).
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formulation of procedural requirements which must be met before a strike 
is Instituted against an employer# Procedural regualtions have taken 
two general forms, .the requirement of a strike election, and the require­
ment providing for a c^ooling off” period prior to a proposed strike.
The strike election requirement. Thirteen states^  have enacted 
statutes requiring that an election be held prior to a strike to determine 
whether or not a majority of the employees are in favor of taking such 
action* In Colorado,^  for e:x&mple, it is an unfair union labor practices
to cooperate in engaging in, promoting or inducing picketing, 
boycotting or any other concomitant of a strike unless a majority 
in a collective bargaining unit of the employees of an employer 
against whom such acts are primarily directed have voted by secret 
ballot to call a strike#
In Florida, a state which does not define unfair labor practices, the 
legislature' has declared it unlawful to p^articipate in any strike with­
out the majority secret ballot vote authorising the strike#!*^  Missouri 
Imfi requires that the election
•**shall be held.and conducted at such place or places and under 
such rules and regulations as the Industrial Commission may pre­
scribe in order to assure a secret, fair,and impartial election 
and a fair count of the ballots##*#
In addition,- this statute declares that m  election, to be valid, must *
be preceded by notices to all employees that the vote is to be held#?
*
3 Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, louisiana, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Morth Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin and Michigan#
& L* 1943, section 6 (2) (e)#
 ^1945 Supp,, section 481*09 (3)*
6 3* B. 79, U  1947, section 3*
? Ibid*# section 4*
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three of the state laws which require m  election of employees 
prior to a strike have been invalidated by the courts* These states 
are Alabama,^  Kansas,^  and Oregon*-*® The Alabama Supreme Court held the 
requirement unconstitutional o il the ground that it tended to curb lawful 
as well as unlawful strike#* A district court held the Kansas statute 
unconstitutional in 1945* It declared that the right to strike, like 
the right to freedom of speech, is a fundamental liberty which the state 
.may not. abridge in the absence of clear 'and present danger to the. com-*. 
©unity* Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court in 
the Alabama decision but was dismissed for lack of substantial question*^ 
The Court did not consider the constitutionality of that part of the 
statute dealing with procedural requirements*
The rteoolin& off0 period requirement* Eight states, Colorado, 
Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, North Dakota, Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin, require that a specified period of time must elapse between 
the calling of a strike and its actual inception* Of these provisions, 
that which is found in the Georgia law is most stringent* No labor 
organisation and no local shall call or cause any strike, slow-down or 
stoppage of work until after a thirty days1 written notice is given to 
the esployer, stating the intention to take such action and giving the
 ^Alabama State Federation of labor v* McAdory. 244 Ala* .1, (1944)*
 ^Stapleton vl Mitchell* 9 labor Cases 62,574, (Kan., 1945)*.
10 Mk X* Bain. 165 Oreg. 133, 106 P. 2nd 544, (1940).
11 235 U. S. 540, (1945).
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reasons therefor*-^  Colorado requires that twenty days* notice must 
be given prior to the inception of a strike in non-agricultural 
Industries, and an additional ten-days in agricultural industries* 
Delaware and North Dakota only require that notice be given*
The cooling off period requirement is designed to aid in 
effecting a settlement of the labor dispute* The element of surprise, 
which is a vital factor in many strikes, is significantly lessened, 
however, by this procedural requirement, and organized labor Is thus 
deprived of the right to take immediate, effective action* One writer 
is of the opinion that the cooling off period is in reality a heating 
up period, and is actually designed to prevent the advantage which 
organized labor might gain from surprise action*^ Whatever is the 
truth in this matter, it is doubtful that the requirement is as effec­
tive in promoting industrial peace as that which requires an election 
among the employees affected prior to the strike* The latter reduces 
the number of “wildcat” and “outlaw” strikes in industry, and protects 
the majority of ecployees from irresponsible action by a dissatisfied 
minority*
Peculation of strikes in violation of collective bargaining aisreements 
In addition to procedural requirements, the states have limited 
the right to strike by prohibiting strikes in violation of a collective
rrrito^rrTi^W-nvrv,
1* 1941, Act No* 293, section 3*
^  15 University of Chicago law He view 282, (1948), *
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bargaining agreement* Eleven states1*' have acted in this respect,
excluding a 1949 Michigan statute1^  which prohibits any. strike to upset
>
a valid certification by the State■labor Eolations Board*
Pemsylvania has made a specific exemption in its Anti-Injunction 
Act of strikes which are called in violation of an employer-employee 
agreement* The law declares that the act shall not apply in any case 
involving!
*«*a labor dispute, as defined’herein, which is in disregard, _, 
breach or violation of***& valid, subsisting labor agreement****1®
Both injunctive relief and damages may be sought in Colorado,
Delaware, Missouri, South Dakota, Texas, Worth Dakota, Louisiana and
California, if a strike is called in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement* A strike for this purpose has also been included as an unfair
labor practice by laws in Colorado, Minnesota, and Wisconsin* The
Minnesota provision is typical! It is an unfair employee labor practice
for
any employee or labor organisation to Institute a strike if such 
strike is in violation of any valid collective agreement** *and the 
employer is, at the time, in. good faith complying with the pro­
visions of the agreement**#*1'
State prohibitions of jurisdictional .strikes
The existence of jurisdictional, strikes in industrial, relations.
^  Pennsylvania, Colorado, Delaware, Missouri, South Dakota, Texa^ 
Horth Dakota, Louisiana, California, Minnesota and Wisconsin*
*5 Public Act No. 230, Acte 1949, effective May 31, 1949. 
1^  Title 43, section 206d, Purdon's Stets. Anno, '
1? 1. 1939, section 179.11 <1).
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has prompted a number-of states to enact specific, proscriptions of this 
type' of union activity* The jurisdictional ©trike involves a work ' 
stoppage as a result of a conflict between two- or more labor organisa­
tion© over the right to represent a group of employees, or the right to 
perform certain type© of job© for an employer* fhe former type of 
jurisdictional strike, is a direct result of dual unionism and the exist­
ence of rival labor organisation© | the latter form is at least partially 
due to unavoidable technological progress* The prevalance of jurisdic­
tional strikes in recent years has not been taken lightly by the public, 
to whom the' jurisdictional ©trike represents a gross mate of productive 
power and efficiency, nor by the employer© vfoo find that their plants 
are strikebound even though they have no dispute with either union*
►v
Consequently, much pressure has been brought to bear on the state 
legislatures to curb such ©trike©*
At the present time, eleven states1^  either prohibit or strictly 
regulate jurisdictional ©trikes* Bepre sentative of the group of state© 
that merely prohibit such strikes is the provision of the Florida statute 
which declares ■ that it is unlawful for any person !}to interfere with work: 
by reason of any jurisdictional dispute, grievance or disagreement 
between or within a labor organisation,thus condemning both types 
of jurisdictional strikes*
Califondl, Florida, Kansas (invalid), Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Missouri, Oregon (invalid), Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, lorn, and Minnesota*
19 1945 Supp. section 481,09 (3).
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Other states* such as Michigan^  and Minnesota* have set up 
rather elaborate machinery for the settlement of Jurisdictional dis­
putes* in addition to prohibiting strikes growing out of these con­
troversies# ■ The constructive- approach to the problem, taken by Minnesota 
Is worthy of comment* In this state* whenever a Jurisdictional dispute 
arises* the employer may request that the .labor Concialiator notify the 
Governor of the State that a Jurisdictional dispute exists# The latter 
then may appoint a referee to hear the conflicting claims of the disputant 
labor organisations# The referee nsliaH make such decision as, in con­
sideration of the past history of the organizations, harmonious operation 
of the industry, and most effective representation for collective bargain­
ing, will best promote industrial peace*1 1 Following the appointment of 
the referee, it is declared to be unlawful to strike against the employer* 
While the prohibition of Jurisdictional strikes by the states 
prevents their occurrence, it is necessary to point out that the problem 
of Jurisdictional disputes cannot be solved by legislation* is long as 
dual unionism exists in the United States, and, as long as technological 
progress continues to change the manner in which certain tasks are per* 
formed, these conflicts will continue to plague industrial relations* 
Methods of settlement, such as those which’ the Minnesota law provides, 
constitute a more enlightened solution to the problem, of course, than 
the mere proscription of Jurisdictional strikes*
The sit-down strike
Another form .of work stoppage which the states have prohibited by
n urn I# ii m-ic 1 9 4 1 ,  s e c t io n  1 7 9 * 0 0 3  •
legislation is the sit-down strike#. During the latter half' of the 
1930* s, this device was used on a wide scale by the rubber worker’s,
-the auto -worker’s and a number of other major unions* From its incep­
tion there' was little doubt but that it was an illegal method of exert­
ing' economic pressure# the question was convincingly decided in 1939 
in the case of MUffl y> Fansteel Metallurgies Corporation * ^  in which 
Chief Justice Hughes characterised it as Ma high-handed proceeding 
without shadow of legal right**1'
Fourteen states^ have specifically prohibited its use by employ­
ees# Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota*
Pennsylvania* Utah and Wisconsin- declare such a strike to be an employee
/
unfair labor practice# the Wisconsin statute is typical# It provides 
that it shall be an unfair labor practice for any employee or labor 
organisation to Mtake unauthorised possession of property of the employer 
or to engage in -any concerted effort to .interfere with production except 
by leaving the premises in m  orderly manner for the purpose of going cm 
strike."23 This provision has been interpreted to include as an employee 
unfair labor practice intermittent work stoppages for attendance of union 
.meetings which are called for the purpose of slowing down production*^ *
30b U. S* 2m,
Colorado* Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Utah- Vermont, Washing­
ton, and Wisconsin#
23 L. 1939* chapter 57* section 111.06 (h).
^  MM of America jr. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board. Wis. Sup.
Ct,* 1947* 12 labor Cases 63,843*
those states that do not have labor relations acts have pro­
hibited the sit-down strike as unlawful, illegal and subject to injunc­
tive relief# Washington declares such a strike to be. a felony and 
excepts it from the state’s -anti-injunction act*^ It is clear, that • 
even in those states that have not condemned the sit-down strike by 
-statute it would be enjoined* la view of this fact, few sit-down 
©trikes have occurred, in .recent years*
\ .
Other regulation of ©trike activity
In addition to- the main categories of strike regulation which 
have been discussed above, a number of states have enacted miscellaneous 
laws-which are of less importance* Six states,^ for example, have 
prohibited strikes by public employees, the Missouri statute readst
Any employee of the United -States, or of this state ...who shall 
call, support, encourage or participate in any strike against his 
employer shall be considered engaged in an act of grave and 
immediate danger to the community and ©hall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor.#^
This type of ©trike prohibition is* of course, in line with the policy of 
the Federal Government with regard to public employees* Such employees, 
however* have been granted the right to organise and bargain collectively*
Texas, Horth Dakota and Missouri have outlawed sympathy strikes* 
Epical of these statutes is that of Horth Dakota which declares- sympathy 
strikes to be %gainst the public policy and against the peace and dignity
25 hem* Rev* Stat**, section 2^ 63-4♦
^  Michigan* Missouri* Hew York, Ohio* Pennsylvania and Texas*
\
27 L. 1947, S, B. 79, section 7. (Repealed, July, 1949)*
of the (state)**.and shall be subject to restraint by the district 
courts...as well as suits for damages therein."28 In Arizona, moreover, 
it is illegal to force an employee to strike against Mo will,27 and in
Massachusetts it is an employee unfair labor practice' to strike where the 
objective thereof is to force any person to eoinmitt an unfair labor 
practice*
In one state, Oklahoma, the law relating to striking, ^ if given a
literal interpretation, apparently outlaws nearly every type of strike*
The provision reads*
It shall be a misdemeanor to prevent by force, threats, or 
intimidation, any person from enploying another, or to compel such 
employment, or to ecsspel a person to alter his mode of carrying' 
on business, or to limit or increase the number of his...(employees) 
or their rate of wages or time of service*-*®
Since almost any strike contains the element of force or coercion, the
■. *fc
law could possibly be construed m  prohibiting even the so-called economic 
strikes for- better wages and conditions of employment. If interpreted in 
this manner, the constitutionality of the provision is extremely doubtful.
II* STRIKE REOIMTIOH W  PUBLIO 0TB1TSES
To this point the discussion of state regulation of the right to 
strike has been confined, though not absolutely,^ to such regulation
■,nTiirn,'-,:ntri)iilim,WTjmTOinarTin,.'t'j.ii.;ii:iir'irtiinro‘[;ti'ri:',riTi(t'..
1* 194?, chapter 242, section 13* (Approved by referendum,
July 29, 1940*)
1* 1947, ’ chapter 01, section 5&-1304*
3® cM&h<mia Stats*, Title 21, chapter'.30, section 030*
31 Many regulations may apply to both private and public industry.
no
m  it applies to employees of private business and industry,-' Since a 
somewhat different approach to the problem of strike .regulation has 
been taken in the public utility field, it is desirable to make a 
separate study of the pertinent legislation#
3 M  regulation o f strikes Jg| nubile utilities
In  the course of a strike in. a private industry, two groups are 
primarily affected, the employers and the employees* Only in an indirect 
way is 'the general public inconvenienced# Such is not the case, however, 
when a work stoppage occurs in. a public utility industry,. for not only 
are the employers and employee© affected through loss of profits and 
wages, but also a burden is placed directly on the citizens who depend 
upon the utility for essential service#
The public has recognized -the desirability of continuous operation 
of public utilities for many years, since these industries are by nature 
monopolistic and effective substitute© f o r their service are not readily 
available# Thus the court© as well as the independent regulatory com­
missions have -often insisted on continuous operation of a utility, even 
to the extent of denying abandonment petitions where a fair return, on 
investment could not be made*^ 2 It has been firmly established that the 
interest of the public in  m ch an enterprise must be considered in any 
decision affecting the operation of the utility, and that management 
prerogative, which is dominant in private enterprise, must not go un­
restrained where the general welfare of the community is at ©take*
3% Transit Commission jr* United States* 284 U* S» 360, (1932) *
In spite of the traditional attitude of the public with regard 
to the continuous operation of essential utilities, the states took 
little action, prior, to the 194? legislative sessions, to eliminate 
disruption of utility service as a result of strikes*' Kansas,^ North 
Dakota,*^  and Colorado*^  had experimented for many years with public 
utility strike regulation, with varying degrees of success* It was only 
after the wave of public utility work stoppages that swept the country 
in the wake of the coal strike in 1944 that a large number of states 
recognized, the significance of the problem* At the present time twelve 
states^ have legislation that limits or prohibits the strike in a public 
utility industry*
The need for strike regulation In public utilities introduces a 
problem which is not easily met* By such regulation, it,is claimed, the 
normal processes of free collective bargaining are subverted* With the 
strike weapon removed by legislation, organized labor Is placed in a 
disadvantageous position* As one student of the problem has' stated, 
however,
In  theory collective bargaining is the best .and most desirable 
method of adjusting differences- between employer and employees»
In practice, it has not met with the degree of success necessary
33 19^ 5 G©n* stats*, Article 6, chapter 44*
3k lev* Code, 1943, section 3?~01®4*
33 Colo* Stats* Anno*, chapter 9?, section 32, (Supp* 194?}*
3& Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Wisconsin, Missouri, Massachusetts, Virginia, Minnesota, Colorado*
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to insure the public against strikes and. the interruption of vital 
utility services*^ ?
It Is therefore necessary to experiment with other means to insure
continuous operation of essential industries; twelve states are at
present engaged in this experimentation process.
the OQQllng~off period requirement
Four of the states, Virginia,^ Massachusetts,39 Hew J e r s e y ,  40 
and M i c h i g a n ,  41 require that prior to the inception of a strike in a 
public utility, a certain number of day© must elapse. In Michigan, not 
less than thirty days must pass between the serving of a notice of an 
impending ©trike-and the actual walkout* The Virginia provision state© 
that at least five weeks must intervene between serving of strike notice 
and the date of the strike*
As was pointed out in the discussion of cooling*~off period© in 
private industry strikes, there is some doubt concerning the value of 
such regulation* It is .claimed that the cooling-off period m^erely 
intensifies the determination to ©trike on the part of the workers con^  
cemei,”^  Another argument against this procedural requirement is that 
the parties to the dispute in a public utility Industry usually negotiate
t ■iinraTTfniijf'rin,i)i;^" yioyd, U^tility Strikes and the Public Interest,1 48 
Wis. law Eev* 597, at 600, (1948).
3® I** 1947, chapter 9, section 4.
39 l. 1947, chapter 596.
4® L. 1946, chapter 38.
4^* Acts 1949, No* 230, section 423.9*
42 12 law and Contemporary Problem© 355, 362, (1947)*
for a considerable length of time even without a compulsory period 
required by law* Only in the event of a breakdown in negotiations does 
the strike actually begin* One value, however, in the cooling-off 
period is that it prevents "wildcat* and "outlaw* strikes by dissatisfied 
minorities. But as far as promoting labor-management peace:.in the public 
utility field is concerned its value is subject to question. Notwith­
standing, where the policy of the state is designed to provide continuous 
operation of essential industries, traditional prerogatives of labor must 
suffer. Jn Virginia, for example, a threatened transit strike was everted 
by a combination of the cooling-off requirement and the seizure provisions 
of the law. In the final analysis, it is for the state to decide whether 
the desirability of continuous operation outweighs the undesirability of 
restrictions which are placed upon the "rights” of labor*
Compulsory arbitration in. public utilities
Another method with which the states are experimenting at the 
present time is strike regulation by means of compulsory arbitration and 
mediation. Florida, 43 Ind±am,44 Mebraska#45 Pennsylvania, 46 Wiscon­
sin^ outlaw strikes in public utilities and provide for compulsory
43’ L. 1947, chapter 23911,-section 1-19*
44 l. 1947, chapter 341, section 1-18.
43 Eev. Stats., (Supp* 1947), chapter 48, 801-23*
44 stats. Anno., Title 43*
47 U  1947, chapter 414, section 111.50.
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arbitration. Another group of states, M i c h i g a n ,48 Massachusetts,49 
Virginia^ 0 and North Dakota^ provide for the mediation of dispute© 
on a compulsory basis, limitations on the power to strike during 
mediation, and for the seizure of industries if mediation fails*
The history of compulsory arbitration in two of the states that 
have given it a sufficient test indicates that It Is not likely to prove 
to be the. complete answer to the problem, of public utility ©trikes*
Kansas attempted to put such a plan into operation Just after the first 
World War, by establishing the Kansas Industrial Court in 1920.^ This 
court was charged with the responsibility of arbitrating disputes in 
Industrie© "affected with the public interest*" In holding certain 
portions of the Kansas Act unconstitutional in the Wolff Packing Co. case, 33 
the Supreme Court indicated the area in which the states could Impose 
coB?>ulsory arbitration without violating the Fourteenth Amendment* These 
three types of enterprise are (I) public utilities; (2) exceptional 
occupations traditionally clothed wdth the public interest; and (3) 
industries not considered public at first but rendered so by changing 
conditions* The meat packing industry, the Court held, did not come 
under any one of the three class if leatlons, .and thus a significant portion
Acte 1949# Ho. 230, section *33.9.
**9 Anno. Laws, (Supp. 1947) chapter ISO B, section 1-7.
Va. Code, section 1887 (Supp. 1948).
51 Rev. Code, section 37-0106 (1943).
52 Gen. Stats., section 44-601 (SQpp. 1936).
53 262 B. S. 522,
of the Act was declared unconstitutional*
Prior to the Kansas experiment in 1916, the State of Colorado 
had instituted a forn of compulsoiyr investigation of disputes in 
industries affected with the public interest,, particularly in coal 
mining* The Industrial Commission was charged with the investigation 
of utility disputes and the making of an award, which was not binding. 
Strikes which occurred 'during the period- of investigation were illegal 
and subject to severe sanctions of the courts* Marne and Caddis, in a 
study entitled "Eleven Tears of Compulsory Investigation of Industrial 
Disputes in Colorado, "34 point out that the plan was not successful in 
stopping strikes in important disputes, largely because of deficiencies 
in administrative technique. Because of its early failures the plan has 
been abandoned in recent years*, In spite of the apparent failures in 
these two states, compulsory arbitration has become an important method 
which the states are now employing to eliminate strike© in public utilities* 
Typical of the compulsory arbitration features of state laws is 
that of the Indiana statute*33 It encourages employees and employers to 
first exhaust every available means to settle a dispute by collective 
bargaining* If collective bargaining breaks down the Governor then 
appoints a conciliator who shall attespt to bring the disputant parties 
together in a compromise* If this effort is unsuccessful within thirty 
days, a Board of Arbitration is appointed and it must hand down an award
54 35 Journal Pol. Been. 657, (1927)
55 Acts 1947, chapter 341.
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within sixty days* The award 1© subject to judicial review, but 
reversible only under certain circumstances,; if a circuit court reverses 
the judgement, further conciliation and arbitration must be eagaXoyed.
The Florida law, in addition to these provisions, makes the award bind-* 
ing on both parties for a period of one year, unless altered by mutual 
consent*^
The compulsory arbitration features of state laws which have been 
passed since 194? have been subject to frequent criticism by organised 
labor* A number of reasons are given in support of the contention that 
compulsory arbitration is unworkable First, it is claimed that 
genuine collective bargaining is subverted* It cannot be denied that 
cocgpulaory arbitration replaces genuine collective bargaining, but this 
is true only after all available attempts to settle the dispute have 
failed in private bargaining conferences* Host of the states have specifi­
cally provided that arbitration machinery shall only operate where no 
other hope for settlement exists* Consequently, this argument does not 
hold up under close scrutiny of the laws* It has further been claimed 
that compulsory bargaining will increase rather than diminish disputes 
in public utilities because of the -difficulty of working under an agree- _ 
merit which either one party or the other disputes. Very few cases, how­
ever have arisen under the compulsory arbitration features of state laws,
 ^ 1* 1947, chapter 23911, section 1-19 •
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A complete analysis of such criticism is found in 97 Univ. of 
Pa. Law Rev* 410, 415, February, 1949*
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certainly not enough to formulate any valid conclusions. Hie initial 
test of the Wisconsin law was highly successful, both employer and 
esployees claiming victory as a result of the arbitration award.^
Since the arbitration boards are supposed to be impartial, it would 
seem inconsistent with the laws if one party was deliberately harmed 
at the ei^ ense of the other#
It has been further argued that the failure of the Kansas and 
Colorado compulsory arbitration experiments forecast the doom of present 
day legislation * It has been shown, however, that the Kansas law was 
only invalid as it attempted to regulate private businesses, and the 
Colorado failure was a result of administrative inefficiency. These 
early tests of compulsory arbitration furnish insufficient evidence 
of the workability or unworkability of the present statutes# All of 
these arguments, on the other hand, indicate that compulsory arbitral 
tion should not be depended upon by the states as the sole answer to 
public utility strikes#
Seizure Power in public utility strikes»
An even more drastic measure than compulsory arbitration are the 
seizure provisions found in tie public utility strike laws of Virginia, 
Massachusetts, Kansas and North Dakota# The North Dakota law provides 
that in the event of a strike in a public utility or coal mine, the 
Governor of the State is empowered to seize and operate the facility* 
Virginia and Massachusetts have adopted this policy since the end of the
5® See IS Wig* 2§S‘» 6o8» (1948).
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wax* Virginia provides to r extensive mediation and arbitration in. the 
event of a public utility labor dispute* M  this process faH%. a 
strike'or lockout may be- called for not less than five weeks in-the 
future* Upon the receipt of the strike notice the Governor must investi­
gate to determine whether the strike or lockout will result in inter- 
ruption of essential services constituting a serious menace to the public 
health* safety or welfare* and if he so concludes he may proclaim that 
at the time of such interruption he will take possession of the utility* 
its plant and equipment* for use and operation -of the tomaonwealth• ^  
During the period of government operation* no changes may be made in 
working conditions or wages since it is intended that such matters shall-, 
be left to collective bargaining* Hie Governor of Virginia may operate 
the utility m  long as he deems necessary and may return the facility 
whenever he is Satisfied that normal, operations will be resumed*^ ® The 
New Jersey law is similar to the Virginia statute* and both make it 
unlawful to strike during the period of government operation*
Hie seizure power of the state governments is not subject to 
question in the public utility field* Admittedly,- it is a drastic 
measure; its use* therefore* should only come after all methods of strike 
prevention have failed* The utilisation of the seizure power indis­
criminately by the four states having such laws could have repercussions 
which might be less desirable than lack of continuous operation of
^  1* 194?* chapter 9* section 5* 
60 Ibid.. section 13*
. utilities* •&, the final- analysis, all ooop^stan by the states
should be directed toward facilitating free collective bargaining and 
voluntary settlement of disputes,-rather-than toward a subversion of 
these processes* State control of the right to strike in public utility 
industries Is necessary to the welfare of the ccmssamity, but it must be 
exercised'with discretion*
The ri^ at to strike has been limited as m  economic pressure 
device both in private industry and in the public utility field. Be# 
©trictione which have 'been placed on the right to strike in areas of 
private enterprise have not been so severs as those which the states 
have felt necessary to prevent interruptions of service in esaeniiaX 
.industries* Purely economic strikes, such as those for higher wages 
and shorter hours, have been .relatively unaffected by state regulation, 
but many states have instituted procedural requirements, such as strike 
votes, strike notices, end cooling-off periods in. order to cut to a 
minimum work stoppages* Hie sit-down strike is prohibited on a wide 
scale, and the jurisdictional, strike has been, either prohibited or 
regulated, in-a mvaber of states*
la the public utility field, there has been a trend in the post­
war years toward coflopuleion -in one form or another to prevent strikes 
from occurring* Compulsory investigation* arbitration, mediation, 
cooling-off periods are all being tested in the state laboratories at 
the present time# Even m m  drastic 1mm have been written* allowing
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some states to seise utilities' in which a dispute threatens to become 
a strike# Many of these laws have been in operation less‘than, two years$ 
consequently* there is too. little evidence upon which to base judgement 
of their merits*: Although public utility strike provisions have been 
attacked on constitutional, grounds* as well as on the ground that they 
are unworkable* such, judgement seems premature* the problem of continuity 
of operation in public utilities mist be solved* and many of the states 
are now attempting to discover workable solutions# It is quite possible 
that some features of the present laws will prove unsatisfactory and 
others will be modified in light of legislative experience, but the fact 
that they are being given a fair trial may provide the foundation upon 
■ which these and other states will discover the solution to public utility 
strikes*
In. conclusion,.' Justice Brandeis* statement in connection with his 
dissent In the Duplex -case is worthy of note* He said;
'Because 1 have come to- the conclusion that both the common .law 
of a state aid a statute of the United States, declares the right . 
of industrial combatants to push their struggle to the limits of 
the justification of self-interest, I do not wish to be understood 
as attaching any constitutional or moral sanction to that right*
All rights are derived from the purposes of the society in which 
they exist| above all rights rises duty to the community* The 
conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in, 
it cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community#
^ Duplex Printing Preps Co. v* Peering* 254 U* S* 306, 311, (1926)*
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The regulation of unfair labor practices as such began in 193f 
with the passage of the Wagner Act by Congress* This important labor 
legislation specifically defined certain practices which m$layers were 
forbidden to- perform in the course of their relatione with organtod 
employees* The Intent of Congress at that time mm to encourage the 
organisation of employees, and to aid them In achieving collective 
bargaining power which was equal to that enjoyed by employers* the 
Wagner Act sawsmted only employer unfair labor practice©! employees 
wars left .relatively free to- exercise economic coercion in industrial 
relations* The first state labor relations acts, passed fey ^ ©eensJa,
Hew fork, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Utah in 193?, were models 
of the Wagner let, and included provisions dealing with employer unfair 
labor practices*: 3h 1939, however, Michigan and Minnesota enacted, labor 
relations law© which were considerably loss restrictive on the rights of 
employers, and which defined employee unfair Saber practices It* addition 
to those which were forbidden to employers* this trend'.has continued to 
the present time* Of the eleven States^  which now have labor relations 
Saw© which list unfair labor practices* only Cormecticut, hew fork* and 
Bhode Island fail to define er^ ployee unfair labor practices* It is
.1 u.nir.i Itti (O'•lu.-.riiwiwurpi^ mirtrn 'Urijm-.rirutt r r T '  r n i i  iniiiir
A Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Pennsylvania, Mew fork, Bhode Island, Wisconsin and Utah* the Delaware 
labor Halation© Act, which ms s&all&r to tfe.faft#Martley Act, ms 
repealed by the 1949 session of the legislation*-
worthy of note that while the states followed the Wagner Act in the 
matter of proscribing m p l& y ^ r unfair practices* they led .in the trend 
toward restricting ea^loyee unfair practices* It was not mhtt the 
passage of the faft^lartle^ Act In 1947 that the. national, government 
.specifically defined certain practices which mm unfair when performed 
by labor*
the purpose of this chapter is to- survey the mm ig&or&aixb 
labor practices which the twelve states that here emcted this type of 
legislation haw prohibited in the course of regulating industrial 
relations*
4** j » t r u i s r i u y t t  ioRouit r i  s&v *
. Bvery state labor relations act now in 'operation contains piwt* 
alone describing m & l& y& r unfair labor practices*: ..lb general* these 
provisions am  Introduced by the statement that *5& shall be m unfair 
labor practice for an ea^ loyer* individually or In concert with others”^  
to engage in any of the practices which the -act prohibits* fhe t$m 
enployer $# interpreted to wan anyone acting in the interests of an 
eaployer* this position In that which ms taken by the Supreme Court in 
connection with e^loyera In Interstate- fhus m  m^lmymw may­
be guilty of perforating m  unfair labor practice even though he Is-. 
unaware of the fact* If It is done 'by a subordinate acting for the essplcyer
^ Utah Code lnno** 1943* chapter 55* section
3 S». £4 Hcina So. *». NUtB. 311 » * S . 51h, (19 41 ).
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w id e r delegated authority.
Interference with the of employees
ten states^  make it an unfair labor practice for an employer to 
interfere with the guaranteed rights of employees granted by the Act. 
these rights invariably include the freedom to organise, to bargain 
collectively, and to engage in concerted activities which are legal in 
themselves. Interference has been interpreted by seme state courts to 
include an employers offer to grant wage increases If employees resign 
from the union*-* and threats of discharge for union membership and 
activity.^  Other courts have held* on the other hand* that the mere 
granting of a wage increase during a union* s organisation campaign does 
not constitute an employer unfair labor practice*? nor the discussion 
of the union by an employer where there is no threat of reprisal for 
joining or promise of benefit for not joining#9
The question as to whether an employer may transfer his business 
to a different locality in order to thwart unionisation without commit- 
ting an unfair labor practice has been determined in the negative by the
^ Colorado, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin, Connec­
ticut, New fork, Rhode Island, Michigan, and Kansas*
5 £a» M g  v. Bust*a Bairy. 13 labor Cases 64,003* (1946).
6 Pa. J M  X‘ bellow Cab and Bug Co.. 10 labor Cases 63,085, (1946).
 ^Building Service Employees v. Uewhouse Realty Co.. and Utah LRB. 
9? Utah 562, 95 Pae, 2nd. 507, tl»9T*
8 Pa, MB v. Beck, 7 labor Cases 61,863, (1943).
124
Pennsylvania courts.^  It was held that this action, or the threat of 
such action, constitutes an unfair interference with the rights of 
ss^ loyees*
The inportance of making employer interference with the rights 
of employees an Illegal practice lies in the fact that the whole 
philosophy of collective bargaining is grounded upon the freedom of 
workers to organize and to choose their own representatives. These 
rights have become widely accepted by all but those who are extremely 
anti-labor* It would be fruitless, however,- to give labor these rights 
by legislative enactment and fail to provide a semblance of protection 
from employer interference and coercion* The making of such interference 
an unfair practice is one of the means by which the states have attempted 
to protect labor in the exercise of its granted powers to organize and 
bargain collectively through the representatives of its choice*
Domination of labor organizations
In the early years of the labor movement in America* one method 
which employers found to be a reasonably effective weapon against the 
rising power of the national unions was the company union* These 
unions were formed with the assistance of the employer and were confined 
to the ei)f>l0y©r,s business* Although employees were often represented 
by chosen workers in the company, the employer usually dominated the 
affairs of the organization* thus making them relatively ineffective*
The independent national unions fought the company union tooth and claw
M  IS Patterson, d.b.a. Tufoe, Pity Taxi and Transfer Co.. 350 Pa. 
601 (19447.
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for many years, and these efforts ultimately led to the passage of 
legislation first on the national and then on the state level of 
government,. At the present time, ten states^ ® make it an unfair labor 
practice to either initiate, dominate or interfere with the formation 
of any labor organisation#' The Wisconsin provision is typicals
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer♦. *to 
initiate, create, dominate or interfere with the formation or 
administration of any labor organisation or contribute financial 
support to it, provided that an employer shall not be prohibited 
from#•♦permitting employee organisational activities on company 
premises on the use of company facilities where such activities 
or use create no additional e^ qpense to the company* XX
in connection with this unfair labor practice the state courts 
have held that the initiation and formation of an employee’s association 
by supervisory employees, and the immediate recognition of this associa­
tion by the employer as the representative of workers in the plant at a 
time when an affiliated union was attempting to organize the plant was 
ample evidence of an illegal interference*-^  In another case it was 
held that an sublayer who allowed an employee association^  (dominated by 
a personal friend' of the employer) to use company premises for meetings 
at a time when an affiliated union was attesting to organize was ample 
evidence of interference and dcsainaiion.^
X® Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, 
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Mew York, Rhode Island, Michigan, and Kansas#
XX i# 1939, chapter 57, section 111*06 (l)(b).
Stork Restaurants Im * v# Boland, 282 M* Y* 256, 26 N« E* 2nd' 
247, (194077^
Mgw loi^  fflgEj v* Interboroui^  Mews, go,,■ 1 labor Gases '10,302, '
(1939)4
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Discouraging or encouraging union membership
Another .form of sqployer interferences which the lavs'of ten 
states*^  proscribe a© an unfair labor practice is the discouraging or 
encouraging of membership in a labor organization. In these laws there 
is typically a provision which allows the en^ loyer to enter into a 
union security agreement subject to certain limitations. For example* 
the Colorado statute declares it to be an employer unfair labor practice:
To encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization, 
employee agency, committee, association or representation plan by 
discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure or other terms or 
conditions of employment, provided, that an employer shall not be 
prohibited from entering into an all-union agreement. * .with Me 
employees* • * where three-quarters or more of his employees shall 
have voted affirmatively by secret ballot in favor of such all 
union agreement*» * .X5
It was pointed out in chapter three that the Colorado requirement of
an affirmative vote of three-fourths of the employees prior to the
execution of an all-union agreement is considerably more stringent than
that found in the majority of state labor relations acts. W i s c o n s i n ? ^
requires a two-thirds vote, but the remaining states merely prescribe
a simple majority.
\
An interesting case developed in Wisconsin with regard to this 
employer unfair labor practice, An employer entered into a collective 
agreement with a union whereby employees were required to either join 
the union and pay its admission fee and dues, or to obtain a work permit
X& Colorado, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, Connecticut, Mew York, Bhode Island, and Michigan,
X5 L. 1943, chapter 131, section 6 (l) (c),
16 L. 1939, chapter 57# section 111.06 <c)j as amended by chapter 
624, L. 1945.
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from the union which cost on© and. one-half times as much as the dues 
alone. This was not an all-union agreement since the employees did 
not have to join the union as a condition of future employment* The 
state courts held that this was an unfair labor practice on the part 
of the employer since the contract interfered with the employees* 
right not to join or assist a labor organisation*^
With regard to discriminatory discharge for union activity* 
the Pennsylvania courts have held that the burden of proof of such 
discharge rests upon the employee The employee must show con­
clusively that he was fired for union activity and not for inefficiency 
or insubordination* One court has held that the mere fact that th© 
employee had a clear record over a period of seven years is not suf­
ficient proof that his discharge was discriminatory**^  It is apparent* 
therefore* that it is extremely difficult to prove to the satisfaction 
of the courts that an employee*© discharge was made for union activity*
On the other hand* it is relatively easy for the employer to avoid the 
prohibition of discrimination in favor of* or against union members.
The inclusion of discrimination as an unfair labor practice* however* 
has undoubtedly had a deterring effect on the tendency of employers 
to keep unionism in check by discrimination *
■ w m n x - m r n m r T ^ - ^ r m r m - * .  t w w
International Union* Unitetf Automobile* Aircraft and Agricul­
tural Implement Workers of America v* Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Board. 245 Wis, 417, 15 S7 W, 2nd 873,' " ( & & ) ',
^  Pa. LKB v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.. 7 Labor Cases 61,755
(1943).
W  American Foundry and Machine Co. v. Utah LRB, 106 Utah 394,141 
pae. 2nd, ^ , " 1 1 9 ^ 7 . --------- - ~   ------
128
*te|ueaX to bargain collectively
One of the most important unfair labor practices which seven 
of the 'states2® have included in their labor relations acts is the 
refusal of employers to bargain with the representatives chosen by the 
employees * the rights of enployees, which include the right to 
organ ize and select representatives for bargaining purposes* would be 
of little consequence if it were possible for the employer to refuse 
to meet with the agents of the employees to bargain collectively over 
terns and conditions of employment. The making of such a refusal an * 
unfair labor practice obligates the employer to participate in the 
collective bargaining process* and to recognizee the representatives as 
the agents of his employees* These representatives must be the certi­
fied bargaining agents of his employees* and a refusal to bargain with 
a minority representative does not constitute an unfair labor practice*2^  
The Pennsylvania courts have held that an employer who made an 
oral agreement following a collective bargaining conference* but who 
refused to sign a written agreement was not guilty of an unfair labor 
practice,22 Under the Taft-Hartley Act* however* a written agreement 
must be executed at the request of either the employer or the agents of 
his employees* Another Pennsylvania court declared that an employer
i
20 Colorado* Massachusetts* Pennsylvania* Wisconsin* Connecticut* 
Hew York and Rhode Island,
M  |S Sekles» d,&*a. Hill Top Bus lines.* 13 labor Cases 
<3*988* Kt94?IT .
22 M S  v* Gamine* ? labor Cases 61*615* (1943)*
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who persistently failed to arrive at an agreement was guilty of an 
unfair practice*^ A Rhode Island court, however, held that the State 
labor- Relations Board was in error when it declared an employer to be 
guilty of an unfair practice when he refused to bargain with a union 
after repeated negotiations, and after the union1 s contract had esjpired,2^  
It is interesting to note that the state laws do not require the employer 
to bargain f,in good faith** a© does the amended M&tional labor Relations 
Act* this requirement, however, is usually inferred by the courts*
State courts have held that the duty to bargain does not mean that the
employer must accede to all conditions demanded by a un ionBut  a
*
mere willingness to bargain is not sufficient % bargaining in good faith
entails compromise and cooperation in attempting to arrive at an agree-
26ment* u Dilatory tactics constitute an unfair labor practice and signify 
bad faith.27
Discrimination for filing charges
In order to insure employees against retaliatory discrimination 
by employers in the event that they are called upon to file charges or
32 Pa, 1RB v, Oestreicher, 10 labor Cases 6J,0B2, (1945)*
^  McGee v* local Mo* 662, Brotherhood of Painters * Decorator© 
and Paper hangers. 36 Atl* 2^ 302^1^^17^
25 S* 1 » SLRB v, Loehmann Coro.. 56 W* It. S. 2nd 485, (1945).
26 I* X* SUP I* Montgomery Ward and Co., 38 N. X. S. 2nd 85$,
(1942).
27 Collier Service Coro, v . Boland. 4 N* Y. S. 2nd 480, (1938).
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testify under the laws, eleven statehave made such action on 
employer unfair labor practice. Protection is thereby afforded employ­
ees who have been discriminated against, but who, in the absence of 
protection, would be reluctant to make a complaint for fear of discharge 
or demotion*
Other unfair labor practices
the preceding labor practices are prohibited in the majority 
of states having such laws* Other employer labor practices have been 
listed by various states, and while they are of less significance and 
fewer states have incorporated them into legislation, they nevertheless 
indicate the scope of regulation which has been placed upon employer 
prerogatives. These unfair labor practices include the refusal to 
accept a final order by the board or commission after judicial review, 39 
the use of the check-off system of union dues payment, unless individu­
ally ordered to do so by employees,20 the commission of any crime or 
misdemeanor in the course of a labor dispute,^ ! the recognition of 
a minority union as the agent of the employees for collective bargain­
ing purposes *23
30 Colorado, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin, ^ 
Minnesota, Connecticut, hew fork, Rhode Island, Michigan and Kansas*
3^  Colorado and Wisconsin*
30 Colorado, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin*
32* Colorado and Wisconsin*
33 Utah- and Wisconsin*
mOf more importance is the prohibition of blacklists in six 
states* Colorado* Wisconsin* Minnesota* Connecticut, New York and 
Rhode Island. These same states declare the use of spies to be an 
unfair labor practice,
All of the unfair labor practices which have been discussed 
thus fab have pertained solely to employers* They are designed to 
restrict the economic power of the employer in the industrial conflict, 
and to protect the rights which these states have accorded to labor# 
Beginning in 1939, a number of states amended their Acts and other 
states passed legislation which also imposed restrictions on employee 
prerogative in dealing with employers. The tremeridous growth in the 
sice of labor unions, fostered by protective legislation in the Hew 
Deal era, soon necessitated legislative action by the states to bring 
into equilibrium the balance of power between unions and management.
The states felt that protective enactments had enabled organised labor 
to achieve enough strength that if it were allowed to thrive unchecked, 
the employer would soon become the underdog in the industrial conflict.
II. EMPLOYEE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
In nine of the states^ that have labor relations acts, employee 
unfair labor practices are defined* Both individual employees and 
employees acting in conceit- through a labor organisation are prohibited 
from engaging in these practices. Michigan and Kansas do not use the
33 Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsyl­
vania, Utah, Michigan, Wisconsin*
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term unfair labor practices, but they describe such practices as unlaw­
ful* Since little practical difference exists between the two terms 
the laws of these two states have been included in this section*
Coercion of employees
Colorado, Utah, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Delaware 
make it an unfair labor practice for employees individually or in con-
s
c e r t to coerce or intimidate an employee for the purpose of interfering 
with the rights of other employees which are guaranteed by law* This 
provision is a corollary of the provisions in state laws which prevent 
employers from engaging in this practice* These four states apparently 
see a need for employee protection not only from the employer, but also 
from the coercive tactics of fellow employees.
One of the outstanding court decisions pertaining to this unfair 
labor practice was handed down by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the case 
of International Union* DAW of America* AH** local 2^ 2 v. Wisconsin 
Ensplovment Halations Board »34 Here it was held that employees have a 
legal right to continue their work despite work stoppage© by the union# 
Injury to the property and person of employees who refuse to join a 
work stoppage constitutes coercion of employees in the exercise of their 
legal rights and is therefore an unfair labor practice* The same court 
v upheld an unfair practice charge against a union where its members had 
participated in acts which included the assault of non-union members,*^
34 12 labor Cases 63,843, Wisconsin Sup. Ct., (1947).
35 Christofel v, Wisconsin Employment Relatione Board. 243 Wis. 
332* 10 H. W. 2nd 197, (1943;.
mCoercion of an employer
In two states*^  the legislature has made it an unfair labor 
practice for an employee or labor organization to coerce or intimidate 
an employer in order to prevent him from exercising his guaranteed 
rights under the labor delations Act# These employer rights closely 
resemble the rights of employees* Employers are guaranteed free choice 
of representatives, the right to bargain collectively and the right to 
refuse demands of employees providing that they are bargaining in good 
faith*
Five states, Colorado, Massachusetts, Utah, Delaware and Wiscon­
sin make it an unfair labor practice for an employee, acting individually 
or in concert" with others, to use coercion or intimidation to induce 
an employer to interfere with the rights of his eaployees, or to commit 
an unfair labor practice* It has been held that a union which coerced 
the employer into signing an agreement which provided that all non­
union members were required to obtain work permits from the union, and 
to pay a fee for the permit, was guilty of an unfair labor practice*
The employer, the court reasoned, was committing an unfair labor practice* 
by interfering with the right of employees to refrain from joining or 
assisting a labor organisation, and the union was equally responsible 
because it had forced the employer to sign the agreement*^
3o Colorado and Pennsylvania .
^  United Auto, Aircraft- and Agricultural irsgslement Workers of 
America v* Wisconsin SSatlons Boards 245 Wis* 417# 14 N* W*
2nd & ? 2 r
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Unfair strikes. picketing and boycotting
A number of state labor relations acts make certain phases of 
economic activity by employees and unions unfair labor practices* It 
ms noted in the preceding chapter that seven states^ make it an unfair 
practice for employees to engage in any concomitant of a strike unless 
a majority of the employees in a plant or business establishment have 
voted to call the strike* Colorado, Utah, Wisconsin and Delaware also 
outlaw as an unfair practice mass picketing, coercion, violence or 
threats to prevent the pursuit of any lawful work or employment. Eight 
states^ characterise the sit down strike as an unfair employee labor 
practice, and Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Kansas similarly proscribe 
any jurisdictional strike*
The secondary boycott has similarly been proscribed in eigirt 
states.^ *0 The courts in,Kansas^ * and Pennsylvania,^ hox^ ever, have 
declared these provisions to be unconstitutional* The Kansas courts 
have so held since 1945, and on March 21, 1949, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held this unfair labor practice to be invalid. The courts of both 
states linked- the secondary boycott with constitutionally protected
3® Colorado, Utah, Wisconsin, Delaware, Minnesota, Kansas and 
Michigan*
39 -Colorado, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin, Dela­
ware, Minnesota and Kansas*
^  Colorado, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Dela­
ware, Minnesota^ and Kansas*
- ^  Stapleton v* Mitchell, op. cit*, (1945)*
^  v. Chester and Delaware Counties Bartenders. 361 Pa. 246, 
64 A* 2nd 834,(1949)*
freedom of speech, declaring that the legislature could not make this 
type of union activity an ‘unfair en^ leyee labor practice*
Picketing of -a workerfa home is .an- unfair labor practice In 
Colorado, Wisconsin and Utah, and in three states^ It £0 also unfair 
to picket the domicile of an employer. Stranger picketing la an 
unfair practice in Pennsylvania and Minnesota, hut the decision handed 
down in the Chester; & Delaware Counties Bartenders case invalidated the 
Pennsylvania provision, the Minnesota statute is also- xweonstitutionaX 
in light of the Supreme Court decision in AFL y. Swing.
fteMfcteffi s£ & aigsgasS
Colorado, Wisconsin, Betorare and Minnesota laws declare the 
violation of aecollective bargaining agreement to be an employee unfair 
labor practice, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has upheld a Wisconsin 
iikployment Bel&blons Board order restraining a union from violation of 
an agreement in which all disputes were to be submitted to arbitration, 
the union engaged in a strike without submitting its grievances to a 
board of arbitration, contrary to- the provisions of the collective 
bargaining contract which It had with the employer.^ *
m sfite i§fess sbmMsmi
Other types of employee sxtd union activity have been declared 
unfair labor practices by the states. For example, three states^ make
Wisconsin and Kansas.
Public Service Employees* Union v. Wisconsin Employment .Helations 
Board. 246llSr^^  ** *------^ ---- ** *—
^  Colorado, Delaware and Wisconsin.
mit-, an unfair practice to fail, to servo notice of .intent to strikej two 
States^ discourage featherbedding practices of onions ty -malcing such 
activities unfair* and three states^ have declared the eossrdsslon of 
any ©rime or mledemeaiior during the' course-of a labor ’dispute to’-he- an 
unfair labor practice* • * - ■;
Other proscribed practices Include the refusal to - bargain collec** 
tlvely with an employer* found .in the Massachusetts Act* and the refusal 
to accept a final order* of the labor relations board after review by the 
courts*^ ■
Summary of ,m d employee unfair labor practices
It.--is apparent tm m the prodding discussion of unfair labor 
practices of both employers and employees that the provisions of state 
laws ■ constitute a ©IgdLfleant phase of industrial relatione 'reflation# 
With regard to employer unfair practices it is evident that the states 
have closely adhered to the provision© of the JS&iiohal labor Helations . 
Act- prior-: to its amendment In 1947^  the imofe .important practices which 
are proscribed include interference with the guaranteed rights of 
ea^ loyees, interference in the affairs of labor organisations^ , the mm 
of blacklists and spies* discrlialnation against union mmskem or .in 
their favor in employment and discharge* the refusal to bargain with 
the representative© or organised .employees* end the discharge of or
4^'' ado ^and Delaware*
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Colorado* Delaware, and, Wisconsin* ^
^  Colorado, Delaware and Wisconsin*
discrimination against any employee who files charges or testifies 
against an employer*
Employee unfair labor practices may be divided into three general 
groups* the first group includes unfair practice© which coerce of 
intimidate an employee In the exercise of his guaranteed rights tinder 
the Act# Included in the second grotp are those practices which inters 
fere with the rights of, employers* The third group of unfair employee 
labor practices embraces a wide segaent of union coercive activities* 
including limitations or the right to strike, and the use of boycotting 
and picketing#
The significance of state labor relations acts which define 
unfair labor practices lies in their influence upon national legislation, 
as well as in their more immediate influence on industrial relations
4
within the states*. The trend toward placing;controls on employee 
practices, which ms initiated in the states a® early as 1939, has only 
recently been adopted on the national level of government* It is 
apparent that acme states, Colorado for example, have gone to an extreme 
In prohibiting almost every conceivable practice of labor organisations 
In the industrial conflict* On the other hand, Hew fork* Rhode Island 
and Connecticut have done nothing to limit employee practices while 
vigorously controlling eagaloyer prerogatives# It is submitted that 
neither extreme provides a workable solution to the problem of achieve 
ing Industrial peace* Only through modification of existing laws and 
endeavours to achieve balance in the bargaining power of employers and 
employees can the probl<5m be effectively met* The balancing of bargaining
pm®#' is$3& not In  ttM if  pmmmk -a ll b u t-It -wmiM
-bo % long ©top
CMMtm EIGHT
STATE REGULATION OF THE INTERNAL 
AFFAIRS OF UNIONS
The preceding chapters indicate the significant scope of state 
industrial relations regulation*. It is readily apparent that the 
greater part of such legislation Is designed to restrict the activities 
of organized labor* and a much smaller share is devoted to the regular 
tion of the employer* The legislation thus far discussed is well 
established in American law* In this chapter* however* a relatively 
novel phase of regulation is discussed* that which includes the regu~ 
lation of the internal affairs of labor organisations*
Che of the most important aspects of state regulation of internal 
union affairs is that which deals with the registration of labor organ!-* 
zations, their principal officers* and members which are engaged in
Typical of these registration requirements is that which is found
I* REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
organizing employees * At the present time* ten states^  have statutes 
that require such registration*
The Alabama
in the Alabama lav* Every labor organization in the state must file
. . . . . . . . . .
■* Alabama* Delaware* Florida* Kansas* Maine* Michigan* North 
Dakota* Texas, Utah and Massachusetts*
 ^Code of 1940* title 26* section 3&2m*
with the Alabama Peparfcment of labor a report giving the name of the 
organisation and its pricipal location and offices, and the names and 
addresses of its officers and business agents* together with the 
salaries paid to each.. Soon after this law was passed it was challenged 
by the Alabama State Federation of Labor on the grounds that it prohibit-*
v
ed freedom of speech and assembly, and denied union officials equal 
protection of the laws. The Alabama Supreme Court, however, upheld the 
provision as a valid exercise of state police power which did not limit 
the unions functions in the state
fh® Florida statute
Although the Alabama courts have upheld registration require­
ments, some doubt as to their constitutionality was raised in 1945 when 
the Supreme Court considered the Florida ubion registration law. This 
statute was similar to the Alabama provision in that it required the 
registration of all union officers and business agents, together with a 
report showing the location of principal offices in the state,A In 
.Hill v. Florida ax rel. Watson*^  the United States Supreme Court declared 
the statute invalid to the extent that It may not be applied to enjoin 
a union from acting as a collective bargaining agent for employees if the 
union has failed to cosily with the law* The Court reasoned that such a
3 Alabama State Federation of iabps* v. McAdory* 246 Ala. 1, 18 So. 
2nd 810 (1944) *
* Fla, Stats. 1941, (1945 Supp,), section 461.06.
5 325 H. s, 536, 65 Sup. Ct. 1373, (1945).
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situation would be inconsistent with the federally guaranteed right to 
bargain collectively as provided for in the national labor Helations 
Act* The Court did not, however, declare the, registration requirement 
illegal oer set rather it merely declared that the penalties for failure
t
to comply with the law could not be invoked against non-complying 
organisations* An opinion of the Florida Attorney General issued a 
year following the Hill decision bears this out*- In December, 1946, 
he stated that all unions must comply with the registration requirements 
of the law,^  but it is evident that the teeth have been removed from the 
statute* 1
Xn spite of the Hill case, a number of states have passed regis­
tration legislation since the opinion was rendered* Massachusetts,? 
for example, requires the registration of all the officers of every 
labor organisation and provides that failure to comply is punishable 
by a fine of fity to five hundred dollars* It is doubtful that such 
a statute would be declared unconstitutional since the penalties would 
not necessarily preclude an organization from acting as a collective 
bargaining agent. On the other hand it might be shown that excessive 
fines for non-compliance prevented m  organization from re p re se n tin g  
employees, but no such case has yet been considered* The present 
legality of state registration requirements, therefore, is not subject 
to question, but it is apparent that penalties which undermine the
? L* 1946, chapter 61$, sections 1, 5, 6*
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function of labor organisations as collective bargaining agents '.for 
employees may not be levied when a union fails to comply with the law*
II. HEFORTS mn FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
The regulation of the' internal affairs of unions- in nine states^ - 
has included the requirement that labor organisations most file financial 
statements and reports with an appropriate agency* Similar provisions 
in the laws of Colorado^  and Texas10 have been declared unconstitutional 
by the state courts# and the New Hampshire provision enacted in 194? 
has been repealed by the 1949 session of the legislature*
The Massachusetts provision
A typical state law requiring the submitting of financial state-** 
ments is that of MassachusettsIn this state any labor organisation 
which has more than fifty members must submit a report to the Commissioner 
of Labor and Industries showing the unionfs total receipts for the year* 
the sources of these receipts# and its disbursements * Failure to comply
with this law makes the organisation liable to a fine ranging from fifty
<
to five hundred dollars. A previous Massachusetts law with similar 
requirements was upheld by the state courts as a proper regulation of
t
mmrftmrmm: -wrx^mmwrKxrmm..^mim
Delaware# Kansas, Massachusetts, Florida, Minnesota, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Wisconsin and Alabama*
9 m . v. Reilly. 1X3 Colo. 90, 155P. 2nd 145, (1944),
10 M k  2- Man«- 9 Habor Cases 62,593, 188 S. W, 2nd 276, (1945).
U  1949, chapter 394, effective September 5, 1949,
munion affairs in light of the power which labor organisations have 
achieved and- the necessity of preventing this power from falling into • 
irresponsible hands.^
Wisconsin and Minnesota provisions
Wisconsin*^  and Minnesota,^ while not requiring that financial 
statements be filed with any state agency, provide that every union 
member must be furnished with a copy of the labor union* s annual 
financial statement* The requirement contains certain advantages over 
the filing of statements with a government official required by most 
of the states having such laws* In the first place, every union member 
has an opportunity to scrutinise the financial condition of the organ!** 
nation* Second, every member is made aware of the uses to which his 
dues and assessments are put, thereby providing a sound basis for 
criticism of certain disbursements if such be warranted* On the other 
hand, certain disadvantages are apparent in the Wisconsin and Minnesota^  
plan* The possibility of submitting fraudulent statements to members 
by questionable organisations weakens the law where it is needed most*
> Also, it is extremely doubtful that many union members are sufficiently 
interested in the financial affairs of their unions to devote much 
attention to the statements which are furnished them* -Bines these
■Bows v* Secretary of Commonwealth* 320 Hass# 230, 69 N*. B*
2nd 113, •(SPSPT ..... T
^  Stats* 1943, chapter HI, section 111*0$. .
^  1* 1943# -chapter 625$ section 4*
144
provisions requiring the filing of reports with a state agency or 
submission to the rank and file are primarily an attempt to prevent 
unscrupulous practices by. a. small minority of labor organisations*
t
it would seem necessary and proper to require that both the state 
and the members be .furnished copies of the financial statement'* 
Professor KilXingsworth has taken a conflicting view, stating that 
there ttis more logic in requiring financial reports to member© than 
in requiring the filing of such reports with some: state agency *«• •
He does not deny, however, that the possibility of falsification 
exists if the either course were followed*
Availability of statements and reports to the public
Reports or statements required by state law are made available 
for public inspection in Horida,*^ Massachusetts,^ North Dakota,^ 
and South Dakota#^ Delaware,^ on the other hand, declares that union 
Statement© and reports may be examined by appropriate state agencies and
officials only*' In Alabama^ " these documents are available ts> union
members for inspection, but the general public is not allowed to 
scrutinise them*
^  Killingsworth, Charles C*, H Restrictive State labor Relations
Acts,1 4? Wisconsin law Review 54b, at 595* duly, 1947*
36 L, 1943, chapter 21968,
1? L. 1947, chapter 180, section 18.
1, 1947, chapter 242, section 3*
19 1, 1943,. chip ter 86.
20 1. 1947, H. B. 212, section 15,
21 Acts 1943, No. 298, section 7.
On© of the principal arguments expounded by organized labor 
against the filing of reports and financial statements is that employers 
could gain significant information concerning the strength of a union 
for use in his negotiations at the bargaining table* Thus, if an employ­
er is aware of the fact that a union is in financial straits he,could 
reasonably refuse demands of the union* knowing that the organization 
could not afford a strike* This argument, it is submitted, does not 
weaken the need for such statements but is rather a criticism of the 
practice of making those reports public* This criticism was probably 
more valid fifteen years ago than it is today, however* Corporations 
advanced essentially the same argument in the early years of security 
regulation, but at the present time they are quite willing to make their 
reports public for publicity purposes* It is not unreasonable to suppose 
that the day will come when unions will also willingly publicize their 
financial condition*
Books of Account
Closely related to state requirements of financial statements and 
reports by labor organizations' are the stipulations found in the laws 
of Delaware, Florida,^ Massachusetts^ and Texas23 which require 
labor organisations to keep books of account* The Texas provision states
^  L* 1947* chapter 196, section 24*
23 1945, Supp*, section 481.0?*
^  1* 1947# chapter 180, section 18*
23 Tex* Rev* Civil Statutes, 5154a, section 9*
that all labor unions must , keep accurate books of accounts itemizing 
all receipts and esqpenditures and stating, the sources of these funds 
and the puiposes of expenditures* Hie books are available to any 
enforcement officer of the state and to Judicial bodies making inquiries 
into the practices of unions* The latter provisions of the law were 
attacked on the grounds that mandatory availability of these accounts 
constituted unlawful search and seizure and involved compulsory self** 
incrimination* But a court of Civil Appeals held that the provision 
was a constitutional regulation of labor unions and industrial relations*
111* REGULATION OF EKES, DUES AND ASSESSMENTS
One form which the regulation of union internal affairs has taken 
is the limitations which seven states2^  have placed upon the rights of 
labor organizations to charge their members for services rendered*
Alabama has prohibited unions from collecting or demanding money for a 
permit to engage in lawful work which is not in the form of membership
t
dues in a labor organization* This law has been upheld as a constitutional 
exercise of police power.2^  The Colorado provision that initiation fees
and dues must be “reasonable” was declared unconstitutional because it was
30a part of an invalid law, but it would undoubtedly stand on its own
! 26 APL v> Mann, 188 S. W. 2d 276, (1945).
^  Alabama, Colorado.- (invalid), Delaware, Florida, Kansas,
Massachusetts and Texas '{invalid}*,.
2a 0ode of 1940, Title 26, section 390*
Ala* State Federation of Labor v* McAdory* op* cit,
^  jAffb V* Really* op* cit.*
merit#* In a labor organisation Im prchiMted from charging
more than fifteen dilate as an initiation fee*
■ Crape
M  ..interesting 4®m%a%m&n% in the regulation of , dues and assess- 
menti charged fey unions m ©  the lf4f California Supreme Court decision
to pg^as 2. Miss&m EsgmMmM Mis. isUsla*32 toe plaintiff,
according to the f&dfe©* reseed, to tender an aesesemeniby Me union 
for the purpose of opposing a proposed open shop amendment to the consti­
tution Of California* Because of Ms refusal* -BsMille was barred 'from : 
membership in the union and thereby prevented from producing radio plays* 
a job which he had held for eight year# and for which he was- paid mere; 
than njyoeiy^ ight thousand dollars a year#- IN&ttlle • coMsn^d that the 
assessment ms made for a purpose with which he ms personally msyapathet- 
£$* and that Ms deprivation of union membership because/of failure to 
pay it was In violation of the Fourteenth ^ mendteent* fh© court refuted 
Ml of these arguments in. holding that the assessment ms.-made for a 
legM purpose* and that reddles#, of the plaintiffs personal beliefs 
Ms oontinusd meshersMp in. the .union lias dependent upon M b paying: 
'whatever assessments were- levied in the interests of the organisation.
as Ssm.
Seertion seven of the Texas Union Control law33 strictly regulates
31 Florida Stats* 1 » (. (Supp. 1945) section «81,Q5.
• -<K-
32 31 A. C. 137, 187 P. 2nd 769, (1917),*.
33 itev. Civ. Stats. 5154a, section 7.
the.amount# which 'union© .may charge in connection M t h  initlation fees*.
. dues* ■ lints--end- assessments* the courts of the* stats* however* have 
hSid that this provision Is an unconstitutional,. Iit^osltion of burden, on. 
labor organisations which I# not demanded by the public Interest and 
which is not essential to the enforcement of other valid provisions of 
the laif#^
It may be argued* in' contrast to the opinion of the Ism# courts* 
that there is. a definite, need for reflation of union fees* dues and 
assessment#* there I# a particular need for such, regulation in ease# 
idler® a closed or union shop contract would allow a few- .unscrupulous 
unions- to charge exorbitant rate# for the privilege of union membership 
whieh is required a# a condition of employment* . m  this sense the 
union# have been granted monopoly power# similar to- that • of a public • 
utility* On the other hand* where m  such contract exists# Or idler® 
the state has proscribed such contracts* there is somewhat less justifi­
cation for- regulation* although -the pubHo nature of labor union# place#
. them In a category In which regulation of due# and assessments reasonably 
comes within the police power of the state* In many case# where the 
union, exert# no monopoly power In- the: labor market the .administrative 
burden, of such regulation* "both for the state and the unions* Is unduly 
large in comparison. 'with the advantage# which the regulation may provide*
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. Although only mm state* C&Ioradqv has attested to regi&ate the 
internal affaire of unions by requiring such organi^tions to incorporate,
and; although'the law has hew declared unconstitutional*', it is nsverths* 
less, important to ecsasaine the-provisions of the statute and to consider 
the - reasoning of the ' court - In. rendering the .law iiqaobert*. ■ the signifl** 
canee of the Colorado incorporation law lies in the fact that it involves 
a radical c^perMent in union control* as wall as .in the fact that organ** 
ised labor has traditionally shunned the corporate to m  of organisation.
■• . c. <■;.■ -.i.ji-.b .; .. , ,.;. ;.; c,
P tv v < > 4  Q  4  e  /sf" ■ f.lh tJ f V i l  A t» a /1 r t  4  a m  1  i5 « v  ^Sis. .wr0.sr'
The Colorado law requires every collective bargaining unit local 
of any labor organisation to incorporate under the corporation laws- of 
the state#- An. exception, to the general law of Incorporation is made in 
that labor organisations' are not required -to have capital, stock divided • 
into shares# Additional requirements are- loosed,* however^  which include 
the statement in the Articles' of Incorporation for each union that: each ■. 
member shall have one vote* that annual .meetings will be held With - 
officers elected at such .meeting* and that' 'by-laws will be adcpted at a 
meeting-'of all mwbers*. *
After Mcoxporaiion* each bargaining unit is accorded all of ■ the -, 
-benefits -and -responsibilities provided .by thegeneral laws of incorpora** 
tim  within. 1he -state# tJnder the la% the union mgr sue and be. wed*
1# 1943*- chapter 131* sectiw
/
file fSnaneialand other reports with the IMusbriaX 
-m& As subject to periodic audit#. of it# account#* He penalties £m  
failing to incorporate- under the- Act- consist of denial of recourse to 
the: industrial Commission in m  of a# employer unfair' practice or 
Other grA-eimnc#, end- fine# of three-4iundred dollar## laeh member of the 
bargaining unit -which refuses to incorporate A# liable to a fine of 
three^ himdred dollar#, in'addition to the organi^tion*# ■penalty'#.
€on#titutionality ffjT the Colorado incorporation law
fkm entire- section of the Colorado labor Eolations Act requiring 
incorporation of union# was held unconstitutional by the State Supreme 
Court^ in 1944* He section us# challenged; on the ground that com** 
puiaor^  incorporation of labor organisation© delate# the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution* Plaintiff union 
contended'that it# light to freedom of speech,, pres# and assembly had 
been violated, and., that the statute deprived it of civll^ rAghts and 
liberties without due process of law* the court upheld each of these 
contentions, theireby . striking down the ineeipsmtlon features of the 
Act* ihs sepu?ai3ili^ r clause in the law -did net prerent 'the court imm. 
invalidating other' feature# of Section twenty which included the require** 
of reports said financial ■statements on m  amual 'basis;*,.
Since other -states have not -attested to follow the escample of 
Colorado in ecmipuXsOa^  incorporation of union#,, it M.-doubtful that 
there will be- m y s l^ d iX o m t xmrvwmt in this direction' in the future * 
Since 1944 there has ^b#en no state mw&v&mry imorpom&Mn law, and
SJOL-
even during the height' of resbi&cbive labor ieglalatiou'is* 3.94? 'there 
iser# m  concerted attempts to pass!such legislation*-
At? IttKTftRf TIJ'mi'PMrtY 61F??A Y?7<S * UanjEii* JlayijyUAijAP W  ynlljv JptJUSaM$&4« iUrfaAw
t 1 I , I . , .
* iMi# the i^ eeiStig methods of :reg^eting the interml affairs of 
unions ■ have had a significant role in the regulatory process* the states 
have not- been' content to allow labor organisations a free rein in several. 
Other ii^ ortari aims 'that relate to the conduct of union brines©*
for example* fourteen states?^  ■ now provide that a union may sue or 
he sued in its common name# kathode of service vary among the states 
that have such provisions* In florlda*^ - service may be had, upon any 
officer - or husinessr:agCnt of the union*. 3ft it 1# only- •
required that a copy of the Ammons be left at the office where union 
business is transacted* thm m m z m U p  law provides that service may 
he'had upon the Secretary of State* who is deemed to he the agent of 
all unions within the state#
fhere is also a divergence among the state .provisions as to the 
liability of union, officers or members in- Case of successful action
Alabama* Colorado (invalid) * Belaware* Florida* Kansas* Mains, 
lassachusetts* Hlth&geta* Bebraska, Berth Bakota, Sheds -Island# South 
p&lsota*,- Utah and Ifcuwcut*.
&* 1943# chapter 2196&, section H*
39 L» 1%?* L. B» 376* section 25-314*
46 U  1947* chapter 527*
agai&st i M : . Mmeccta#.^ ;ifoh¥&Qtea>jft*.
Ehodc Island*^ South and X te & ffi m m m x ^ may be had only .*
against the common property of the association^  in Bel&w&ra*^ on the
*  .*■'•' - -7-
other hand* aaagr ae»b*r who is. a party named, in the suit is beM liable 
to m m m w  of "his individual property#.
. rEb® swahility of unions as unincorporated association _ la wd1 
established in.-the common h m  me well as in the statuatory law of many 
states* for the ..drisona court# two held that ,rnmm
state statutes recognise the existence of labor unions# their right to 
contract and to adept a label and seal* 'by indication it follows that 
a labor union may e«e or be aued as a legal entity.49
fo u r states'*0 Shave regulated-the in te rn a l a ffa irs  o f anions by
4 1 0 0 ^  1940, title 7* section 143. 
i . . 42 L. 1943* 3. B. 264, section 10. ;■
. : ■ 43 L. 1947*: chapter. 527.
44 1 . 1947* 1 . 8 , 276j amending Kev; S tate* 1943, section 25-313.
'45 1 , 1938, chapter 530, sections 1 -4 .
44 1. 1947, S. B. 225, section! 1.
  . 47 Code, 1943* necbiph 104-3-26*'’ .
48 li-1947,' 8, B# ai,''section 8. ? * ■
‘ 4^9 4 H  V . !4fi»ridffla'Sssh and Door C o., (A ria , 1947) 13 lab o r Oases
6 3 .9 9 1 .,C t. Kingsley y . Amalgamated Kept C nttsrg, 323 301. 6pp* 353,55 . 
N. £ . 2d 554. . .............................
90 Alabama, Colorado, Delaware and Texas.
prohibiting' ouch organiration# fram shaking contributions to political 
parties* In Colorado the provision was invalidated because it was an 
Integral part of an cnconetitutlonal section of; the labor ^ Halations Act,^ . 
and the Alabama provision me declared unconstitutional because it violated 
the provision la the state constitution 'limiting each act of the legiala** 
ture to one subject*^ 2 In neither m m  did the court indicate that the 
provision was unconstitutional on its own merits# On the other hand* a 
Massachusetts court declared that m  initiative proposal .to prohibit 
polictical contributions could not be submitted to the voters for approval# 
The court held that such a provision wsuld limit without''Justification
? ■" t- ■
ft * r • r-V-.
freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and Would not only regulate union 
activities but also would serve to destroy the ability of unions to engage 
in legitimate activities*®' 'YY ' Y : .V.'
A Texas court Me taken an opposite viewpoint* The ban in that 
state m  union. political contributions was. held constitutional as a 
reasonable regulation of union activity desired to prevent public offi* 
Ciate tm m becoming unduly .subject to the influence' of .organised labor 
The labor Managcaaent .Eolations* Act of' 194?^ considerably eo&ended the
:■ ■ : i. ■ ’ ■ : : ' . , ■; ■■■ '■• ; • • I < . •. c< ' ■
scope of prohibitions; of political contributions by macing them unlawful
■ M k  Z * B e llly . m i  c lt .
52 £&» hassaU&gt Mtee 2* tMfez, «&• Mt.
t •
IjfSp- 2* ^eerat^r f t  CQiiMonwealth* op# cit#
Sl&* ‘ ' 7 5-7
53 T itle  3 , section 304* 39 B* S. C. A. 151 et seq.
An a Pras&dential or Cangrassionai election* The two states m m  having 
valid provisions relating to political contributions include any contri­
bution regardless .of the type of' election being held* . *
Ee^ulation of union elections and officersmmm rnmmmSmm wSSSmm-
Five stater^ have loosed regulations on the election of union 
officials* These provisions include such limited regulation as that 
found An the Kansas law which makes At an unfair 'labor practice to pra* 
rant the election of union officers^ and m m  comprehensive legislation 
found in the M m  of and Minnesota.^ Colorado law# prior to
its invalidation in the asUSy case# required annual elections of union 
officers by secret ballot* with any member in good standing eligible to 
run for office*.
Certain classes of people have been prohibited from holding office
An 61
in a union by tbs % m m  of Taras and Belawara* in Texas# no alien or
person convicted of a felony whose citizenship has not been restored may
be elected, .la addition to these limitations# Delaware has provided that
-2-- — —w. .X j-. fti i-— . ■Vrn *■ .*t* — -# ■ j*iiJSLJ£wJS ** dr- »  .. .
Colorado (invalid}* i)elaware^  Crepealed)* Kansas, Minnesota and
fmm*
^  h* 1943# chapter 191# section 44-809 (2).
^  1* 1943#' chapter 131# section 20* (invalid)
^  1* 1943# chapter 625*
^  Her* Civ* Stats* 5154a# section 4s*
61 1* 1947# H* B..212* section 21*
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nth ragsrd to -the regulation of union *^etton% mm atudent-. ■ 
has., stated' that these Estate regulations ■ of elections appear to grow 
out of a conviction that democratic procedures are particularly Important 
. t o  union*i<**eo irportant that the state to' Justified t o  stogltog unions 
out «nd topeatog Upon ih m  requirements ‘not applied to other private 
organizations* It to true that the states have been, particularly 
interested to promoting democratic procedures to labor unions# and 
preventing racketeering union officials i t m  gatotog a foothold to the 
union movement# hut the contention that the unions haw been %togtod 
cute for regulation ignores the existence of other state regutotton 
designed to promote democratic practices to. other private organisations.* 
A number of states have passed Fair Bi§&eptenb Practice Acts# for 
m m plQ p which are- primarily designed to prevent und^ nocratie -employe 
ment practices by e^toyers* the incorporation laws of many states 
provide for the .regulation of elections of cojporation directors and 
set forth certain qualifications which officers of such organizations 
must possess.*^ ® It to therefore- apparent that labor unions# while 
subject to considerable regulation of election practices# are but one 
type of private organisation that has been so- regulated* .
Although It to not within the scape of this study to examine the 
Charles# op* d W #  p* 397* 
^  Se% for srampto# la* Cktn* Stats* ,1939# Tbl* 1# section 1S10*-
uto*
fair Ik^loyme&i Practice Acts- found to five stoles#^ it is desirable 
to mention to c m m m t t m  with the ragulstton. of, union affairs the fact 
that these states prohibit mmsbemhUp diso^ tetoatito* Under these 'tows# 
a person cannot be denied membership to a labor organisation because of 
race# religion# color or national origin* to every state having such a 
tow but l&seonsto* preventative provisions haw toon enacted* ‘A cm m im  
aion to empowered to hear grievances and issue cease and desist orders 
to these states* to Wisconsin^ the ct«isslo& to merely ejspowered to 
conduct an investigation of discrimination to labor untons and to publish 
its findings.
. It to shown to this chapter that labor organizations are subject 
to a significant amount of state regulation to the conduct of their 
internal affairs* the neatest part of this legtolation to designed to 
restrict the ims crapulous practices of a small minority of labor leaders# 
who# under the guise of representing employees* era to reality preying 
upon the rank and file* Honest union leadera# perhaps uhforturately* 
must also comply with the law*
. The regulation of union internal affairs’ ha# .been criticised by 
organised labor as an unwarranted toterferance with private, organisations* 
■It to submitted* however*, that there to a definite need -for such raguto* 
Cion. Most state and rational regulation of private businesses has been
*** Connecticut* Massachusetts# lew- Jersey# Mew fora and Wisconsin* 
^  3tats* 1943# Raptor 1J1*31* sections 111*31 to 311*37*
necessary because of toe' injudicious and fraudulent, practices of/a -small 
m ^m ni of -the gren^* ' Security regulation to & prime exacjple to -the- 
United .States# as to: toe business o t banking* The tremendous growth of ,. 
labor organisations since 1935 places them to a category to. which regu­
lation of financial and menhershto practices to justifiable*- It has been 
shown# however* that such arbitrary interference as. cm phXm rf tocorpora- 
tier* requirements cannot he recommended as furthering toe public interest 
to any appreciable degree# and appear to constitute 
iabor
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toe preceding chapters of the present study of state industrial 
relations regulation, have dealt# in the main* with the. substantive assets 
of pertinent state legislation* lama dealing with the restriction of 
prohibition of the basic weapons of organized, labor have .received, appro** 
priate emphasis to keeptog with toe postwar trend, toward restrictive 
labor legislation* In chapter serai* it was shown that employers have 
also 'been subject to state regulation# several states having defined 
certain practices which mragement could not towfully perform to dealing 
with employees*
to this chapter a transition to made tm m  substantive law to 
administrative law* to general# the purpose of this part of the study 
to to determine too to charged -with toe resporaibility of enforcing state 
industrial relations legislation* what duties, and powers .are delegated to' 
the responsible admtototrative agencies*, end toat procedures are- followed 
to carrying out the will and intent -of the several legislatures*
*
It should be noted at the outset that tot great majority of states 
'have left the responsibility for tto admtototration and enforceioent of 
industrial relative legislation to toe hands of toe judicial, branch of 
.government* them states have not .seen fit to'establish separate agencies 
to deal with to© adtatototrablon of their laws* adhering to the philosophy 
that toe established judiciary to best equipped to carry out the duties of
minterpretation and enforcement* fbf defects of the »oourh technique1* 
as it is utilised in the imjority of state# are generally recognized tf* 
students of the problem* 4# one acute ^observer has stated#: there ha# M m  
.little enforcement of these- laws because of the lengthy litigation that 
must follow and civil action or original prosecution for violation of the 
state law* Wmm iwm M m  .little Incentive to secure damages In the
courts since much time and effort if- necessary to secure remedial relief#
V * ' * . : .
It is not within the seeps of this chapter! however* to, discus# the reto*
tlire merits of the judiciary as opposed to the independent cemjmission as 
the proper agency for law enforcement. But since ten. of the states 
bom set up administrative beard#' to expedite the enforcement Of Indus*’ 
tidal relations legislation! the ccphasi# I# placed upon the technique# 
used by these state#!; rather than upon the familiar method# of judicial 
enforcement. It I# true# of course* that even where administration is 
carried out by board# and commission# remedial and punitive -orders are 
subject to review hr the court#.*
■ s*, hie m um c'sm  of 4«cx&s
M  the eight state# which dp not- utilise the. court technique of
labor law enforcmnent^ the state labor- relations act ha# created a board
gats* I*, a*.* «A Decade of State labor 
l^gi^tica*’1 15 Ihiiversity- j|J Sh%ago tor leview.. 282* (X#48).'
2 Colorado* eonnacticut* Hassaehusetts, Sew fork* Feimasrlv^ aia* 
Shed# Island* fiaS, and li*#tes#ta«
3- wichigan.and Minnesota* while providing for administrative 
agencies .to Conduct election# and perform mediation and coiUJiMatlon 
service#! do not enpower the## agencies to take action against unfair 
labor practices*
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or commission to mrry out thepurposee of the legislation* four states*
Connecticut* Hew fork* Bhode Island- end Pennsylvania hare established
labor Belations Boards* fallowing the precedent set by the 'Wagner Act in
1935*- In Massachusetts * the administrative bodyis known m  the labor
Kelations Commission* while the Utah and Colorado acts are-enforced by
the Industrial Commission* the .latter agencies having been in operation
✓
for, a number of years prior to the passage of -comprehensive labor legist 
latlon in these states* . Wisconsin has established an Employment Belations 
Board* and Michigan has given its administrative agency the title of 
labor .Mediation Board* In the latter .state* the court technique- of 
enforcement, is heavily relied upon, but the board has certain powers 
which may properly be included in the discussion of the administrative 
technique* Minnesota has a one man administrative' official known as the 
labor Conciliator*
It is apparent that a considerable diversity of nomenclature 
exists -among the states with respect to the agencies responsible for the 
administration of industrial .relations legislation* for the purpose, of 
this chapter the term ’board* is used to denote these agencies* frrespee** 
hive of individual variations among the states* except where a particular 
state law is being discussed*
dOBg3Qsitlon of bjie administrative boards
With the exception of Minnesota* 'the state ' labor relations boards 
invariably consist- of three -members appointed by the governor with the 
advice and consent of state senate* general assembly or executive council*
Members of the board met have certain qualifications which are defined ,
in the various laws* , epical requirements are- found- -in the Hew fork
statute*^ , 3§&ch ma&ber.must be a citizen of the United States, a resident
of |be,,state# and a qualified-'elector for a-period of mm year prior to
his appointment*' m,addition, |t is stipulated that the member met-not
hold any other position during the period of his service on the boardj
this provision has apparently been included to assure' greater Impartiality
among the appointees* tBhode Island, however, takes .a different approach
to the appointment of board members by stating that one member is to be
appointed from each of the three large groups involved in the industrial
conflict* labor, jmnagemeot and the public*^
■ Salaries of board members:*: fhe salaries of board members vary
markedly from, state to state* While Mm lbt k  pays- each member ten thousand 
£
dollars a year, Bhode Island pays its members only two thousand five 
hundred dollars per year* ^ Michigan and Connecticut ecs^ ensate members^  
of the labor relations board, on a dally basis* the latter providing pay-
g
meiti- at the rate of twenty-fivir dollars..-for*eqch day worked, and the 
former at the rate of twenty dollars per diem*^  'Michigan,, however, 
provides that in no .case shall a member be paid more than five thousand ■
A  -&*• 1937* chapter 443* section 702* ' 1 
; -5: X*. 1941,. chapter ■ 1066* section. 3* .
 ^I**" 1937, Chapter 443* section 703*
? 1* 1941, chapter 1066, section 3*
■- ^  - Gen* Stats* (1945 Supp*) section 934h*
^ 1* 1939# section 423*5*
dollars In any one -year* -
faken m  a whole, the states do not compensate the member# of 
their labor relations boards in a manner commensurate with the responsib­
ilities which accompany the appointment to such a position#' the salaries 
of government officials a are generally subject to this, criticism* In  the 
case of board members it would be particularly desirable be have rela­
tively large salaries provided, in view of the qualifications of members 
necessary for the efficient and honest administration of the laws*.' Bines 
members, may not engage in any other occupation, it. I# doubtful that the 
position would appear desirable to any but a few selfless public servants* 
Appointment to the boards la likely to develop into a “political plum11 
which the governor may use to reward the party faithful* Bvsn the 
relatively Mgh. salary paid in Hew fork is .hardly sufficient 'in view of
the Industrial and legal background necessary,, to the. efficient perform-
■ < ! ■ ■ ■  ■’
anee of the duties of the poaitlon* With the salaries of members, of the 
national labor Belaiions Board fixed at twelve- thousand dollars- per year, 
however, it is unlikely that the states will raise their salary scale in 
the near future*
tenure £f office* Members of the state labor relations boards 
enjoy a datively long tenure of office* Michigan provides that board 
meBlber8 011811 80rw* *w  thpee #»*«* bufc to Massachusetts the 
length of service is five years. In Hew fork,' Pemsylvania, Bhode Island, 
Wisconsin and Connecticut, appointments are made for six yeans* this 
long period of service is highly desirable, since it allows each member 
to become proficient as an administrator of labor legislation, and also
because itpre vents the office, to a certain extent, from becoming a 
part of. the patronage system ;m prevalent in many states* Since state 
governors.are usually' elected every two years, it is not possible for 
the membership to change drastically merely because • of a change in the 
political party in power*..
xi* k w w  w  w m rn  of «otisihaiivi boahds
.in examination of the state labor .relations acts indicate that the 
legislatures have delegated to administrative boards a significant amount, 
of power and responsibility in connection with industrial relations* The 
most important powers which the boards exercise include the investigation 
of labor disputes, the certification of collective bargaining represents** 
hives and. the holding of elections, ' together with the responsibility for 
preventing unfair labor practices*
lew York, Pennsylvania, Ehode Island* Utah and Massachusetts have 
granted rather extensive investigatory powers to their boards* The other 
states having Ward administrated labor -relations acts -also provide for 
investigation to a limited degree* In .general, the purpose of iavestiga** 
tion is to enable the boards 'to- determine the fadts in a labor dispute or 
to gather data concerning -the claims of unions who wish to act as collect­
ive bargaining representatives of eaployeea in a particular- bargaining unit* 
The Mew Toiic Xaw,^ provides an example of the broad investigaiofy
" ,W!L M" 443, section 708#
p o m m n i state-. boards which administer the .labor relatione acts* The 
board is given the power to gain access to .records of any person being 
investigated,- Including the right to photograph or -oopy any. evidence . 
which is: pertinent to.-the purpose of .-the investigation* Jhur member of 
the board may subpoena witnesses and require them to disclose any 
information, or produce any documentary evidence which is appropriate 
to- the investigation* The law, provides that refusal to obey a board 
order to -appear, before It or to t^ dthhold information makes any person 
subject .to legal, action in the. state courts* . Ho'person ray-refuse to 
testify on the grounds that his information is self. incriminatory £ but 
the -law provides, that no. person may be prosecuted for anything which he 
says or produces as evidence under compulsion* The board, ' in  connection
Mtti any investigation may call upon any state agency to .furnish infer**
ft
nation or .records which are necessary to the proceeding*
P reven tion of unfair ' im &pM m p
Perhaps the most- important- power which has been delegated to the. 
state boards, which administer the labor relations -acts is that of prevent** 
lug unfair-labor practice#*^ • The- procedure which .is- followed, in this, 
connection'varies among-the states, but three'.general classifications-'are 
apparent. In the first group of states^ the ■.procedure'--follows Is 
closely related'to that-of the- national .labor Eolations Act, in, that the-, 
boards'in' these states are' responsible for the investigation, prosecution
^  Massachusetts, M m York, §wm mtlhut, Utah .and Bhode Island*
and ■adjudication of charges of unfair labor practices*/ to these,.five 
states the board itself may initiate proceedings.; against an ettplcyer or 
employee to effectuate the policies of the state law#
In  Pennsylvania* Colorado and Wisconsin, 'however,, the state hoard 
merely'acts as a court of .initial resort. In these states the burden of 
proof of an,unfair practice is not upon the hoard and. its legal, staff 
but upon the person or persons who make the charge* The main function 
of the board under these 1awe is to-- hold a hearing following a complaint 
by an aggrieved person, and to issue an order after the hearing 'has been 
terminated# Ho attempt is made to effect a voluntary settlement of a . 
dispute, prior to the adjudication proceedings* It - is interesting to note 
that in these three , states the - parties to the ^dispute,may twithdraw charges 
and- thereby end the hearingj if this- is done the board may not issue any 
remedial order even though it is clear that the state law ‘has been violated* 
In Colorado, an alternative procedure may be followed which allows the 
Industrial Ootmaissibn to issue cos^ laints against persons guilty of 
committing unfair labor practices, but the board, is not given the power 
to prosecute in its own right*
The third group of states, which includes Michigan and Minnesota, 
roly almost entirely upon the state courts to- prevent unfair labor prac­
tices defined in the law* The Minnesota law, for example* provides that - 
when any unfair labor .practice Mis threatened o r committed# a suit be 
enjoin such practice my be maintained in the district court'of any county 
wherein-such practice has occurred or is threatened In Michigan* the
’^ ^ WW^ 3 m n^stats * * „ chapter Iff,, section 1TO.1&*
m.labor Mediation Board has power to attempt' to settle dispates by media** 
tion* but here again the- main reliance for prosecution is upon the state 
courts*- * '•
imong the three, types of preventive procedures utilised by-the 
states* it has been generally conceded by students of the problem that the 
procedure followed in Hew Tork* Connecticut^  Hhode Island* Massachusetts 
and Utah, which is patterned after the -national law# is the. most effective 
method of preventing unfair labor practices*; In these states the law 
cannot be. subverted merely- because' an employer or an employee does.' not 
wish to engage in the procedure of initiating and proving the charge of. 
an unfair labor- practice* . the. board is charged with carrying out the 
purposes of the law by initiating coa^ laints# prosecuting* and issuing . 
remedial orders 'to- effectuate' state policies*-. On the other hand* in the 
second group of states- which -utilise the ouasijudielel technique* the - 
effectiveness of the law depends upon the aggressiveness of.ei^ Xoyees-- and 
employers in Initiating and prosecuting coiaplaints before the beard*. -St 
.is possible* and highly probable that many charges of unfair practices . 
never reach Hie adjudication stage due to- the time and effort necessary
to receive- remedial relief' in-these states*. - ..flic- same' criticism*''as ,it
' * ; ■ r
has been pointed out, applies to those states Which us
technique*1 of enforcement#
Certification
the admiuis trs tive boards have also- been granted the power; to
conduct elections among employees for the purpose of determining "
r
appropriate collective bargaining units and for purposes. of certifying 
representatives as the sole agents of enployees, The Wisconsin statute 
is representative of one method in which the appropriate bargaining unit 
is chosen by the employees* and is alto found in the Colorado statute*
The Wisconsin provision reads*
Whenever a question, arises concerning the determination of a 
collective bargaining unit«»*it shall be determined by secret 
ballot* and the Board* upon request* shall cause tbs- ballot to 
be taken in such manner as to show separately the wishes of the 
employees in any craft* division* department or plant as to the 
deteminatlon of the collective bargaining unit . *
Although the appropriate collective bargaining unit is always 
determined by an es^ loyee election ih Wisconsin and Colorado* It may be 
determined by the board .in lew York*; Connecticut* Bhode "Island* Massachu­
setts, Pennsylvania and Utah* for magpie* the Bhode Island 'law states 
that “the board shall decide in each case whether* in order to insure to 
employees the fuH benefit of (their rights) * * .the unit appropriate for 
the purpose of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit* craft 
unit* plant unit* or any other unit**1' provided that if a majority of the 
employees wish a certain unit the board shall designate' that unit as the 
m® appropriate*^ -5
In a case where a dispute arises between two labor organisations 
over the question of: which is to represent the employees in a certain 
bargaining unit the state boards are empowered to hold hearings and 
elections among the employees to determine their wishes* If an election
14 U  1939, chapter 57, eection 11.05.
^  1 . 19W.# chapter 1066, section 6 (2 ) .
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is held* the representative chosen by the majority of employees is. the r‘ 
unit is certified by the beard as the sole collective bargaining agent 
of the employees* This certification is usually binding for at least 
one year* although a linger period may be provided for to' a collective 
bargaining contract* Colorado and Wisconsin have provided that in any 
election to determine collective bargatoiiig representatives* the ballot 
. must be so made up tha£ an eaployee may vote against anyrepresent&tive 
-whatsoever if- he wished to do so*
m & s i pM $ s&
although the state boards have been given a great deal of power 
over' industrial relations* it is m% an absolute ‘power*- 'toe boards merely 
act as courts of first resort* and any person has the right to petition 
the state courts for a review of any order of the- agency* Orders of the 
boards consist largely of remedial rather than "punitive actions* Thus 
the cease and desist order*, the reinstatement order and the. certification 
order have'been the. main remedies granted* The right to judicial review/
is expressly stated - to many of the state labor relations, acts*, and where 
it does not appear to the text it may be /readily found to. the law which 
has. been, formulated to America since the rise of independent regulatory 
commissions,
toe state courts have taken jurisdiction over the orders of labor 
relations boards but they have generally upheld the finding of the agency 
where substantiated by evidence* fhto principle has developed throughout 
the entire American court system*, -and even the. Supreme Court of the United.
U f
States refuses to reviewevidence presented by enforcement officials 
where; there are no apparent errors# ■ Orders of state boards have most', 
often been set aside because they- -violate some constitutional principle 
or because they have .exceeded the boundries of delegated legislative- 
power#
In many cases .the.; board itself must resort to the state judiciary
for-the enforcement of .its carders* . Xf voluntary compliance is not
achieved, the board must petition the courts of the state for appropriate
enforcement, and must submit all evidence in the ease, together with its
findings, to judicial review*- ' the person charged with non-compliance is.
ordered to- appear before the court and is allowed to present additional
evidence to show that the order was in error* Usually* the lower court #s
order or judgement becomes final, but in certain, cases- the process of
: * 
review extends to the United States Supreme Court* judicial .review,
while providing necessary safeguards against the arbitrary action of
administrative agencies, is not .resorted to- in. the vast majority of cases*
For the most part the labor relations boards have settled controversies
- 4.
without extensive- litigation in -the courts, which, in the final. analysis, 
is indicative of their success in the administration of state- legislation*
W'BUIlAif Aiidii JJ&N
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Ihe preceding chapters of the present study have been concerned, 
in the main, with the role of state governments in the regulation of 
labor relations# Xh keeping with a leather marked legislative trendy 
emphasis has been placed upon the regulation of organised labor and its 
use of the more important economic capons at Its command# It is apparent
t
that the tremendous growth of labor unions since 1935 has resulted i n sn^ 
almost universal feeling in the state legislative chambers that this 
expansion of union power must not go unchecked# thus* the era of 
restrictive employer regulation and union encouragement has partially 
given way to widespread concern with the potentialities of unrestrained 
labor union prerogatives* and this concern has been translated into 
thoroughgoing regulation in many states#
i# m m m
In order to integrate the various sections of this study It is 
appropriate that a brief summary be presented at this point# for the 
most part* this analysis will be objective in nature* leaving to a 
subsequent section the task of formulating conclusions#
im W M M m  o l Haa f M a
One of the important problems of labor relations regulation 
Is that which dials with the division of regulatory powers between the
state and federal governments* Although this problem has by no means 
been conclusively resolved* certain trends are evident# -.for example* 
it Is clear that'the states may regulate union security - agreements 
provided that the regulation is not less restrictive than the federal 
law* It is ifi5>ortant to note that this state regulation covers industries 
operating In interstate as well as intrast&te commerce, Hie states'may • 
also limit the. right- to strike, provided that such limitations are not 
Inconsistent with controlling Supreme Court decisions* Section thirteen 
of the Ta£t~Hartley Act makes this point clear*
Certain limitations have also been placed upon the Jurisdiction of 
the state in regulating industrial ablations* -Since- the Bethlehem case 
in 1947* the federal .government has held exclusive power to certify" bargain-* 
ing representatives in interstate commerce# the states are also denied 
Jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices in the four main areas of 
Interstate commerce* mining* manufacturing* transportation and earamenlea-* 
tlon, But the National .labor Belations Board has beenempowered to- cede 
jurisdiction to state agencies in other industries where- cOBoparable state 
and federal laws exist* even though these industries operate in interstate 
comme.rce* - - ■
■ 'In-actual practice*, the refusal to- take Jurisdiction over small 
industries by the- MSB 'in.'.recent- months points to the ©mansion of the 
state police power within the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment* the 
outcome of the controversy between the KLRB* which does not wish to assert 
Jurisdiction over essentially local industries* and its General Counsel,
who firmly believes that Congress has g iven the Board a mandat© to process 
all .oases within 'the botMdsries of its' possible Jurisdiction, will hairs
claimed a significant ©hare ofXegisl&tive attention, particularly since
cedural requirements idiich must, be met prior to the execution of such
unit must approve any union security clause, and Wisconsin law stipulate© 
that a two*»thirds affirmative vote must be cast for the agreement,
In addition to. those state© that merely regulate- union security,, 
thirteen states have, by legislative enactment or constitutional amende 
menb, entirely prohibited the making of any closed shop, union shop, or 
maintenanceHsf^ membership agreement# These proscriptions have recently' 
been upheld by the United States Supreme. Court a©-a valid exercise of 
the state police power*
Regulation off picketing
In spite of the'decision to Thornhill y* Alabama# to. which the 
Supreme Court extended constitutionally protected freedom of speech to
peaceful picket tog, the state© have, enacted a significant amount of 
regulation restricting this tom . of union activity* Wot all of the state
considerable bearing upon toe expansion or contraction of the state'police
power.
'The .regulation or prohibition of union security agreements has
194?* to twelve of the states, regulation has taken the form of pro-*
an agreement, The most important requirement I© that a majority of
affected, employees must vote for such an agreement to a secret ballot*
Colorado provides that three-fom'tb© of the employee© to a bargaining
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activity to "this field to constitutional to light of controlling deci- 
©tons, of the Court* ■ Nebraska, for example, prohibits even peaceful 
picketing if the law to accorded a literal, interrelation, South Dakota, 
Missouri,^  Delaware*^  North Dakota, Virginia, Pennsylvaniir5 and Minnesota 
have declared stranger picketing to be illegal, an assumption clearly to 
conflict with the Supreme Court decision to Apt y* Swing, South Dakota 
and Texas have laws' which ‘limit picketing to situations' to. which a labor 
dispute exist# between m  employer and hit employees* .The Court has held 
such'laws to be unconstitutional to gajseagr and gftgfegg- grtoem^  X* M i *
Certain regulation# of picketing, however, are clearly constitu­
tional* Violent picketing'has been, prohibited to fifteen states, and 
would undoubtedly be enjoined by the courts to many others* It was noted 
to chapter •four that the. toornhill doctrine does, not extend bo picketing 
attended with violence, coercion or intimidation, toe Headowmoor Dairies 
decision clearly points this out*
Eleven states prohibit mas# picketing*, toe constitutionality of 
this phase of picketing regulation ha# not been questioned since, the 
Iri-Gity case to 1921, and ha# 'been, recently, affirmed to Carpenters and 
M m m M m  2* m s * m  sm$« Here Justice Robert® declared the states 
could legally limit the participants to picketing to w reasonable,.numbers ***
Picketing to achieve an. illegal ■ end is prohibited to Massachusetts
■ •£ ^
2 fiepealed, 1949,
3 Invalidated recently by the courts of Pennsylvania.
and. Oregon! Texas ha# outlawed picketing to which fact# are misrepresented 
by the- participants!; ftorldar.and- Kansas- have limited picketing' to the 
place -of business where the.dispute exists! - and ten -states outlaw the 
picketing of a workers home.
ft is -thus apparent that the states have deemed -picketing a 
significant source of tobor*mamgement conflict and have "adopted extensive 
.regulation;:.of this device* Thirty-six of the forty-eight states have 
imposed some, manner of regulation on the v right to picket*
Regulation of the 'boycott
In chapter, five it was shown that twenty states' have prohibited 
the use of the secondary boycott* to two of these states, Alabama and 
California, the law has been held unconstitutional as an invalid .exercise ' 
of the state police power violating- the .'Fourteenth Amendment, to two 
other states, Missouri and Delaware, the prohibition of the secondary 
boycott was repealed to 1949*^
to eight of the states having labor relations acts, the secondary 
boycott is characterised as an unfair labor practice, 'to tour states it 
to -declared to- be a conspiracy to restraint of trade. Georgia, Iowa, .
i f
Idaho, Missouri tod-Texas have merely declared the boycott to be unlawful 
without giving specific .pounds for its illegality.
to. some states, Alabama for example, the courts have attempted to 
extend the immunity of free speech be boycotting to much the same manner 
that peaceful''picketing has been protected from legislative prohibition*.
& Both the Missouri, Bradford Act and. the'Dataware labor Halations 
Act were repealed to the 1949 session of the legislature*
that# this movement will gain headway in other states is. subject to 
considerable doubt, not only because of essential dissimilaritie a 
between picketing and boycotting in their effects, but also because 
of the enactment of federal' legislation making the boycott illegal, in. 
interstate commerce. IMS union device is made an unfair employee 
labor practice in section eight of the faft-Hartley Act and also by'
, section 303 of the labor Management Halations Act#
L M ^ a t ion of the X M &  M  strike i
- fhe basic economic weapon of organized labor has traditionally 
„ been the strike# Although It has been clear since the Wolff Packing Co# 
case that the states cannot prohibit strikes in private industry alto­
gether* thi# fact has not prevented- a significant degree of' regulation 
by the states* In private industries {as distinguished from’public 
utilities}- the right to strike has -been limited by the imposition of 
procedural' requirements such* as the strike election provision found in 
thirteen states, and the ‘cooling off1* period requirement la: eight- • 
states*
Strikes in violation ,of collective bargaining* agreements are - 
proscribed in a number of states*. The jurisdictional strike has- been 
banned or strictly regulated in eleven states* - In* some of these rather 
elaborate machinery for the settlement of jurisdictional .disputes has 
been set up. ftm sit-down strike* which has always been condemned by 
the courts* is- proscribed in fourteen, states by legislative enactment. - 
■ Michigan* Missouri* Mew fork*. Ohio, Pennsylvania and ferns outlaw -
Strikes by public employees* a policy which is in 11m  with that of the 
federal, government.
. The attention of the 1917 legislative sessions was directed to 
the prevention of strikes in public utilities* M  order to promote . 
continuous operation of these essential industries a number of states 
enacted legislation requiring cooling off periods* c<m$>ulsory arbitra­
tion and mediation of disputes, and providing for broad seizure powers 
in case of a breakdown In. negotiations which would be or is followed by 
a strike,
Regulation o f unfair labor practices
Following the passage- of the tfegner Act in 1935, a number of states 
enacted similar laws to govern the conduct of Industrial relations in. 
intrastate commerce. In these early “little Wagner Acts*1 employers were 
forbidden to engage In certain activities which the states characterized 
as unfair labor practices* Beginning in if39,'labor relations' laws were 
passed which included not only employer unfair labor1 practices but -also 
unfair -practices which were forbidden to eisployees,^  At the- present 
time the laws, of Connecticut* Mow folk and Bhode Island .proscribe employ­
er unfair labor practices but do- -not include «oployee unfair- labor 
practices*
the scope of employee unfair labor practices defined by the- various
$'‘-'Prior to the 1949 legislative sessions* twelve states had passed 
coaprehensive labor. relations laws similar to the National labor Belations 
Act* The Delaware apt was repealed by H* B* Mo* 1* laws of 1949* effective 
dune 29* 1949*
melates includes many acta by employees which are merely unlawful in 
other states not hairing comprehensive legislation* these include the 
use of the secondary boycott, the sit-down strilce, and in several 
states- 'the calling of'-a stri&e where less than.- amajorityof the affected 
employees have voted for' such action* On the other -hand, most of the 
state- labor-relations- acts' include practices which are not specifically 
outlawed .in, other states, having fragKientary reflation# For eseasple, 
many of the states mah© the coercion of an employee or: an employer to * 
prevent his exercise of certain guaranteed rights an unfair employee 
labor practice* Befusal to bargain collectively with an employer, or 
the violation of -a 'valid 'collective 'bargaining agreement has also been 
included in the labor relations acts as an unfair labor -practice, it 
may be noted that these practices are- closely related to those enumerated 
in the f&ft^Hariley law* Since the state acts-were passed prior to the 
1947 national law, it is evident that Congress was influenced by the 
states to a considerable degree*
Unfair ©fspXeyer 'labor practices' as' defined in the..state acts 
closely follow the terminology and philosophy of the Warier Act* Hie 
more important practices which employers are prohibited from, performing 
includes (l) Interference with the rights of employeest© organise and-
t
bargain collectively* (a) the domination of labor organisations through 
financial or other means* (3) discouraging or encouraging union member* 
ship I £4) discriminating against employees for .filing charges or testify*
, / i . W  A . ’ . ■ . , . • ’ ■ '' ’ ’ ' ■ '
■ ihg 'under the provisions' of the law* repeal t# 'bargain :c©lle0tivi3y with
• .; 1 r - * - ' ' * * * * ‘ . *
Ji
.duly certified representatives of Ms ©nployeesj and {*>} ' the use of 
spies or blacklists*
Bsigolabloo gjg union.
A relatively' new phase of industrial relations regulation by 'the 
states has taken the fbrm of eontrol over the internal, affairs of unions* 
Hie .growth and achievement of economic power p i 'the labor union in the 
past fifteen years has resulted In a felt need for the regulation of 
internal union practices, just as the growth of the coloration as a 
powerful economic and social institution in America has called forth a 
significant amodht of regulation of its Internal affairs in the past*
It the ■ present time, ten states require the registration of union 
officers and business agents' with m  appropriate government agency* 2h 
Hill v* Horida ex rejL* Watson* the United States Supreme Court invalidated 
such statutes insofar as they were applied to prevent union officers and 
agents from acting as collective bargaining, agents* the status of these 
laws is therefore in doubt* apparently non-c<m^ liance with the law cannot 
result In penalties m  severe that they interfere with the-collective 
bargaining power of the organisation*
Hine states -have regulated union internal affairs by. requiring 
these organisations to Hie periodic reports and financial statements 
with the state* Procedure with regard- to the availability of these 
reports varies* in some states they are held bo be confidential and 
subject to the scrutiny of state official© only,, while in.other ©bate© 
the .public has access to them* A im  states require that reports’be 
submitted to union members*
if ;Cnipn dues* fees and assessments have come within the control 
of seven states* In general* this regulation la designed to prevent 
racketeering practices by a email minority of union leaders and to pro**
beet the “worker whose job is often dependent upon union membership*
the ecvapulsory incorporation of labor unions* and although the %m ban 
beep held unconstitutional by the state courts^  this method of regulating 
the internal affairs of unions deserves mention* It constitutes a radical 
experiment in the control of union affairs which hardly seems justifiable* 
It has been shown that effective regulation of union activity and organisa­
tion in the public interest is not dependent upon the forced adoption of 
any particular i^ pe of union structure* While it is difficult to concur 
with the Colorado Supreme Court*s holding that compulsory incorporation 
Interferes with civil liberties* the benefits of such regulation are 
Clearly outweighed by the necessity of preserving freedom of organisation 
and association*
Other methods of regulating union affairs include the prohibition 
of political contributions in four states* the regulation of union 
elections In five stages and the regulation of membership practices of 
unions in those states which have enacted Fair Employment Practice Acts*
for the most part* left to the judicial branch #£ goverment* £n ten
Although only on© state* Colorado* has enacted a law requiring
the administration of state industrial relations legislation is*
States* however* administrative agencies have been set up to carry out
the: purposes'of. the,state legislation* In tm  of these states# Michigan 
' and Minnesota* the - administrative agency does net have1 tire power to 
enforce the law when .ft is violaied| in these states the tteourt technique0 
in relied upon, and the chief faction of the agency- is to mediate -and 
conciliate labor disputes*
. In. the eight states which haw given wide discretionary power over ' 
labor relations to a board or commission two general types of ada&nistra** 
tloa are evident* In Massachusetts* Mew lork^  Connecticut, Utah and 
Bhode Island the board is empowered to initiate ansi prosecute unfair 
labor practices in its own right without the necessity of a formal cosh* 
plaint having been filed by an aggrieved person* M  Pennsylvania,
Colorado and Wisconsin# however# the state board or eomisslon merely 
acta as a court of' first resort after a 'cosplaimt has been'' filedi the 
agency in these states may not take the initiative in prosecuting unfair 
practices#
Together with the prevention of unfair labor practices, an inportant 
function of adatef^ tr&tive. agencies is the certification #f collective 
bargaining representatives' and the IV?lding of representation elections#
In Colorado and Wiscomin# collective bargaining representatives end 
units arealways chosen by an election'‘held by the board or COTaission, 
but In other states the board may decide what unit will best serve the 
'Interests of employees#
Even in the eight states which rely upon the adaiinistrative rather 
than the court technique of .labor relations law enforcement, (the technique 
which leaves the enforcement of the legislation to the judiciary} the law
m i
preserves - the right of the courts to review orders and Judgements of • 
the state agency* This, of course, provides protection'for individuals 
from the arbitrary decisions of administrative officials*
xs* a « iiis x M s
The preceding study of state .regulation of industrial relations 
has revised in broad outline the general characteristics of state regu-*
■ Xatory legislation ‘in this field# little, attempt has been made to • 
evaluate' the desirability of this body of'legislation in its entirety* 
although criticism-or-defense of specific laws has not been lacking# 
it- this point it is. appropriate to formulate conclusions based upon the 
data which has been presented in' the preceding, chapters*
• 4a examination of the present body of state legislation dealing 
with industrial relations, reveals a preponderance of restrictive- regular 
tien of .labor organisations* and a somewhat less aggregate, concern for 
the actions of employers In the 'Industrial conflict# This fact indicates 
a rather sharp departure-from the era of practically unlimited encourage** 
meat of labor and its activities sduring the early 1930*0# The condition 
of Industrial relations at that time* however* -ms vastly different from 
the present situation# - labor organisations were -weak .generally*: and the
, - , ‘’f
bargaining power of labor ms inferior to that of management# w hence*, 
both the state and national legislatures felt the necessity of restrict* 
ing the employer *a ^ rights* in the' industrial conflict* .as well' as the 
need for strong'unions to meet the collective bargainliigopower of the 1 
employer on equal terms# The lam- passed In this period reflected this
pMXoeophy, •«*$ they «ert suecessfhl- in
achieving ihair -objectSires* ■ la 193$, only throe and one-half million 
- . workers at the present tim warn eighteen, taHlion persons
belong to the anions*
The era of practically unlimited government encouragement of labor 
organisations ended In 1939 on the state level of goverj»nt# and la 194? 
on the federal level. The latter year olimxed the period of restrictive 
labor legislation, with the passage-of the f&fWBartley-let as wel1" as 
a. .great-deal of restrictive state legislation* In 1949,. there was some 
indication that the movement had subsided, as pressure -'grew for the 
repeal of the fa£t*»Hartley Act and as the repeal of restrictive XegisXa** 
tion in Delaware and Missouri was effected*
The motives behind the restrictive labor legislation of the states 
may be summarised' as- the desire to equalise the bargaining power of labor 
and management*^  which many legislatures deemed to have swung too far in 
favor of the unions, and the desire of the states to protect the individual 
working man from the collective action of Ms fellows* M  order to 
achieve these objectives the states have prohibited or strictly regulated 
union security agreements, end have' regulated the use'of the basic weapons
i **
of organized labor, including strikes, picketing and boycotting* Also,
*
in order to protect the’ individual wbrker and the public, many states' 
have passed legislation- which regulates the internal affairs of unions*
.the desirability of this body of legislation, particularly from the'
'■,i -
6 Jg. Cohan* Sanford* State labor legislation. 1937~19i»7. Ohio 
State University, 1943, p* 99*
mstandpoint of the public iniereab* mmt be deteradhed bya separate
*# ** g* <fiE A  jP  *#*%.«*klLa -■»- -«*- _.. -J&F m Jlifr Jf in 'iti .tahJb>Mb<ie lir  aS ^aUw U lA A  #L _w i^ .. iLi. •© *■ mW ^  Ml A '1»evcuLya v3»on 01 each  a re a  juci w hicxi i% 0uxsvi»on lia s  seen n^poseu*
'fhe right of the states to regttiate or prohibit the closed shop, 
the union ©hop and mlnbeneiiee^^ agreements is not subject
to question* the baited States Stpiw Court clarified this point In a 
number of- recent decisions discussed in chapter three# fiats* whatever 
conclusions may be dram with respect to union security relation 
turn upon the desirability of such regulation rather than its legality#
The desirability or undesirability of union security regulation 
must rest upon two considerations$ namely the right of iadividuals to 
obtain work without encumbrance, and the necessity of maintaining the 
bargaining power of organised labor# It is submitted that the closed 
shop* while isaterially strengthening the bargaining power of labor* 
Interfere© unduly with the rights of Individual., worker© to obtain 
^jloyment* the monopolistic position of the union under a dosed shcp 
agreement* particularly where a dosed, union has been instituted* enables 
It to ©aeereis# power over the m m m io deailty of imkers to a degree 
which is not hamodons with the public interest# The objections to 
the dosed shop are partially removed* however* men the union mop is 
considered* Under this type iif union security agreeaent the individual 
worker is given, a chance to approve or disapprove its- e m m t& m * with 
the laajosity .ruling in a secret ballot taken among es^ loyees affected*
-fhe union shop .removes many of the undesirable featuyes of the closed shop 
and at the same time it enables the union to a strong bargaining
• position*. Even, if the union ©hop- is given public' approval, m  it has- 
been under the provisions of the £afb#Hartley Act* ■mrtmm additional 
safeguard© must be given the Individual; worker* In general* these 
should include rather strict state regulation of union fees* dues- and 
assessments, together with considerable government control of the 
membership policies of organised labor*
It may he concluded that the union chop is more in Hue with the 
public interest than is the closed shop* It is true, nevertheless* that 
thirteen state© have 'adopted a public policy which outlaws all forms of 
union security* In the final analysis* the desirability of these laws 
smsb be tested by experience in the various states, and any arbitrary 
condemnation of such legislation is not justified at the present time.
Regulation of picketing
, State proscription, of mas© picketing* picketing involving violence 
and intimidation, and secondary picketing.!© desirable from the stand-* 
point of the public .interest* It would be difficult to present a con­
vincing defense'Of any of these foms of ,tn*ion activity* ' Peaceful 
picketing, on the other hand should be protected by' the' state© m  a 
legitimate, weapon of organised labor*'. A curious situation has- developed 
with, regard to the law of picketing* - however, in that a number'of states 
have attempted 'to outlaw even peaceful, picketing in spite of'the fact 
that the Supreme Court ha© ©truck down such statute© a© a violation of 
conetitutionally protected freedom of speech*. the public welfare is-not 
* best' sewed when auch^tates so limit iheuse of the > of labor
185
that • its Imrg&ining power is drastically weakened. ■ .Apparently nothing 
can be done to- rectify'this situation-until the state courts review . 
cases arising out of violations of tjiese unconstitutional laws*
s i imsa&Uag.
State regulation of boycotting, which has been directed principally 
toward limiting or prohibiting the secondary boycott seems desirable, on 
the whole, frost the public standpoint* The element of coercion, which is 
almost always present in a secondary boycott, involves the rights of 
third parties which are interfered with even though they have no relation^  
ship to the dispute*, 'The fact that the secondary boycott -lias been con­
demned on a wide scale by the state governments as well'as'the federal.
’ ■ *
government is indicative of the-public attitude- toward this activity*
It may be- argued that labor should have the right to enlist the assist* 
ance of third parties to further its interests in a dispute with an 
employer* This assumption is valid insofar m  the enlistment of aid " 
is carried on in a .peaceful manner and the element of coercion and iniimi* 
dation is absent* the publication of unfair lists would not violate 
this principle* On the other hand, most secondary boycotts .Involve the 
refusal to work with non-union .made materials or the bringing of pressure 
to bear upon third, parties to refuse to handle the products of an employer* 
To be effective these activities must foe coercive* since this is true, 
the interests of the public are vitally affected* Hence, the state govern­
ments have strongly condemned the secondary boycott as -an. illegal, use' 
of collective union power* "•/■■■V
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aims- s&fHsg.
State regulation of the right. ..to- strike .in private. industries 
has generally taken the fom of prohlbiting oertain types of strikes. 
Jurisdictional and. sit-down strikes have been widely pm M hiM M  by the 
states* 'and. .such"action ‘cannot he criticised from the standpoint of 
the public interest*- With regard to the former type* however* it is 
doubtful that legislative prohibition can do much to- remove the cause 
of such strikes* fhe Michigan provision© with regard to jurisdictional 
strikes constitute a. more enlightened viewpoint* in that state juris** 
diction&l disputes must be submitted to iruediation* If mediation fails 
the dispute is. settled by secret ballot among the affected employees*
* A recent development .in strike regulation which Is desirable. 
requires, a majority vote among employees prior to the calling of a 
strike#, this not only protects the'public from ^ outlaw1 and w^ildcat1* 
strikes* but also enables the union in the-same maimer from the actions 
of a minority of Its‘members* the .individual worker-la also given a- 
cltemej^coice approval or disapproval of ©trike action* a. procedure 
which gives him a greater share of influence in shaping the policies-of 
the union*
State laws: which regulate the right to ©trike In essential public " 
utilities must be defended on the ground, of-public interest in continuous 
operation of these industries* It Is true* of course* thaithe process 
of free collective bargaining has been ^Interfered with and organised 
labor I© deprived of rights which are- considered to be -fundamental in

2 M
as an Inevitable and desirable outcome of the growingpower of labor# 
ihihlie control of' the: msml^ rirtitp policies -of. labor is
.also justified in light, of the quasi**public nature of the labor union*
As it has been indicated throughout this study* present state 
regulation of industrial relations deals largely with the activities 
and affairs of labor* the Importance of this legislation tea resulted 
in. a lack of emphasis upon the somewhat older and more established regula­
tion of employer prerogative* in. the industrial conflicts* The states* 
however*, have .not left the employer free to deal with enployees without 
restriction* The state anti-injunction laws- have* in most instances* 
successfully prevented .the use- of the injunction in legitimate labor 
disputes* and thus have 'limited the power of the employer to prevent the 
mm of the legal weapons of labor* KLaeklists and labor' spies have been 
condemned In many states* as has the use of the yellow dog contract* 
the state labor relations laws constitute the most extensive 
regulation of the employer*; In the states in which suchlawe have- been 
enacted*- the employer may not Interfere with or -aid a labor union* lie 
may not discharge an employee for union membership nor for filing charges 
under the provisions of the act* In short* the employer is prevented 
from controlling or Interfering with the established and guaranteed rights 
of his employees# from the standpoint of the public* this regulation is 
highly desirable*- It- net only increases the bargaining power of labor* 
but also -enables the worker to raise .his Standard of living* Encouragement
mof this type of legislation In. other states would tend to offset what** 
ever reduced labor bargaining power will reeolt from the' restriction© 
Which .have recently been placed upon -the activities of onions* A 
balance of bargaining power has been generally accepted as desirable f 
but this, balance Cannot be attained in those states which do not prevent 
the employer from interfering with the recognised rights of onions.
S m  .tMSSialfea a£ J M  state
m  chapter two it was indicated that a need for clarification of 
the -division of power over- industrial relations between the state and 
federal government exists* Present federal law with regard to this 
problem is ambiguous* As a result* the courts have been forced to place 
boundaries upon the limits of state and federal Jurisdiction based upon 
inadequate legislative guide posts* Bven the .national'labor delations 
Board is - uncertain as to the extent of its jurisdiction and the amount 
of power within Its legal'jurisdiction which it may delegate to the ' ’ 
states.
It in submitted that :ihe states should be allowed to exercise' 
power over industrial relations- where the dispute- in. -question does ‘not 
materially affect interstate commerce and where the controversy is 
primarily local In scope* 'If the present federal system of'government is 
to survive* the states .must be- -granted'-wider powers than'they have been 
allowed in the past* A trend is apparent, however, which would allow 
the states wider latitude in matters of’ industrial relations'"than they 
have possessed since the passage of the 'Magner Act* fh© Supreme Court Is
wo
&%m r more reluctant to .strike down state legislation which does not 
conflict radically-with -the federal law and which is not an arbitrary 
denial of; constitutionaX protections*.
The states 'have the potential ability, to foster industrial peacej 
this power should be' given encouragement t r m  Congress as well as from 
the Supreme Court* In a. sense# the states provide a valuable service in
1
that they serve m  the proving grounds for widely diversified industrial 
relations legislation* Upm these experiments in social control the 
federal government may base its actions* This fact# of course, embodies ' 
one of the strongest arguments against condemning any state action no 
matter how restrictive of the rights of employees or employers it may be* 
It is perhaps better that a law be proved inadequate and.- -unjust through 
trial on the state level of, government# than, that such esperb&entation 
be conducted oil the federal level where the. effects of regulation involve 
a 'much .greater sequent of industry and organized .labor*'- .
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